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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
This thesis is about how organizational characteristics and institutional factors shape the 
administrative preparation phase of the transposition of EU directives in the Netherlands. The 
rationale for this focus on the role of ministerial departments results from a prior analysis of 
Dutch transposition data, which showed that a disproportionately large share of all delays occur 
between the publication of a EU directive and an agreement on the national transposition 
measures within the Council of Ministers (Steunenberg & Van der Zee, 2013: 16). Much more 
than the chambers of parliament, ministerial departments seem to increase the probability of 
delayed transposition already early on in the process. Which is an interesting finding that leads 
back to the origins of the EU compliance literature that mostly looked at how bureaucratic 
structures and administrative cultures affect implementation processes (cf. Siedentopf & Ziller, 
1988). Although they never really disappeared, administrative explanations for delay seem to 
reclaim territory in more recent studies that look at administrative capacity, -experience and 
coordination structures as important factors of compliance (Haverland & Romeijn, 2007: 774; 
Steunenberg & Rhinard, 2010: 504; Zubek & Staronova, 2010).  
 
A 2008 report by the Dutch Court of Audit on the national implementation of European 
directives shows that on average between 50 and 60% of all directives were implemented late in 
the Netherlands over the last three decades.1 Which seems to indicate the severity and structural 
nature of this problem that apparently has not yet been confronted with a definitive solution. On 
the contrary, we should not forget that the Netherlands is a top ten performer within the EU in 
terms of transposition rates and compliance with EU legislation (European Commission, 2013).  
 
Moreover, transposition delays are rarely if ever followed by punitive measures of the 
Commission or the Court of Justice of the European Union (when it comes to Dutch non-
compliance), if only because of the expensive and time-consuming infringement procedures. 
Nevertheless, an official response to the Court of Audit report by the Dutch Government, 
voiced the unabated aim to prevent “every single delay”.2 Which is an implicit indication of the 
enduring existence of uncertainties during the transposition process that cannot be managed or 
mitigated properly.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31 498, no. 1-2, see also: Algemene Rekenkamer (2008). 2!Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31 498, no. 4. 
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This thesis has a twofold goal; in the first place it aims to shed a light on the organizational and 
institutional characteristics that shape transposition processes within ministerial departments, for 
the sake of conceptual refinement, and an exploration of possible “other factors” that have 
hitherto been underexposed. Secondly, it aims to identify which administrative characteristics 
contribute to the success and failure of timely, correct and complete transposition. The latter 
more practical goal is inspired through an internship at the Ministry of Security and Justice, which 
I simultaneously perform with and in extension to the writing of this thesis.  
 
This subject is thus relevant for both scientific as well practical purposes, since it aims to offer a 
refinement of existing “administrative explanations”, that are either too narrowly presented in 
large-n studies or much too detailed to be meaningful outside its immediate context (with in-
depth case studies). In search of a middle ground between specificity and generalizability I use an 
institutional-organizational framework to compare several administrative departments within the 
Dutch central government using the method of structured, focussed comparison (George & 
Bennett, 2005: 67-72). The institutional factors that will be identified through the application of 
this framework will be operationalized and tested in a binary logistic regression on a dataset 
containing recent (2008-2013) transposition data. 
 
In terms of the societal relevance; I have been asked to perform this research by the 
Governmental Platform on the Quality of the Legal Function 3 , which underlines the 
administrative need for further exploration of how administrative practices shape, accelerate and 
delay transposition processes. Furthermore as the frequency of official studies indicates (e.g. 
Steunenberg & Voermans, 2005; ARK, 2008; Janssen et al., 2010; Curtin et al., 2010; Deloitte, 
2013), the implementation of European law is persistently considered to be an important subject 
of study. The results of this project could then also potentially lead to the refinement of 
administrative practices and the facilitation of the exchange of knowledge between the 
implementers of EU directives. Moreover, it also aims to serve a broader societal goal by 
providing insights in the functioning of ministerial departments and the legislative process, which 
I think, is a blind spot in the general knowledge of the society at large. Unlike the popular saying 
attributed to Otto von Bismarck on laws and sausages4, this thesis actually does aim to expose the 
processes that lead to creation of laws and other legally binding measures. 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In Dutch: Kwaliteitsplatform Juridische Functie Rijk 
4 In which he refers to the: “.. two things that you rather don’t want to see being made” 
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1.1 Main research question 
Questions such as: why are certain departments structurally underperformers?; what are the 
differences between ministerial departments in terms of coordination structures?; and, how do 
they monitor progress and guard the process? Have fuelled my curiosity towards focusing my 
attention on the administrative preparation phase of transposition. More concrete, they have led 
me to formulating the following research question: 
 
How do organizational structures and institutional factors affect the administrative preparation phase of EU 
transposition within ministerial departments? 
 
In line with the arguments of König & Luetgert (2009), Steunenberg & Rhinard (2010) and 
Haverland et al. (2011), I also expect sector-specific differences in terms of transposition practices 
that lead to variance in terms of performance. But instead of focusing solely on the outcome 
(performance and delays) and idiosyncratic policy characteristics, I primarily look at the 
administrative styles of implementation that I assume to be shaped by the organizational 
characteristics and so-called structuring institutional elements peculiar to the ministries by which these 
policies are implemented. Similar to inter-state differences, I also expect transposition practices to 
differ between administrative departments given their varying degrees of experience with EU 
transposition, substantive frame of reference, relations to the societal actors and executive 
agencies, and their organizational cultures and resources. Of course, given the relatively short 
period of time provided for writing this thesis, doing justice to all these features equally well 
would be impossible. However, in collecting the data and writing the thesis I have tried to strike a 
balance between the very detailed descriptions of the process by some of the respondents I have 
interviewed and the relatively abstract (and frequently shallow) descriptions of these processes in 
the literature. 
 
1.2 Sub-questions 
In order to answer the main research question I have formulated a number of sub-questions that 
provide structure to the body of this thesis. Moreover, these questions will guide the process 
towards proper conceptualizations and demarcations, and they will help to direct the efforts 
towards finding a connection with existing literature, theoretical expectations and the 
observations in practice: 
 
i. How can we define transposition, implementation and compliance? 
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ii. What are the instruments used for transposing EU directives? 
iii. What does the national transposition process look like? 
iv. Which factors influence timely, correct and complete transposition? 
v. What are the differences between the ministerial departments in terms of transposition 
procedures? 
vi. What kinds of organizational structures and institutional factors affecting the process can 
we distinguish among ministerial departments? 
 
1.3 Research method in brief 
As the subtitle of thesis already suggests, the subject of research is studied from within. Which 
means that the administrative preparation phase of transposition processes is literally studied 
from within the ministerial departments. In a period of twelve weeks I have had the opportunity 
through an internship at the Ministry of Security and Justice, to question a number of officials on 
their role and experiences with the transposition of European directives. In this brief period of 
time at least one interview was held for each ministry responsible for the implementation of EU 
directives. In accordance to the method of structured, focused comparison I have composed a 
standardized list of questions (semi-structured interviews) that I have submitted to civil servants 
in every ministerial department who are active in the transposition of EU directives (George & 
Bennett, 2005: 67-72). These questions reflect on the theoretical groundings of institutional 
theories and ought to elicit information on the factors that lead to timely and successful 
compliance or the obstruction of that process. Moreover, the observations were compared to 
earlier findings, which are summarized in the literature review, which formed a frame of 
reference alongside the theoretical framework. After qualitatively identifying a range of different 
institutional factors of compliance and delay, the factors were operationalized and tested in 
quantitative model using binary logistic regression. 
 
1.4 Brief thesis outline 
In the following chapter an outline will be presented of the subject under study, what do we 
mean when talking about implementation, transposition and compliance? and how does that 
translate in the Dutch context? These delineations of the process under consideration help in 
focussing the research efforts and understanding the resultant observations. Chapter 3 contains a 
broad literature review that discusses the subsequent waves in the development of the field 
towards the current state-of-the-art. Moreover it has a special focus on administrative processes 
that are central to the research question. Interwoven in the these studies are various theoretical 
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strands that will be explicated in chapter 4, moreover in this chapter I will also develop an 
analytical framework that serves as the guideline for data collection, analysis and in forming a 
proper understanding of the results. In chapter 5, the research methodology and the 
operationalization of theoretical concepts will be discussed. More explicitly the specific questions 
(interview questions) that were used to collect the data can be found in the appendix. Chapter 6 
and 7 present the empirical results with respectively the different administrative procedures and 
practices of transposition and a comparison and analysis of the structuring elements conducive 
and detrimental to the process. As an initial attempt of testing these institutional elements they 
will be quantitatively operationalized and combined in a binary logistic regression. The thesis is 
concluded with a discussion of the results and an answer to the main research question. 
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Chapter 2.  Conceptualizations and demarcation 
 
The EU compliance literature investigates a range of concepts and processes and it is a field that 
is characterized by overlaps and divergence on various key elements. Where some researchers 
primarily focus on transposition of EU directives in the “narrow sense”, others include the stage 
of enforcement, or even the practical phase of implementation by executioners in the field. 
Furthermore, some researchers particularly pay attention to timeliness of transposition processes, 
while others focus on the completeness and correctness of implementation measures and actions. 
Within these categories, some look at the implementation process of directives and/or 
framework directives while others focus on the operationalization of regulations or on 
infringement procedures as a measure of compliance. These different options are reflected in 
research questions, matters of case selection and conceptualization, but might not always directly 
speak from the resultant conclusions that are drawn. These conceptualizations are useful 
demarcations and they are particularly important when it comes to the so-called “relevant 
universe” to which research findings can potentially be generalized (Hancké, 2010: 47). 
Furthermore they also contribute to the judgment on whether the results can “travel” across time 
and context (Thies, 2002: 364).  
 
An illustrative example can be drawn from Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2013) in their study of 
the ‘implementation of European movable cultural heritage policy in Bulgaria’. They investigate 
the implementation of a European directive both in terms of the formal transposition (legal 
implementation), as well as its implementation and enforcement in practice. They demonstrate 
that even though officials at the national administration argue convincingly that they have fully 
implemented the directive, and that they have enabled systems to enforce the policy in practice, a 
first-hand confrontation with the workings of the policy shows otherwise. The officials entrusted 
with the execution of the policy in question were (as it turned out) still abiding the 
(institutionalized) older practices, in contrast to what was argued/believed by officials at the level 
of the national administration. Such a discrepancy between two phases or levels of the 
implementation process illustrates how important it sometimes can be to grasp beyond the 
official statistics and look at how policies work out in practice. That does not mean, however, 
that these results are necessarily typical for other implementation processes in Bulgaria, neither 
might they resemble the situation in other CEE member states, let alone the EU-15.  
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Gaining an understanding of the various layers that exist within this line of research is important 
to place research findings in perspective and get a clear picture of the demarcation that is made in 
the following chapters. Notwithstanding the broad approach taken in this thesis, this chapter has 
the goal to create some order and clarity along the naturally formed break lines that structure and 
subdivide this field of study in a patchwork of interrelated subjects.   
 
Below we will first look at the differences between transposition, enforcement and practical 
application in society; secondly we will address the criteria for compliance and non-compliance 
with EU legislation. Lastly, we will focus more thoroughly on implementation processes of 
European legislation in the Dutch context. Which includes a short description of the process, an 
overview of the responsible governmental bodies, and the various instruments used for 
transposing a directive.  
 
2.1 Implementation 
In the broadest sense, implementation is defined as a process in which to “carry out, accomplish, 
fulfill, produce [and] complete” (Hill & Hupe, 2002: 3). This definition contains clues of a 
predetermined direction and a specified end goal; moreover it implies the use of certain means in 
order to reach that goal (i.e. production goods). A bit more specific but still rather broad, the 
Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy (2004) defines “implementation” as: 
“… the process of putting into practice the decision to act on a particular preferred policy 
option, and it is considered the sharp end of policy because it involves coordinating the 
resources (budgetary and human) associated with that practical process into an action 
plan” (Schultz, 2004: 224). 
This notion of implementation already narrows down to the execution of a “preferred policy 
option” and more explicitly includes the requirement of the reallocation of certain resources 
associated with the implementation process. It is considered to be the “sharp end” of policy 
because this phase of the policy cycle involves the translation of “policies into action”, which is a 
process that is potentially fraught with challenges, difficulties and discrepancies between political 
plans and administrative realities (Barrett, 2004: 255). Although most of these aspects are in 
someway represented in EU implementation processes – e.g. carrying out, resources, political 
plans, administrative realities - we have to relate it to “European” legislation in order to specify 
more clearly what is exactly implemented and what we mean when we talk about such policies.   
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2.1.1 Implementation of European policies 
European Union policies are the product of collective decision making at the supranational level, 
which is a process that is embodied in the interplay between EU institutions such as the 
European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. In various degrees 
the member states are represented in these bodies, shifting between general and particular 
interests, which makes for a dynamic whole. In the background many processes precede the 
actual political decision-making, such as formal consultations by the Commission, the extensive 
preparation of national positions and the administrative preparations that feed this process.5 The 
eventual products (legally binding decisions) that result from it, frequently need to be transposed 
into the national legal system in order to make a connection with existing policies and 
institutional legacies, and before they can be effectuated.  
 
In the policy making process, the European Commission is generally considered to be the driving 
force of European integration, however, it lacks the resources to implement and enforce these 
policies in the member states itself. Therefore, this responsibility primarily befalls the member 
states and more specifically the timely and complete implementation becomes the responsibility 
of the national administration.6 The three binding sources of European legislation are: (1) 
decisions, (2) regulations and (3) directives; according to article 288 of Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) these legally binding agreements are respectively characterized 
by the following features:  
 
1. “A decision shall be binding in its entirety, a decision which specifies those to whom it is 
addressed shall be binding only to them”. 
2. “A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States”. 
3. “A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods”. 
 
Decisions are often very specific and deal for instance with the obstruction of a merger between 
two already very large and influential multinationals in line with the agreements made on anti-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For an extensive overview of the European institutions and the policy making procedures see for example 
Lelieveldt & Princen (2011) and Borragan & Cini (2013). 
6  According to Article 4 (3) of Treaty of the European Union (TEU), member states “shall take any appropriate 
measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the 
acts of the institutions of the Union”. 
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trust law. The primary difference between directives and regulations is that the former only 
specify certain end goals which member states have to pursue (through the implementation of 
the provisions of the directive into their national legal order), while regulations explicitly prohibit 
implementation, and are directly binding (European Commission, 2012). Directives are normally 
more labor and resource intensive for national governments to effectuate and frequently allow 
more leeway in terms of specific policy options. Especially in areas in which there is no complete 
harmonization, shifts in policy across the EU is quite common. Directives are especially common 
in the area of the single market, however, with the successive treaty changes and expansion of 
EU’s competences, this instrument is nowadays frequently used in almost all policy areas. 
Regulations on the other hand are very similar to the idea of a law, but they are enacted at the 
European instead of the national level. As said, they are not meant to be implemented, however 
in some cases regulations require a national legal basis in order for the member state to execute 
and enforce them (e.g. the installment of an inspection service, systems of permit or sanctioning 
mechanisms). Moreover, in some cases existing national legislations, which are in conflict with 
the European regulation, need to be amended or repealed.7 Overall, a trend is emerging towards 
relatively more regulations and less directives (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2009: 72). 
In this thesis we only look at the implementation of European directives, which is a quite 
delineated process that offers various advantages from a research perspective. In the first place, 
compliance rates on European directives are widely available, both nationally (i-Timer) and 
internationally (internal market scoreboard), which offer a picture on how member states 
perform in an international perspective. Furthermore, given that directives are policies parcelled 
in small and comprehensive packages, with a given period of time and a number of specific 
provisions that member states need to take into account, they are very suitable for across case 
comparisons. That is, the relatively structured trajectories are convenient to get a notion of which 
wheel “squeaks” and what part of the process functions fine. Especially given the varying degrees 
of leeway offered in these directives, their impact on the national polity and the large number of 
policy fields they cover, they really touch on most aspects of administrative behaviour. 
 
2.1.2  Transposition, enforcement and (practical) application 
Above, I have primarily spoken about the implementation of European directives and policies, 
without clearly conceptualizing this term. Figure 2.1 below provides a more detailed picture of all 
aspects related to the study of EU compliance processes, including the implementation of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31 498 no. 1-2. 
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directives. It subdivides the process according to the role of the EU institutions and the role of 
the national member states, including all related entities within their confines.  
 
After a directive is published in the Official Journal of European Union (OJEU or in short OJ), 
the national implementation phase starts. Implementation is a two-stage process, which includes 
the transposition of legal measures into the national legal framework and also contains the 
creation of enforcement mechanisms. Important to note is that the transposition phase consists 
of an interplay between the core administration, ministerial departments, the political institutions 
and various stakeholders in the field (depending on the policy at hand). The enforcement stage 
includes all activities that are undertaken to ensure abidance of the transposed legislation in 
practice, which is a responsibility mostly taken by the member states through the installment of 
various inspection- and enforcement agencies and the court of law. At the end of the chain we 
find the actual decentralized application of the policy in practice, which is realized by various 
organizations in the field (again depending on the policy at hand).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following chapters we will primarily focus on the transposition process within ministerial 
departments. Which at first sight might seem to cover only a fraction of the subject, because it 
Figure 2.1 Illustration of the processes under study in EU compliance literature: “Directives in the 
multi-level system”; Source: adapted from Falkner et al., 2005: 6!
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excludes everything that follows after a decision on a draft legal measure has been reached in the 
council of ministers. Quite contrary, however, recent analyses of transposition data in the 
Netherlands have shown that the bulk of delays can be found in the administrative preparation 
phase (Steunenberg & Van der Zee, 2013). Hence a focus on transposition of directives and the 
ministerial contributions to that process is a subject that demands further exploration. The 
intermediate steps in this process will be further specified below, it should be clear however that 
the aim is to investigate administrative behaviour shaping and affecting the transposition of EU 
directives.  
 
2.2 Compliance and non-compliance 
The concept “compliance” can be understood in relation to regulative mechanisms such as 
norms, rules and agreements to which individuals, organizations or (member) states are able to 
abide. In a European perspective, the regulative measures described above (e.g. directives and 
regulations), along with various more “soft” instruments, embody these kinds of agreements. To 
be in a state of compliance in this context can, in accordance with Article 4 (3) TEU, be defined 
as “the fulfilment of obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union”. More specifically, compliance contains various aspects of the 
processes described above, as such that it “(…) goes beyond implementation … [and] refers to 
whether countries in fact adhere to the provisions of the accord and to the implementing 
measures that they have instituted” (Jacobson & Brown-Weiss 1995: 123). 
This definition thus exceeds the idea of transposition and the installment of enforcement 
mechanisms, and extents towards the actual application in practice. As outlined above, formal 
transposition of European directives (i.e. the primary focus of this thesis) is “merely” the transfer 
of supranational norms into domestic legislation; however, it does constitute the first and 
foremost locus of attention when it comes to the Commission’s scrutiny on compliance with EU 
legislation. Furthermore, since this process has been sharpened after the ratification of the 
Lisbon treaty, it is a crucial step for member states to avoid infringement procedures. 
Such infringement procedures now only contain a few stages and the criteria to start and proceed 
with infringement procedures (as a result of non-compliance) are respectively: (1) timeliness (2) 
completeness, and/or the (3) correct integration of the legislation into the existing regulative 
context (Knill, 2001: 342).  As mentioned above, member states only have a given period of time 
before their national legislation needs to be in accordance with the principles laid out in the 
European directive. As soon as the member state fails to meet that deadline, an automatic “letter 
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of formal notice” is sent to the member state, which contains an obligation for the receiver to 
communicate its observations on why it (up till then) fails to meet the agreement. If the member 
state does not reply, or the Commission deems its answer unsatisfactory, it can directly refer the 
matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union on the basis of article 258 TFEU. The 
shortening of this process8 also brings along the possibility for the Commission to suggest to the 
Court a lump sum or penalty payment (art. 260 (2) TFEU), already to include in its first judgment 
(when substantive and/or procedural compliance is still to be judged in pursuant of article 258 
TFEU).9  
To reiterate, when talking about compliance in the narrow sense, I primarily refer to the 
transposition of European directives in a complete, correct and timely manner. We will now turn 
to the transposition process in the Netherlands, in order to get a grasp of the stages in this 
process and the part of it that will be studied in the following chapters. 
2.3 Transposition of European directives in the Netherlands 
Preparations for transposition processes in the Netherlands frequently already start before the 
actual European directive has even been published. When the Dutch Working Group for the 
Assessment of New Commission Proposals (BNC10) receives a new European Commission 
proposal, it first determines which ministerial department is responsible, based on the area of 
competence. The BNC is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and meets weekly11, this 
organ is basically the Dutch “inside defender” in the multi-level game of European Union policy 
making. The responsible ministry is subsequently asked to prepare the Dutch position on the 
issue in question, provide an analysis of the consequences of this policy for the Netherlands 
(BNC-fiche), and eventually transpose the directive (alone or in cooperation with other 
ministries). Included in this responsibility is the obligation to present an implementation plan 
within two months after the Council has adopted a common position at first reading during an 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’ 12 , or when the directive is published in the OJ 13 . The 
implementation plan is most frequently composed by the (central) legal department within the 
ministry, given that it does not only contain the planning of the transposition process, but also a 
legal specification of the instruments used for the transposition of each provision in the directive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 i.e. the infringement procedure used to include a pre-litigation stage in which a letter with a so-called “reasoned 
opinion” was included, before the matter was referred to court.  
9 Communication from the Commission, SEC (2010) 1371: Implementation of Article 260(3) of the Treaty. 
10 In Dutch: Werkgroep Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen (BNC). 
11 BNC: ‘Leidraad BNC’, March 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.!
12 In accordance with article 294 (5) TFEU. 
13 This requirement stems from instruction 343 from the Instructions for Legislation (in Dutch ‘Aanwijzingen voor de 
Regelgeving’ (2013). 
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(a so-called “correlation table”). Moreover, it also includes information on whether the directive 
allows any scope for substantive (policy) choices. 
 
As figure 2.2 displays below, the implementation plan is presented to the ICER-I, which is one of 
the three working groups within the Interdepartmental Committee on European Law (ICER) 
specialized in the interdepartmental coordination of the implementation process. The ICER-N 
and ICER-H (not included in the figure) are respectively installed to deal with matters of 
Notification and Court of Justice Cases (Steunenberg & Voermans, 2006: 27). The ICER itself, is 
the transcending body that is fed information provided by these three working groups, is chaired 
jointly by both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Security and Justice and meets 
on a very infrequent basis. 
 
The next step is for the responsible ministry to plug in the legal instrument(s) it plans to use for 
transposition of the directive in the ‘i-Timer’. Since November 2007, the i-Timer - ‘early warning 
system’ in the Netherlands - registers the progress of the national trajectory of transposition 
processes by including information on which instruments are being used (per directive), and at 
which stage of the process these instruments find themselves at a certain point in time.14 It is a 
database from which quarterly bulletins are extracted and presented to parliament, which offers 
an instant overview on the progress and delays and strengthens the parliament in scrutinizing the 
work of the government. It is an instrument that has become more important over the years, 
given that it is intertwined in the legislative procedure and constantly updated by the responsible 
ministries. In a way the i-Timer strikes a resemblance to the idea of ‘fire alarm’ controls, yet it has 
not (yet) been fully utilized for that purpose (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). 
 
The rest of the transposition process is very similar to the normal national legislative procedure 
and will be discussed more extensively below when we address the intermediate steps for each 
instrument. Given the special nature of European directives (i.e. they include a time clause for 
national implementation and frequently only offer limited space for adjustments and 
interpretation as soon as they have been published), two important exceptions to the normal 
legislative procedure are made in order to shorten the transposition processes. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 This early warning system carries the official name “i-Timer” in the Netherlands and is a registration system that is 
managed and published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before November 2007 it was not yet managed and 
updated digitally and decentralized, and carried the informal name “egg timer”. 
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In the first place, the Instructions for Legislation: instruction 342 (1), recommends that consultation 
of advisory bodies and deliberations with stakeholders already ought to take place before the 
Figure 2.2 Diagram of the national transposition phase of European directives;  
Source: Author. 
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publication of the directive (i.e. during negotiations at EU level). Moreover, instruction 342 (2) 
further refines that statement by explicating that draft-measures are in principle never pre-
published or discussed with advisory bodies and stakeholders during the transposition phase. As 
figure 2.2 also displays that –with the use of a dotted line around: “consultations and 
(administrative) reviews"— this step is only occasionally filled in, primarily when dealing with 
directives that allow scope for substantive policy choices to be made to the member state and 
when the execution is expected to be complicated. The only official advisory body on legislation 
that formally needs to be requested for advice is the Council of State, which assesses the legal 
quality and content of the proposed national measure.  
 
A second difference to the normal departmental procedure for the preparation of legal measures 
is that, rather than that the draft-measure needs to be moved upwards to the Council of Minsters 
through the administrative preparatory committees and subcommittees of the Council, it can in 
principle directly be scheduled in a Council meeting.15 This saves valuable time and is justified by 
the fact that in most cases, no real substantive decisions can be made anymore during the 
transposition phase (i.e. only the transposition measure(s) need(s) approval). Exceptions to this 
rule can be detected in practice, however, these will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
empirical chapters. 
 
These two adjustments to the national legislative procedure have arisen in yet another episode of 
the discussion surrounding the “faster transposition processes” that has been going on since the 
1990s (Steunenberg & Voermans, 2006: 21). In 2004, when the Netherlands held the EU 
presidency, these were two of the more formal measures that were deployed to shorten the 
transposition process16, but still kept the procedure within constitutional boundaries. That is, 
since the Netherlands ascribes to the “Primacy of the legislature” – “any important subject matter 
must be dealt with by the Crown and Parliament acting together and cannot be delegated” – this 
often means that changes to statutes need to be made that cannot be dealt with in faster and 
more simple procedures (Bekkers et al., 1995: 404-405). Therefore, most measures that have been 
taken in order to ensure faster transposition can be found in more informal agreements (e.g. 
priority of EU matters over national matters in the administrative preparation phase). These 
agreements and practices will be discussed in the empirical chapters, given that the way they are 
perceived and enacted differs quite extensively per department. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15!This exemption can be found in Parliamentary Paper II 2004/05, 21 109 no. 144 and the “Instruction Legislation 
and Europe” (in Dutch: “Handleiding Wetgeving en Europa”). 
16 Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31498, no. 1-2; Appendix 4.  
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2.3.1 Instruments and stages in the process 
The three primary legislative instruments (in hierarchical order) that are employed in order to 
transpose European directives in the Netherlands are: (1) statutes (2) governmental decrees, and (3) 
ministerial orders. These instruments are adopted along different trajectories, of which statutes take 
the most time, followed by governmental decrees and the adoption of ministerial orders is 
normally least time-consuming. Of course, ministries (as the initiators of transposition processes) 
are bounded to a constitutional framework, which directs them to select a certain instrument for 
particular legal amendments. Within that framework, the instrument is enacted that can properly 
accommodate policies proposed in the European directive, given that the legal basis is sufficiently 
provided to do so. E.g. sometimes amendments to statutes have to be made in accordance with 
the formal legislative procedure, before a governmental decree can be adopted (i.e. “the Primacy 
of the legislature”). Hence, legislators are not at liberty to freely select whichever instrument they 
prefer and the sometimes-limited amount of time available makes these procedures problematic. 
 
As described above, the i-Timer registers the progress of the national trajectory of transposition 
processes. In order to provide a meaningful picture of how far the transposition has progressed, 
it projects time periods for each intermediate step in the process. In that way, when transposition 
progress is not in accordance with the “nominal” schedule, delays in the process can be detected 
in an early stage. As became clear during one of the interviews held for this thesis, the calculation 
method of these nominal time trajectories originally stems from the former Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment and is based on extensive experience with the 
implementation of these legal measures. The calculation starts at the deadline that is set by the 
European Commission, (i.e. when the directive needs to be fully transposed) and from that point 
subtracts a number months or weeks for each phase (see figure 2.3 below). Overall this diagram 
provides an impression of the average duration of each stage of the process, and what strikes the 
eye is that the “administrative phase” does not have a nominal trajectory and the time available 
for this step differs per directive and instruments used. Which is interesting because these time 
periods do not have an absolute meaning, but they might affect the duration of transposition 
processes simply by the psychological value attached to a given deadline. 
 
When it comes to the enactment of statutes meant for transposition, the government itself always 
prepares the proposals within the ministerial department. This so-called administrative 
preparation phase includes the drafting of the legislative bill, which sometimes requires input 
from stakeholders in the policy field, and various checks on quality and content before a final 
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decision within the Council of Ministers can be reached (either by checks within the ministry or 
by one of the central legal assessors at the Ministry of Security and Jusitice). As figure 2.3 
displays, an agreement in the Council nominally needs to be reached within 14,5 months prior to 
the notification deadline. In a period of two weeks, the bill has to be sent to the King’s 
secretariat, that in turn formally requests the Council of State for an advice on the legal 
correctness and quality of the proposal. The Council of State as an advisory body provides its 
report (rapport) on the bill to the minister, who in turn, responds to the comments made in a 
“more detailed report” (i.e. nader rapport) before the proposed bill (along with the two reports) is 
presented to parliament. The Second Chamber of parliament has six months to discuss the 
proposal, while the First Chamber of parliament only has three months to reach an agreement 
before the final bill can be published in the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees (Staatsblad) and enter 
into force. 
Governmental decrees are delegated legislative acts that only need to pass the first three stages of the 
formal legislative procedure before they can be enacted. Apart from the fact that decrees are not 
discussed in parliament, after the report by the Council of State has been published, it either 
returns to the department when adjustments need to be made, or it is conclusively decided upon 
in the Council of Ministers. As such, it is hard to define what exactly happens in the final stage, 
Figure 2.3 Projected time periods per legal instrument;  
Source: Author 
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because it strongly depends on the prior stages. The enactment of the decree is formally 
confirmed when it is also published in the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees. 
 
Ministerial decrees are sub delegated acts and are often used as a rapid instrument for small changes 
in the details of existing legislation. These decrees are prepared at the ministerial department and 
can at the approval of the minister be published in the Bulletin (Staatscourant). Large variations 
can be detected in the nominal and actual length of this process, due to interplay between 
European requirements (transposition time and content of the directive) and the existing national 
constellation (legal/policy fit). 
 
To reiterate, all directives that require transposition in the Dutch context make use of one or 
more of these instruments. Moreover throughout this thesis we will focus on the administrative 
preparation phase of EU transposition. Which is the formal phase of the translation of policies 
prescribed in EU directives that are translated in national legal measures. As will become clear in 
the empirical part of this thesis, the kinds of instruments used for transposition strongly 
determine the course of processes that constitute transposition, which is why I tried to explicate 
the trajectories of these instruments. The next chapter, takes us a step back and looks at how 
transposition and implementation processes are studied in the literature, moreover it addresses 
some of the most important trends in providing explanations for delays and other forms of non-
compliance. 
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Chapter 3. Literature review 
 
The study of EU compliance processes can be considered a multi-faceted phenomenon that has 
interfaces with various larger areas of study. Nowadays it is often taken to be a sub-field of the 
discipline of European integration, however, one could easily position it as a branch of public 
policy and implementation studies, international relations or legal studies (Mastenbroek, 2005: 
1104). While at first it sight it might seem to square with only a rather narrow part of science, 
quite contrarily, this body of literature spans across a large area of subjects and offers a wide 
range of empirical and theoretical insights. The next chapter is devoted to the more theoretical 
strands, that will also serve to guide the analysis, while this chapter primarily focuses on the 
developments and main findings in the literature that have moulded the field into a popular area 
of study. For the moment, the distinction that is made above (see chapter two) between 
transposition, implementation and compliance is transcended because (especially in the first two 
waves of EU compliance research) the distinction between these three phases is rarely made. 
Moreover, attention is primarily devoted to studies that are related to the administrative phase of 
implementation, i.e. transposition within and by ministerial departments and only scant attention 
is paid to institutional actors such as the parliament, interest groups and enforcement agencies.  
 
The study of EU (and previously EG) implementation processes seems that have matured over a 
period of roughly twenty-five years. Treib (2008) and Falkner et al. (2005: 14-17) argue that, in 
similar vein as public policy implementation theory, it has already undergone three subsequent 
waves of EU implementation scholarship (Hill & Hupe, 2002). Every wave can be recognized by 
its own data sources, sets of explanatory variables, methods of analysis and challenges when it 
comes to operationalization and measurement (Hartlapp & Falkner, 2009). Although these waves 
have brought valuable insights in factors influencing processes of transposition and 
implementation, absolute consensus about them is not (yet) on the horizon. Not only because 
findings are not unequivocal across studies, but also because some studies (implicitly) focus on 
narrow formal transposition, others both on delays and the quality of transposition, while a third 
group is more interested in practical implementation and enforcement in the field (Toshkov et al., 
2010 Toshkov, 2011). Nonetheless, they all accrue to the broader search for factors that affect 
timely and/or correct compliance and therefore show considerable overlap. 
 
In the literature review below, attention is paid to the broad set of developments that have 
shaped the field of EU compliance into its current state. More specifically it starts with describing 
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the foundations that have been laid by the comparative case studies of Siedentopf & Ziller 
(1988), Pappas (1995) and others who provided in-depth case studies on the subject. At the 
onset, these studies provided a variety of (often ideographic) explanations for the differences in 
implementation practices by drawing eclectically from other fields (Mastenbroek, 2005: 1104). 
Secondly, the “misfit” hypothesis will be discussed. Which contains a number of variants on the 
degree to which the member state is adapted to the European context in terms of policies and 
institutional structure (Toshkov, 2011: 10). Thirdly, we will look at how domestic politics is 
introduced as a factor potentially affecting European implementation, and the state-of-the-art 
developments to which this thesis tries to make a connection.  
 
3.1 Mixed foundations 
An important impetus for the rise of EU compliance studies can be found in the large-scale 
comparative case study performed by Siedentopf and Ziller (1988). They provided a structured 
comparison of the implementation of seventeen European directives in twelve member states by 
primarily focussing on bureaucratic structures and cultures. For that purpose they used a 
framework that looks at the politico-administrative characteristics of the member states, the 
structure and process that constitute the implementation of European directives and the factors 
that potentially frustrate or speed up this process. Within the confines of these aspects, 
contributing authors were left with a margin of discretion – which the Dutch authors have used 
to focus more thoroughly on administrative culture (Kooiman et al., 1988: 573).  
 
Similar to the seminal work on ‘implementation’ by Pressman & Wildavsky (1973), Ziller & 
Siedentopf offer a glance on the administrative and practical implementation phase that follows 
after political decision-making. Analogous to that study in the US federal context, it exemplifies 
the ‘multi-layer’ character of top-down policy implementation. An implicit assumption of these 
‘multi-layer’ studies17 is that the more layers or “clearance points” between policy formulation 
and the actual implementation in practice, the more vulnerable it purportedly is to run into an 
‘implementation deficit’ (Hill & Hupe, 2003: 472; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). Kooiman et al. 
for the Netherlands concluded that delays during the implementation of directives were mostly 
related to: (1) coordination between more than one ministry (when dealing with directives that 
transcend departmental borders), (2) the complexity of inter organizational networks and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 In the European integration literature, this concept would later been rephrased into the idea of ‘multi-level 
governance’ (Peters & Pierre, 2001: 137). Where it refers to the existence of relationships between institutions on 
multiple institutional levels, but also to a variety of governance processes that exist on these different levels. 
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potential faulty exclusion of important actors at the preparation phase, and (3) cultural 
differences between the arenas of preparation and implementation (1988: 601-602).  
 
From an administrative point of view, other first wave EU compliance studies corroborate and 
extend most of these findings. Ciavarini Azzi for example highlights the way governments are 
organized18 (especially in terms of coordination structures) and whether or not they have a 
“centralized system", as important domestic factors for “success or failure” (2000: 56-58). In line 
with that conclusion, Bekkers et al. (1995) argue that the coordination structures in the 
Netherlands are an impediment for fast transposition. They describe it as a dispersed system, in 
which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs monitors progress of all directives, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs primarily coordinates internal market directives, and (due to increasing 
emphasis on the quality of legislation) the Ministry of Justice also increasingly gains coordinative 
power (ibid.: 425). On top of that, some implementation difficulties result from a lack of 
administrative capacity, -expertise and interpretation problems that accrue from vague and 
ambiguous language used in European directives19 (ibid.: 425-426). 
 
Other factors, such as the involvement of interest groups during the transposition phase can also 
complicate and lengthen the process (Ciavarini Azzi, 2000: 59). That is, especially in the more 
corporatist member states, powerful labour unions are able to block or delay the implementation 
of certain directives (Lampinen & Uusikylä, 1998: 249). Another frequently mentioned factor of 
delay is the duration of the formal legislative procedure, which is not attuned to the relatively 
short implementation period provided by the Commission that does not offer room for extensive 
impact assessments and consultations, nor lengthy political debates (Bekkers et al., 1995: 37). 
When taking these factors into consideration, it is deemed important to have a “stable political 
culture” and an “efficient and flexible politico-administrative design” (Lampinen & Uusikylä, 
1998: 248-249).  
 
From a legal perspective, the argument has been brought forward that some problems during the 
implementation phase arise out of the “highly detailed and complex nature of certain directives” 
and/or the magnitude of the steps that need to be taken (e.g. the “construction of a water 
treatment plant”) in order to comply with them (Ciavarini Azzi, 2000: 56-57). Furthermore, there !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Ciavarini Azzi alludes to the ideographic nature of these structure as he explicitly mentions that: “there is no 
miracle solution”, but the most effective structure is contingent on various other (unknown) characteristics (2000: 
58). 
19 Which is especially the case for blurry political compromises that need to satisfy a large number of actors or when 
the directive contains terminology that does not find its resemblance with that of the national legal system. 
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are various techniques that can be used by officials who draft the legislation when transposing 
European directives (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001: 449). Implementers sometimes choose to literally 
copy the text of the directive into national legislation, which is called the ‘copy-out’ technique 
(Ramsey, 1996: 218). By doing so, however, he potentially passes on difficulties and impediments 
for proper compliance to the street-level bureaucrat (eventually frustrating the process at a later 
stage). Alternatively, he could choose to interpret the text of the directive and translate it in such 
a manner that it fits the national legal context, but still being at the risk of over- or under 
implementation (ibid.: 222). Lastly, instead of copying or interpreting the text of the directive, one 
could deliberately add certain content to the European text when transposing the directive. This 
phenomenon is called ‘gold plating’ and occurs when officials in the member state add extra 
requirements during the national phase of transposition, on top of the text in the directive. In 
principle this is not allowed, but could happen out of political considerations or expedient 
behaviour of the official entrusted with the implementation of the directive. That is, a directive 
can be used as a vehicle for silently pushing through painful or unpopular measures. Although, it 
should be emphasized that this is strongly discouraged by both the Instructions for Legislation20 as 
well as the parliament21. 
 
In line with the idea of expedient behaviour (i.e. utility-maximizing behaviour), is the conception 
of implementation as ‘post-decisional politics’ (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001). Some authors see the 
transposition phase not in a technical or mechanistic manner, but as a process fraught with 
bargaining, positioning, pulling and hauling (Bardach, 1977: 85). Making it simply an extension or 
a spill-over of the political process into the implementation phase. Post-decisional politics 
manifests itself for example in whether or not the member state decides to hold consultations 
with the Commission, what kind of national legal instruments it employs, and whether the 
minister in question takes a supportive stance or not (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001: 449-451). Of 
course, most of these processes are implicit and hard to detect as a researcher, but are 
nonetheless useful as a departure from the relatively benign view that implementation is solely 
technical. Later on, scholars such as Demmke (2001), Falkner et al. (2004) and Perkins & 
Neumayer (2007) would further empirically verify these hypotheses with diverging outcomes. 
 
Clearly the first wave of EU compliance studies is very diverse by bringing in a variety of 
explanatory factors and covers aspects of formal transposition, application in practice as well as 
enforcement. However, it does not yet draw the stylistic distinctions that structure the process in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 See Instruction 331. 
21 Cf. “Motie Jurgens”; Parliamentary Papers I 2005/06, 21109, A.!
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these subsequent steps (see chapter 2.). We will now turn to the “misfit” hypothesis that 
permanently marked the field by offering a range of quite commonsensical explanations for why 
delays might occur more frequently in one context rather than another. 
 
3.2 The ‘goodness-of-fit’  
Underlying the second wave of EU compliance studies is the fairly straightforward logic of 
adaptedness brought forward by the “misfit” hypothesis. To put it briefly: it assumes that 
successful compliance depends on the degree of “fit” between the existing situation in the 
member state and the proposed European alternative. The more these two are in line with each 
other, the less difficulty will be met in reaching compliance by the member state. One of the 
strengths of this argument is that it has a kind of intuitive plausibility in the abstract sense, which 
resembles that of the idea of “path dependency”, which assumes that “prior institutional choices 
limit available future options” (Krasner, 1988: 71). The high level of face validity does, however, 
not mean that the workings of this mechanism in practice have also been confirmed. As a matter 
of fact, the hypothesis only finds mixed support in the literature according to Toshkov (2011) 
and the relationship is more robust according to a more recent meta-data study (Angelova et al., 
2012).  
 
The idea of “misfit” (Duina, 1999) or “mismatch” (Héritier et al., 1996) between European and 
national policies, process and institutions originally comes from an interest in the “top-down” 
impact of European integration on its member states (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 58-62). The primary 
questions in this line of research are: how and under which conditions do member states change 
and do they tend to converge / harmonize, or react differentiated to Europeanization (Börzel, 
1999). The drivers of change are assumed to be primarily (1) the incompatibility or “misfit” 
between the characteristics of the European and the national level that lead to so-called 
“adaptational pressures” and (2) other factors (actors or institutions) that respond to these 
adaptational pressures by either facilitating, condoning or frustrating change (Börzel & Risse, 
2003: 58-59). Héritier & Knill (2001) for example argue that in cases of considerable “misfit”, 
veto players might be able to counter existing resistance for EU policies. As such, these forces 
can be approached from rational institutionalist as well as a sociological angle by respectively 
looking at political opportunity structure and the norms and collective understandings that are 
affected by and produce adaptational pressures as a result of “misfits” (March & Olsen, 1989). 
 
The degree “misfit” of a member state with European policies, process and institutions can be 
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operationalized and measured in different ways. Some authors primarily define it as the ‘match’ 
between the proposed European policy and the existing policies at the national level (Knill & 
Lenschow, 1998: 596). While others focus much more on the institutional aspects in terms of the 
regulatory style and structure of the governing system in a particular policy sector, and how the 
EU policy will affect them (Mastenbroek, 2005: 1109). These concepts of course do not exclude 
each other and can be cross-classified to match particular situations. 
 
Although it does not show an unambiguous confirmation of the misfit hypothesis, the article by 
Knill & Lenschow (1998) provides an illustrative example of how to look at institutional fit by 
focusing on how “national administrative arrangements affect implementation performance”.  
This paper looks at the implementation of EU environment policy (3 directives, 1 regulation) in 
Brittain and Germany and addresses institutional characteristics by operationalizing 
administrative arrangements in two separate categories: (1) regulatory style and (2) regulatory 
structures (ibid.: 596). Regulatory style is assessed on the basis of two dimensions, these are the 
“mode of state intervention” (self-regulatory vs. command-and-control) and “administrative 
interest intermediation” (in terms of discretion and flexibility). In turn, regulatory structure is 
defined in terms of the degree of “vertical” (centralization/decentralization) and “horizontal” 
(centration/fragmentation) distribution of administrative competencies (ibid.: 597). Combined, 
these elements can however only provide an explanation for the success or failure of 
implementation in less than half of the eight cases under consideration in this paper.  
 
An empirical example of how policy misfit is measured, is provided by Börzel (2000), who in her 
article tries to refute the argument that the southern member states are “laggards” as a result of 
their political and administrative structures (‘systemic reasons’). Instead she argues that non-
compliance with environmental policy is a result of the interplay between European and national 
policies and also depends on the success or failure to mobilize domestic actors during the process 
of implementation (ibid.: 142). These forces are the so-called push and pull factors that exert 
pressure from outside and within the member state to change the existing policy constellation. 
Outside pressures come from (substantial) “policy misfit” and through the mobilization of 
political parties, environmental organizations and interest groups pressure can also be exerted to 
comply from within (ibid.: 146-149). These hypotheses are tested on five environmental directives 
for which the Spanish and German situations are qualitatively assessed and compared for internal 
(domestic mobilization) and external pressures (policy misfit). The results of these analyses are in 
line with the expectations, which means the alternative explanation ((non)compliance results out 
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of policy misfit and domestic mobilization) can be confirmed.22 
 
As already mentioned above, the results of studies performed in the tradition of the “goodness of 
fit” have been diverse and in some cases their explanatory power is even dismissed completely 
(Mastenbroek & Van Keulen, 2005). One of the inherent characteristics of “goodness of fit” 
studies is that they assume a general propensity of member states’ willingness to preserve the 
national status quo (either in terms of institutional or policy constellations) (Treib, 2008: 8). 
Because of that underlying assumption, attention is directed away from actor-based explanations, 
such as for example presented by veto player theories (Tsebelis, 1995; Haverland, 2000). The 
third wave of EU compliance studies, however, shows a further broadening in the scope of 
explanations and also offers more structured verifications of older hypotheses. 
 
3.3  Bringing in domestic politics, actors and the ‘worlds of compliance’ 
Third wave studies distinguish themselves by a departure from measures of “fit” and a move 
towards more actor-centered explanations. An explicit account of such a study was provided by 
Treib (2003), who in his paper drops the assumption that member states have an a priori interest 
in protecting the national status quo, and with his empirical case studies shows that speed of 
transposition is conditional upon national (party political) preferences (2003: 21). As such, this 
would mean that policy change (or resistance to change) is not so much a function of the degree 
of fit, but rather depends on the kind of policies that need to be implemented and the degree to 
which national governments and political parties support or oppose them. He even shows that 
relatively small changes in comparison to the existing situation (small degrees of misfit) can 
already trigger fierce resistance; such as the case with the European Working Time Directive that 
conflicted with German domestic preferences. A conscious governmental resistance to 
implement this directive led to a delay of more than 6 years (2003: 16). In a similar vein, 
Mastenbroek & Kaeding argue that the relationship between the national status quo and the 
proposed EU policies is spurious, because they are both “contingent upon the preferences or 
beliefs held by national political or administrative actors” (2006: 331). Moreover, instead of 
adding these political constellations as one variable in the model (alongside the “goodness of fit” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 This does not explain, however, why the northern member states on average have a much better implementation 
record than the southern member states. Börzel (2000) therefore adds two more aspects to the model, first she 
claims that because Germany (and other northern member states such as the UK) are much more powerful than 
southern member states in ‘regulatory competition’ and are therefore better able to transfer their policy preferences 
to the European level. Secondly, the level of mobilization in Spain is in general much lower due to a lack of 
resources and awareness among citizens and organization, when it comes to environmental policies (Börzel, 2000: 
159-160). Combined, the absence of push factors for northern member states and the absence of pull factors for 
southern member states, help to explain why the implementation records are persistently different. 
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measures), they argue that it is more efficient to directly focus on domestic preferences and 
beliefs. Hence start by mapping the preferences of the actors involved and relate them to the 
transposition process. 
 
With the abandonment of the misfit hypothesis, the field traded its theoretical underpinnings for 
the ontological foundations of interstate-behaviour and norm-compliance as presented by the 
International Relations and neo-institutionalism literatures (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Checkel, 
2001; Tallberg, 2002, Powell & DiMaggio, 1993). The next chapter will outline these perspectives 
more thoroughly. It is important to mention, however, that these perspectives help to make the 
distinction between member states’ “willingness” and “ability” to comply. Moreover, to a lesser 
the degree they explicate the more deeply embroiled shared understandings that condition 
member states to act in certain ways.  
 
In line with the “willingness” of member states to comply, some scholars have applied a game-
theoretical logic to the process of transposition. Dimitrova & Steunenberg (2000), show that 
policy convergence within the European Union is the product of a combination of conditions 
during the EU legislative phase and the national implementation phase. More specifically they 
argue that actual convergence is only possible if the Council refrains from granting exemptions 
during the legislative phase to specific member states, and if the implementation phase excludes 
incentives for member states to deviate from the specified European policies (ibid.: 219). In 
similar vein, Steunenberg (2006) shows that the successfulness of transposition in the domestic 
policy arena depends on the constellation of lower and higher level actors and accompanying 
coordination mechanisms. Actors are defined as “policy-specific veto players”, because they can 
(formally or informally) block decisions made during the national transposition process, which 
underlines the actor-based perspective (ibid.: 299). Accordingly, he illustrates the differences 
between single- and multi-player coordination games and the relative advantages of the former in 
relation to the speed and shaping of transposition processes (ibid.: 313). Moreover, it is shown 
that such constellations differ quite extensively per policy area, which makes for a diversity of 
transposition styles within member states and across sectors, in contrast to the often believed 
national homogeneity and international diversity (Steunenberg, 2007; Steunenberg & Rhinard, 
2010: 499). The binding factor of these studies is that they all argue that transposition is 
contingent upon national incentives structures and veto player preferences, which is a conception 
of the transposition process that is rather political instead of technical. 
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The latter argument is at least partly confirmed by a large-scale comparative study performed by 
Falkner et al. (2005). These scholars have coined the so-called “worlds of compliance” typology 
that offers an explanation for why some theories have explanatory power in some member states 
and not in others. The typology contains three ways of “reacting to EU adaption requirements”, 
and these types are called the: (1) world of law observance (2) world of domestic politics, and (3) world of 
transposition neglect (Falkner et al., 2007: 404). Notwithstanding the diversity of interests and 
ideologies that may exist at the national level, the ‘world of law observance’ is marked by an 
accurate and timely implementation of EU directives. Delays are only sporadic and caused by 
conflicts with deeply entrenched traditions and regulatory philosophies (ibid.: 405). Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark are considered to belong to this first type. 
 
The findings by Steunenberg (2006, 2007) above are derived from the Dutch context, and this is 
a member state that fits in the ‘world of domestic politics’. Here, domestic interests tend to 
prevail and non-transposition is likely to occur as a result of conflicting interests at the domestic 
level and/or a discrepancy between European directives and national interests. The bureaucracies 
within these member states have the natural inclination to neutrally implement the directive, 
however, in the political realm the sense of duty to implement in a correct and timely fashion is 
not equally shared. This conclusion also finds support in some of the other studies presented 
above (e.g. Treib, 2003; Börzel, 2000). Most of the western EU member states fall within this 
type, such as the UK, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (Falkner et al., 2007: 412). 
 
Lastly, southern European member states such as Greece and Portugal fall within the ‘world of 
transposition neglect’ in which transposition of EU directives is perceived as a second-order task. 
These member states show a large propensity for non-compliance, often as a result of 
administrative inefficiency and/or a posture of ‘national arrogance’ (Falkner et al., 2007: 404). The 
complete ‘worlds of compliance’ typology is a useful theory that sheds a light on the cultural 
entrenchment of compliance behaviour which is deeply ingrained in these member states and 
highly consistent over time (ibid.: 404).  
 
3.4 Transposition as an administrative affair 
Most third-wave studies discussed up till now, assume that non-compliance is a matter of 
preference (i.e. timely and correct implementation only occurs when it is in the interest of 
“policy-specific actors”, i.e. the member state). In contrast, so-called ‘management approach’ 
studies argue that compliance to a large extent depends on administrative characteristics and the 
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‘ability’ of member states to comply instead of their ‘willingness’ (e.g. Tallberg, 2002: 613-614; 
Haverland & Romeijn, 2007: 772-775). As already discussed above, administrative factors were 
primarily dominant in the first wave of compliance studies, but now they seem to experience a 
revival in some more recent studies that primarily point at effective coordination structures and 
sufficient administrative capacity as primary factors of compliance (Toshkov, 2011: 4).  
 
Some researchers stress the importance of sufficient financial resources, administrative expertise 
and (relative) strength of the bureaucracy as crucial factors of compliance (Hille & Knill, 2006: 
538-540; Falkner, et al., 2004: 453). Strength in this respect is operationalized as administrative 
autonomy against political pressures, and whether or not administrative action is based on clearly 
specified legal rules and clear accountability structures (ibid.). Other research refers to institutional 
characteristics, such as the strength of coordination structures and the location of the main 
coordination unit (e.g. Foreign Affairs, Cabinet’s Office or Prime Minister’s Office) (Dimitrova 
& Toshkov, 2009: 5-6).  Still others have provided more fine-grained measurements in terms of 
the number of ‘police patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’ working externally on the bureaucracy (Jensen, 
2007; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984) or created a custom made scale of the strength on “internal 
departmental oversight” (Zubek & Staronova, 2010: 11). 
 
As already discussed in chapter one and two, a large share of the actions that are undertaken in 
order to transpose European directives take place within the confines of the national ministerial 
departments. Moreover, given that a large share of the delays is also incurred in the 
administrative phase (Steunenberg & Van der Zee, 2013: 16) it is justified that more attention 
goes to explaining how and why that occurs. Therefore the rest of this thesis is primarily 
focussed on the institutional and organizational characteristics that undergird transposition 
processes within ministerial departments. In the next chapter I will draw the theoretical lines 
along which these questions are addressed. 
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Chapter 4. Theoretical framework 
 
This chapter outlines an institutional theoretical framework, which will serve as a roadmap for 
understanding and analysing the procedural differences between ministerial departments within 
the national administration. In line with the explorative nature of this thesis, it is purposefully 
phrased as a “roadmap”, since it offers the opportunity to follow multiple routes leading to 
various destinations, while not limiting the scope to the testing of very specific hypotheses. It 
provides the tools that are needed for an in-depth analysis of the cases under consideration, and 
takes into account the multiple layers of institutional processes shaping the transposition of 
European directives.  
 
The course of action in this chapter is first to extensively discuss the three broad dominant 
ontological strands in the EU compliance literature. Each of these approaches contains its own 
ideas about the propensities and motives of member states to comply with EU legislation in 
given circumstances. While the foundations of these approaches stem primarily from 
international relations theory (e.g. Keohane et al., 2000), they have been reformulated and 
operationalized by various theorists to better fit the inter-state and EU context for understanding 
the “paths to compliance” (Tallberg, 2002: 609). Moreover, in this study they are extended to the 
organizational level, in addition with a search for the microfoundations that link these structural 
characteristics to the behaviour of individual agents within organizational units (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991: 16; Kiser & Ostrom, 2003: 58). That is, although reaching compliance through 
implementation is often a collective process, the outcome is the sum of individuals’ actions.  
 
Driven by the assumptions underlying these three main compliance perspectives, they all offer 
their own angle on why member states comply with EU legislation or why not. Although these 
assumptions differ quite extensively and are sometimes competing, looking at these mechanisms 
in interplay with each other has repeatedly proven to be informative and relevant in a European 
setting (Tallberg, 2002; Börzel et al., 2010: 1381). Moreover, in a broader context it has been 
argued that it would be senseless from an EU governance perspective, “not to use all these levers 
to encourage compliance” (italics in the original) (Alter, 2003: 56). Which is why I also expect to 
observe a multiplicity of these aspects in practice (in various stages of the process, possibly with 
conditionality of one mechanism on the other, or an interaction between these mechanisms). 
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Furthermore, when examining these compliance approaches more closely, they show very clear 
traces of neo-institutionalism theories, by the trifold division and the resemblance in the 
mechanisms23 underlying these theories (Hall & Taylor, 1996). The final section of this chapter 
therefore translates the most important aspect of these perspectives into an institutional-
organizational analytic framework as presented by Scott in his comprehensive work on institutions 
and organizations (2008). This framework helps to structure the analysis and lay bare the various 
layers of the structuring elements along the dimensions of the neo-institutional theory and 
attuned to the organizational setting.  
 
It needs emphasis that in this chapter, along with the rest of this thesis, attention is primarily 
devoted to mapping and understanding organizational processes, and administrative 
characteristics conducive and detrimental to timely transposition. The following paragraphs will 
in that respect guide the process of data collection by providing various observable and testable 
implications, and will also help to place the findings in a more theoretical context. In addition, 
when encountered by deviant observations that fail to fit these theories, the framework 
demarcates the fault lines along which to generate new variables and hypotheses (George & 
Bennett, 2005: 7). 
 
4.1  Enforcement, management and legitimacy 
By looking at incentive structures, administrative capacities and the appropriateness of given 
courses of action, this section aims to set forth a number of characteristics that might be able to 
explain variation in the dynamics of the administrative procedures constituting implementation 
processes (Börzel, et al. 2010: 1367-1371; Tallberg, 2002: 611-614). These three approaches cover 
a great range of the theoretical spectrum and have dominated the theoretical undercurrents of 
this field of literature quite some time now. Their perspectives on the capacity, interests and 
institutional arrangements determine the probability of successful and timely implementation. For 
the purpose of clarity they are presented separately, but as already mentioned above, an interplay 
of these mechanisms in practice is expected. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 The enforcement approach shows clear resemblances with rational choice institutionalism; both approaches find 
the solution for free rider behaviour in “hard institutions”, and both assume actors (member states) to be rational 
utility maximizers. The management approach overlaps with historical institutionalism, as the costs in terms of 
“norms, efficiency and interests” are lowest by maintaining a steady course (complying). Lastly, the legitimacy 
approach matches with sociological institutionalism, which is so explicit that it does not require any example (Hall & 
Taylor, 2006). These parallels are not surprising of course, because they originate from the same traditions, 
nonetheless making their connection explicit and using the neo-institutionalist tools helps in adapting to the 
organizational environment. 
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4.1.1 The Enforcement approach  
The enforcement approach is firmly rooted in the soil of game theory and collective action theory. It 
holds the assumption that member states are rational unitary actors that are embedded within 
various incentive structures, on the basis of which they determine whether to pursue a course of 
compliance, or whether they rather prefer to defect (Tallberg, 2002: 611). It centralizes individual 
action (‘agency’) and considers it to be perfectly consistent if member states sign treaties, while 
they simultaneously renounce the implementation of concrete legislation within the framework of 
those same treaties (Haas, 1998: 22). Such ostensible inconsistencies purportedly result from 
cost-benefit calculations that are constantly performed in order to determine whether the benefits 
of defection outweigh the costs of compliance (Börzel, et al., 2010: 1367). In more concrete 
terms, every implementation process is preceded by a series of calculations in order to determine 
whether a member state will comply, defect, or otherwise how to implement it in the most cost-
efficient manner (with the risk of overextending the provided discretionary space).  
 
Driven by a neo-realist current, this perspective assumes that states are generally unwilling to co-
operate in order to solve free riding problems (i.e. non-compliance). Therefore cooperation needs 
to be induced by a “hegemon” or “principal” with a combination of sanctions and rewards in 
order to secure enduring cooperation (Haas, 1998: 23). It is comparable to a repeated game set-
up in which other members participating in the agreement need to impose enough ‘credible 
threats’ (e.g. threatening to revert to non-cooperation) as a punishment for any deviation from 
cooperation (Gilligan, 2006: 939). The primary mechanisms of compliance can therefore be 
found in sanctioning instruments, control and oversight, and other instruments akin to those 
found in the organizational equivalent; principal-agent theory (Moe, 1984: 757). Hence, in the 
analysis we will focus on the interests of the member states (or how those are perceived by the 
organizational members entrusted with implementation), the formal distribution of power, 
regulative rules and institutions and other mechanisms of enforcement installed to induce 
compliance or regulate the process (cf. Hartlapp, 2007). 
 
4.1.2 The Management approach  
In contrast to the emphasis on a member states’ willingness to comply, the management approach 
primarily looks at the ability and capacity of member states to comply with EU legislation. These 
elements are of primary concern because theorists within this approach hold the a priori 
assumption that member states have a natural propensity to comply with international 
obligations. Member states are not expected to defect out of opportunistic considerations 
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resulting from utility maximization, but rather because of an inability to meet with the agreed 
upon arrangements out of capacity limitations, or as a consequence of rule ambiguity (Tallberg, 
2002: 613).  
 
The assumption that compliance is a natural inclination is supported through considerations of 
‘efficiency’, ‘interests’ and ‘norms’. That is, from an economic as well as an organizational theory 
perspective, it can be argued that it is most efficient to further engage in agreements that have 
been made in the past (hence comply), rather than to constantly recalculate costs and benefits of 
various alternatives and (re)thinking through all new strategies before deciding to cooperate 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1993: 178-179). As a way of “satisficing” the natural reflex is to try and 
comply with earlier made agreements, without assessing all possible alternatives (Simon, 1997: 
118). This notion is comparable to the idea of ‘standard operation procedures’, which slowly 
become ingrained in the functioning of the organization and are maintained by repeated practice 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1962). In short, “efficiency dictates considerable policy continuity”, which is 
why member states will aim to comply most of the time (Chayes & Chayes, 1993: 178).  
 
The second assumption of the management approach is that it is rather peculiar to assume that 
member states self-interestedly refrain from meeting earlier made commitments, while they 
bargained out the same treaty agreements in the first place. As if current commitments are not in 
any way connected to future interests. Furthermore, the nature of the treaties should be such that 
they accommodate the interests of the participating members in the agreement, at the moment of 
the decision, as well as the period afterwards (Chayes & Chayes, 1993: 179-184). Hence, with this 
in mind one should expect that it is in the interest of –in this case – the member state to uphold 
its compliance with the legislation that is produced within the framework of the treaty. 
 
Lastly, it assumes that it is a more or less an institutionalized and accepted ‘norm’ that member 
states, but also actors more generally, uphold (treaty) agreements (Chayes & Chayes, 1998: 8). 
That is, because of a kind of unwritten normative obligation in international affairs, it is most 
conventional to expect (member) states to follow up on treaties and agreements. This normative 
obligation does not stem from the possible consequences and the “shadow of the future” but 
rather a kind of noblesse oblige in inter-state relations. The normative aspect is of course not only to 
be found on the inter-state level, but probably also on the micro level where it is maintained 
through processes of socialization and conditioning in the national political and administrative 
context (Johnston, 2001: 494). 
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The management approach directs the researcher to focus on quite different sources driving the 
mechanisms of noncompliance. Primarily, the management approach assumes non-compliance to 
be the product of capacity limitations, rule ambiguity and a lack of transparency. Solving them, 
asks for other measures than the instalment of oversight and enforcement mechanisms, but 
actions such as capacity building, increasing transparency and rule clarification. Reaching a 
common understanding of the norms and enabling all parties to uphold the agreement, are 
central within this approach.  
  
4.1.3 The Legitimacy approach  
The legitimacy approach presents a constructivist notion of a shared structure of legitimate 
international norms and rules in which member states are gradually socialized, and which will 
eventually drive them to comply with EU legislation (Börzel, et al., 2010: 1370; Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998: 897). These drivers of behaviour are even more deeply rooted than the normative 
understandings as presented by the management approach. Accordingly, the member states’ 
acceptance of rules and legislation coming from Brussels is a result of the internalization of the 
“appropriate course”, which shapes the preferences of the member state (Hurd, 1999: 381). In 
line with to the so-called ‘logic of appropriateness’, member states are in various degrees 
embedded in ‘sociocultural ties, cultural connections, [and] intersubjective understandings’ that 
shape and direct the process of European integration (March & Olsen, 1998: 952). Hence, the 
degree to which member states are attuned to these aspects of cooperation, would to a large 
extent determine the probabilities of successful and timely compliance (Berglund et al., 2006: 
699). Creating an atmosphere in which European policies on all levels are perceived as legitimate 
and even natural is even more complex than installing oversight mechanisms, building capacity 
and striving for transparency. It requires initiatives that touch the deepest layers of (national) 
cultures. A recent attempt by the EU to do so, is by declaring 2013 as the “European Year of the 
Citizens” (European Union, 2013).  
 
4.2 An institutional approach 
Through proper interpretation of these ontological strands of the “paths to compliance” 
(Tallberg, 2002) one could bring forth innumerable testable hypotheses, as has been illustrated in 
the previous chapter (literature review). In this thesis, however, the primary goal is not to confirm 
or falsify specific hypotheses through collecting observational data. But rather to understand and 
explain the mechanisms that drive processes of transposition in the organizational context 
through a more explorative approach. Hence, the theoretical considerations above, serve to 
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somewhat explicate the scope, structure the process of data collection and position the findings. 
In addition to this substantial theoretical guideline, a more procedural framework is used to elicit 
the information that is required for a structured analysis. This procedural framework is better 
adapted to the study of organizations and organizational processes. 
 
In abstract terms, the institutional perspective serves as “…the language, and the set of 
assumptions that hold and guide” our understanding of the observations (Frederickson & Smith, 
2003: 67-68). In an organizational setting, institutions function as double-edged swords, by both 
limiting and enabling certain types of organizational behaviour. In various levels of depth, these 
structuring elements24 are interwoven in the theories presented above, and they help to direct the 
attention towards the organizational aspects of the process of legal transposition. Instead of 
portraying efficiency (and rationality) as the driving force of organizational processes, institutional 
theories primarily look at cultural influences on decision-making and organizational structures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Barley & Tolbert, 1997: 93). Within this view, organizations are 
defined as “bounded social constructs of rules, roles, norms, and the expectations that constrain 
individual and group choice and behaviour” (Frederickson & Smith, 2003: 71). 
 
These “bounded social constructs” exist of various structuring elements, that are themselves also 
affected by other structuring elements from within the respective organizational environments. 
These elements are often defined as “rationalized concepts” of administrative behaviour, which 
do not necessarily lead to the most effective utilization of resources, but adherence to these 
concepts offers legitimacy and secures survival of the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 344). 
Such concepts come to being through processes of institutionalization, which is the infusion of 
administrative behaviour/practices with value “beyond the technical requirements of the task at 
hand” (Selznick, 1984: 17). The repeated practice and gradual acceptance of “how things are 
done”, slowly ingrains them in the genetics of the organization. Such “rationalization” does not 
occur in detachment from the individuals and their actions, but is actually fed by them. The 
linkage between individual actions and shared institutions are called “microfoundations” and are 
manifested in “sets of rules governing the number of decision makers, allowable actions and 
strategies, authorized results, transformations internal to decision situations, and linkages among 
decision situations” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Kiser & Ostrom, 2003: 64-65).  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Structuring elements, institutions and institutional factors are used interchangeably in this thesis as they all refer to 
the same phenomena manifested in different shapes but providing tacit or more explicit guidance to organizational 
process. 
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4.2.1  Institutional-organizational analytic framework 
Table 4.1 displays the analytic framework as presented by Scott (2008: 51). In his comprehensive 
synthesis of institutional theories he sketches three dominant threads in institutional theory and 
applies them to the study of organizations. These so-called “pillars of institutions” are the 
systems constituting and ensuring the survival of institutions; these unfold in various 
manifestations, have various characteristics and diverse relations to organizational processes. 
First, these pillars will be briefly described separately before turning to the so-called “carriers” of 
the institutions that are the “tangible” representations of the institutional mechanisms which we 
will look for in the comparison between ministerial departments.  
 
! The regulative pillar includes the most explicit regulatory processes and strongly accords to the 
mechanisms that are presented in the enforcement approach on EU compliance (e.g. 
monitoring, oversight and sanctioning mechanisms). These regulative rules are abided or 
broken as an outcome of cost-benefit calculations and enforced through coercive 
mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a: 67-69). Moreover, besides restricting and guiding 
behaviour, they can also enable social behaviour by providing legitimate grounds for action 
(Jepperson, 1991: 146). For example through acquiring a license for a certain type of action, 
the rules of the game change, and previously prohibited actions are made possible (Scott, 
2008: 52-53).  
 
! The normative pillar contains the values and norms that are more implicitly detected in the 
texture of the organization or the organizational field. They are not (legally) enforceable, but 
they are sustained through the shared understanding of how organizational processes “should 
work” and moral pressure among organizational members. Normative obligations discourage 
inappropriate action and enable appropriate behaviour through routines, roles and beliefs. 
Every organization has such conventions, and these are only violated at the cost of the 
disapproval of others and possibly followed by negative corrective measures. Norms come in 
various degrees of strength and are often assumed to be continuous rather than dichotomous, 
which sometimes renders actual abidance disputable (Legro, 1997: 33). 
 
! The cultural-cognitive pillar constitutes the deepest layer of institutional mechanisms and is 
primarily emphasized by sociologist organizational scholars. It contains the elements that 
shape the shared conceptions of social reality and the frames that provide it with its meaning 
(Scott, 2008: 57). These mechanisms are exclusively implicit and firmly interwoven with the 
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shared identity that members of the organization derive from group membership. Cultural 
elements can be found both on a macro-level, for example through the shared culture of 
being a civil servant. As well as on the meso- and micro-level, by being a civil servant in a 
certain country, ministry or DG. Needless to say, organizational cultures can be supportive as 
well as detrimental to the goal-effectiveness of organizational processes. Moreover, the 
source of cultural-cognitive elements is often the group to which individuals belong or the 
organizational field to which organizations belong. 
 
Table 4.1 “The three pillars of institutions”!
 
4.2.2  Carriers and vehicles 
Orthogonally crosscutting these three pillars are four types of “carriers” that convey the 
institutional factors in the everyday functioning of the organization (Scott, 2008: 79). These 
“carriers” or “vehicles” are the concrete manifestations that enable us to get a grasp of the 
underlying mechanisms shaping the process of the transposition of EU directives (the 
institutions). The four types or categories are: Symbolic systems, Relational systems, Routines and 
Artifacts and they can be found in each of the three pillars25.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 N.B. these are not displayed in table 4.1, but return in a framework in chapter seven (table 7.2). 
 Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 
 Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Basis  o f  Compl iance  Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-grantedness 
Shared understanding 
 
Basis  o f  Order  Regulative rules Binding expectations Constitutive schema 
 
Mechanisms 
 
Coercive Normative Mimetic 
 
Logi c  Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
 
Indi ca tors  Rules 
Laws 
Sanctions 
Certification 
Accreditation 
Common beliefs 
Shared logics of action 
Isomorphism 
 
Affe c t  Fear Guilt/ Innocence 
 
Shame / Honour Certainty / Confusion 
Basis  o f  l e g i t imacy  Legally sanctioned 
 
Morally governed Comprehensible 
Recognizable  
Culturally supported 
Source: adapted from Scott, 2008, p. 51  
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• Symbolic systems – In order for ideas to subsist and move across time and space, organizations 
and collective undertakings more in general, make use of symbols. Symbols are encoded ideas 
that are shaped in such a way that they can be decoded in other contexts by the recipient, 
who in his own situation can interpret their meaning (Scott, 2008: 140; Scott, 2003; Strang & 
Meyer, 1993: 492-294). In the most basic terms, a symbol is anything that represents 
something else; which could be a sign to represent an idea, intention, norm, feeling, etc. 
(Stamper et al., 2000: 15).  
 
A widely used example of a symbolic system is “language”, and more specifically the system 
of written words, which is a system of signs that greatly contributed to the exchange of 
symbols and their attached meanings (Scott, 2008: 80-81). Language is not only a great 
conveyer of meaning, it also adheres to systematics that aim to minimize interpretation after 
the transmission of a message from sender to receiver (i.e. grammar); in order to reach a 
common understanding. It structures all kinds of processes, and not necessarily in the most 
efficient way, as some languages and styles are simply more complex and devious than others 
(which could eventually also defeat the purpose of using that system). In a sense, symbolic 
systems simplify the exchange of ideas and bind individuals and collectives to frameworks of 
understanding, which also in varying degrees can guide behaviour. Tacit or explicit knowledge 
of, and stringent and repeated adherence to the essentials and systematics of the language 
help in structuring the exchange between sender and receiver, by way of which one could 
speak of an institutionalized practice (i.e. there are only a limited number of ways to say 
something in a certain language). 
 
This extensive elaboration on the metaphor of language should ease the translation and 
application of these concepts in the analysis. Within ministerial departments, the institutional 
factors that affect the pace and quality of transposition, are interwoven in several of these 
symbolic systems. According to Scott, regulative institutional elements are conveyed by 
symbolic systems in the appearance of rules and laws, normative elements are contained in 
values and expectations, while cultural-cognitive institutional elements are deeply imbued in the 
mental categories, typifications and schema of the members of the organization (2008: 79-
85). Explicating these linkages in the observed processes is much clearer when making a 
distinction between the “rule/value/schema” and the “sign/symbol” representing the former 
(Stamper et al., 2000: 15). In such wordings, I will therefore try to phrase these connections in 
the analysis below. 
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• Relational Systems – Relational systems are “carriers that rely on patterned interactions 
connected to networks of social positions: role systems” (Scott, 2008: 81-82). The boundaries 
of these relational systems are not necessarily equivalent to those of the organizational units 
or the disciplines within the organization, but frequently transcend them. Moreover relational 
systems tend to overlap as individuals simultaneously belong to several groups. These 
relational systems are concerned with the relationships between individuals within and 
between organizations. As interaction between individuals accords through certain patterns 
and is typified by power relationships that define the prevalence of certain interests over 
others. The regulative pillar identifies primarily the governance structures and power systems, 
while the more implicit “regimes” and “identities” respectively belong to the latter two pillars 
(Scott, 2008: 79-81). Closed relational systems frequently rely on symbolic systems to 
strengthen relational ties by conveying group rules, norms and shared understandings. 
 
An example of a very coherent relational system is the Bar Association (in Dutch: Orde van 
Advocaten); it has clear regulative elements; e.g. the “regulation on the administration and 
financial integrity” (Vafi), normative elements; e.g. by endorsing the core values of 
“professionalism, integrity and independency” and as a trained lawyer, frames of reference 
and identities are shaped through the lengthy process of schooling and on-the-job training 
that precede actual group membership (Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2013). 
 
• Routines – These are the “habitualized patterns of behaviour that rely on tacit knowledge and 
beliefs” (Scott, 2008: 82). Traditionally routines are also defined as: “repetitive, recognizable 
patterns of interdependent actions, carried out by multiple actors”, frequently these routines 
are also –In more abstract terms – prescribed in official documents (Feldman & Pentland, 
2003: 95). Routines should contribute to streamlining processes by minimizing uncertainties 
(among organizational members, by providing predictable sequences) and they also function 
as a management control tool. Although routines are frequently mentioned as factors of 
stability or even inertia, Feldmen and Pentland reintroduce “agency” by subdividing routines 
in “ostensive” and “performative” aspects (2003: 100). The former then refers to the aspects 
of a routine that shape our understanding of what that routine is, while the latter includes all 
aspect of how the routine is dealt with in practice (e.g. specific decisions, by specific persons 
at specific moments) (ibid., 2003: 101).  
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In the regulative context routines are primarily embodied by “protocols” and “standard 
operating procedures”, while in a normative sense they are embodied in the unwritten 
characteristics that belong to the fulfilment of “role” or “job” in the organizational context. 
The cultural-cognitive translation of these types of carriers is a so-called “script” that functions 
on a cerebral level and is imprinted in the individuals’ actions on a deeper level (ibid.). 
Organizational complexity and uncertainties are reduced by the use of routines, however, the 
shape of these routines is often the outcome of various political processes. 
 
• Artifacts – This category will only receive scant attention below but refers to the (tangible) 
objects that carry “mandatory specifications”, “conventions and standards” and “symbolic 
value” of the structuring institutions. More specifically, the study of artifacts looks at the 
social meaning of material objects and culture in the organizational process, such as 
regulatory technology. A good example would be the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees in which 
the national government notifies citizens of new decrees and laws. It is merely a combination 
of paper and ink, but more than, that it also contains a regulatory and normative load.  
 
4.3 Application of the theory 
This extensive theoretical framework has two main purposes. In the first place, the institutional-
organizational analytic framework and the pillar structure under 4.2.1 are the foundation of the 
interviews that are held with officials within the ministerial departments. More specifically, the 
interview is divided in five categories. The first deals with the general organizational 
characteristics of the department in which the respondent is active (i.e. number of employees, 
background of employees, divisions, structures and potential reorganizations). Note that these 
characteristics are aspects that were discussed in the literature review. The second, third and 
fourth category are concrete operationalizations of the three pillars (i.e. Regulative: rules, 
protocols and working methods; Normative: shared norms and relationships; Cultural-cognitive: 
informal habits and practices). The fifth category addresses the way organizations deal with the 
results of transposition processes and whether they have feedback loops and evaluation moments 
that facilitate organizational learning. This fifth category is not directly represented in the theory, 
but provides more depth to this cross-sectional study. In the next chapter this set-up will briefly 
return, however, for a direct understanding of the translation of these elements into specific 
questions see the appendix (as the question are very specifically attuned to transposition rules, 
norms and practices in the Netherlands). 
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The second purpose of including this theoretical framework is that it facilitates proper analysis of 
the observations collected through the interviews. More specifically, the four categories of 
institutional carriers (described under 4.2.2) are cross-classified with the three institutional pillars 
to arrive at a grid in which the structuring elements can be placed. While the first part of the 
analysis is mostly descriptive, the latter part includes this grid and identifies the institutional 
factors and how they affect the transposition process. In the next chapter we will first discuss the 
research methodology and chapter six and seven contain the analysis as described above. 
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Chapter 5. Operationalization and measurement 
 
The previous chapters have been leading up the empirical section of this thesis. This part entails 
to examine the administrative preparation phase of EU transposition processes, and more 
specifically it aims to shed a light on the organizational and institutional characteristics that shape 
such processes within ministerial departments. As mentioned above, not all administrative 
characteristics might be equally conducive to fast and successful transposition (e.g. “rationalized 
myths”), which is why such structuring elements and routines that determine the pace and quality 
of transposition are the primary locus of attention (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 343). The preceding 
chapters have touched upon the main findings in the compliance literature, and in chapter four 
the theoretical underpinnings that structure this field of study have been discussed. The 
institutional analytical framework at the end of chapter four serves as a guideline for data 
collection and proper interpretation of the results in the following chapters. In a more explicit 
way, however, the current chapter will outline the research methodology employed, how the 
cases are selected and how the required information is extracted in a systematic manner. 
 
5.1 Population, sample and unit of analysis  
The population, which this thesis aims to study, consists of all ministerial departments vested 
with the task of national transposition within the European Union. Given time, resource and 
other practical constraints, attention is however fully devoted to Dutch ministerial departments, 
also because earlier findings about the internal dynamics of domestic transposition processes 
were drawn from that context. As such, it could be argued that the sample is strongly biased 
when the results would be inferred to all member states, however, it primarily aims to provide a 
relevant picture of the transposition practices in the Netherlands (while simultaneously 
generating testable hypotheses for other member states).  
 
The primary unit of analysis is the organizational process that constitutes the transposition of EU 
directives. The information about these processes is primarily extracted by a series of semi-
structured interviews, combined with the use of governmental documents and other relevant 
literature, it is verified (Babbie, 2010: 318-322). The semi-structured interviews are held with civil 
servants that are structurally involved in transposition within their department and these 
conversations can be typified as so-called elite-interviews (Van Thiel, 2007: 111). These are 
interviews that are held with respondents that are “eminent persons within the research 
situation” (Baarda & De Goede, 2001: 136), who are in this case primarily civil servants that are 
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specialized in the drafting of legislation (in case of transposition) and policymakers (more 
frequently involved during the negotiation phase) (Steunenberg & Voermans, 2005: 29). For the 
selection of respondents I was unfortunately unable to acquire a proper sampling frame, simply 
because of the large variation in the number of directives per department and the dispersion of 
directives over different departments within ministries, and over time. It would be very 
cumbersome to trace back all the individuals involved in prior transposition processes. Even if it 
would be feasible, most of these officials would probably have changed jobs in the meanwhile, 
and their experiences might not be relevant for the current situation anymore. Therefore I relied 
on the expertise of the representatives in the ICER-I working group in guiding the sampling 
process. Every representative per ministry was requested to point out at least one potential 
respondent for their ministry who, through his or her experience with the transposition of EU 
directives, can be expected to provide the most representative picture. In departments where 
several distinctive organizational set-ups or styles could be distinguished beforehand (e.g. 
according to the divisions in terms of policy fields) I have attempted to interview several 
respondents. Overall, 13 interviews focused on departmental practices have been held at the 
following ministries: 
 
• Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) – (2 interviews, 4 respondents) 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ) (1 interview – 1 respondent) 
• Ministry of Finance (FIN) (1 interview – 2 respondent) 
• Ministry of Security and Justice (V&J) (2 interviews – 2 respondents) 
• Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) (1 interview – 2 respondents) 
• Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) (2 interviews – 3 respondents) 
• Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (I&M) (1 interview – 2 respondents) 
• Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) (2 interviews – 3 respondents) 
• Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW) (1 interview – 1 respondent) 
 
In order to secure the anonymity that allows respondents to speak frankly about their ideas and 
experiences, the following chapters do not include references to specific interviews. This offers 
the advantage of including genuine statements, without potentially damaging the position of the 
source. To secure the validity of the interpretations made when writing the departmental 
descriptions in the next chapter (i.e. procedures per department), all respondents were also 
contacted after the interviews and confronted with the descriptions I made for their ministry. 
The results as presented here were adjusted to their comments.  
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The nine ministries listed above are all the ministries that are involved with transposing EU 
directives. Besides these interviews that were primarily targeted to collect information on 
department specific practices, three subject-specific interviews were held. The first of those 
interviews was with a member of the Governmental Platform on the Quality of the Legal 
Function (Kwaliteitsplatform Juridische Functie Rijk), which is the platform that expressed the 
request to perform research on this subject in order to formulate risk and success factors during 
the transposition process. During this informative interview, the workings of interdepartmental 
platforms and the variety of frameworks for the assessment of legislative quality were discussed. 
The second subject-specific interview was held with the primary writer and secretary of the 
working group that wrote the Manual Legislation and Europe. This interview was relevant to get an 
idea of how the Manual came to being and what were the existing assumptions about the 
elements that drive the internal processes of transposition. A third subject-specific interview was 
held with a very experienced middle manager that has a long-standing reputation when it comes 
to the transposition of EU legislation. Although his current position is more to oversee legal 
transposition as a manager, his past experiences with transposition and structural involvement 
with most efforts to improve transposition practices, make him a valuable source of information 
for this subject. During this interview we discussed EU transposition in a more abstract sense, 
which served to translate the practical experiences collected during the other interviews in more 
generalizable characteristics. Moreover, it allowed me to verify whether some of the 
interpretations of the observations that were made, were valid according to his point of view.  
 
5.2  Operationalization 
In order to answer the main research question, the first step was to delve into the procedural 
specifics of the transposition processes within each department. The three “pillars of 
institutions” that are explained in the previous chapter constitute the core of the structure that 
underlies the semi-structured interview questions. For each of these pillars a number of questions 
was formulated in line with the institutional conveyers (symbolic systems, relational systems, 
routines and artefacts) of institutions and adapted to the actual transposition process (see chapter 
two). Moreover, two categories of questions were added; one on the more general organizational 
characteristics of the transposing departments and a category of questions on how ministerial 
departments deal with results and possibly facilitate organizational learning (see the appendix for 
the complete interview): 
 
1. Organizational characteristics: capacity, expertise, possible recent reorganizations 
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2. The regulative pillar: rules, protocols and procedures  
3. The normative pillar: norms and inter- and intra-organizational relations  
4. The cultural-cognitive pillar: customs and habits  
5. Results and feedback mechanisms: mechanisms that facilitate organizational learning 
 
5.3 The method of structured, focused comparison & binary logic regression 
In this comparative case study there are nine cases (all implementing Dutch ministries), however, 
given the diversity within ministries, the actual number of cases is probably higher. The 
ministerial departments in this thesis will be studied using the method of structured, focused 
comparison. Which is more like a logic for guiding comparative case studies that helps to ensure 
the collection of comparable data for comparative cases (George & Bennett, 2005: 69). As set out 
above, it is structured in the sense that for each case under study the questionnaire guides and 
standardizes the process of data collection, and it is focused in the sense that it only looks at a 
very specific aspect of the cases (i.e. the functioning of these organizations in transposition 
processes during the administrative preparation phase).  
 
As already mentioned in the first chapter, this thesis aims to find a middle ground between very 
specific explanations of single case studies and the abstract indicators often used in quantitative 
compliance studies. Therefore, the analysis consists of two components. The first part is 
primarily focused on the qualitative analysis of the process and builds up to the identification of a 
number of institutional factors influencing the transposition process. While the second part takes 
a selection of these institutional factors and tests them using a quantitative method of analysis. 
More specifically, the qualitative structuring elements that emanate from the in-depth 
comparative analysis of the ministerial transposition procedures will be quantitatively 
operationalized. These quantitative indicators are inserted in a binary logistic regression that is 
performed on a dataset that includes all European directives that were implemented in the 
Netherlands over the past five years (with an implementation date between 1 July 2008 until 1 
July 2013).  
 
The i-Timer data from which the dataset was extracted has two main drawbacks, which led to the 
decision to use binary logistic regression instead of longitudinal methods such as Event History 
analysis. In the first place, the starting point of the implementation processes is not always clearly 
demarcated. That is, although the publication of the EU directive may indicate a starting point, in 
some cases prior steps have been taken before the actual publication date. Moreover, sometimes 
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one instrument is conditional on the implementation of another legal instrument. If so, duration 
of the first step of the process could be over- or underestimated. Secondly, although most data 
that has been entered in the i-Timer since 2008 is believed to be accurate, a small degree of 
inaccuracy seems still persists (e.g. judging from abnormal values of intermediate steps; such as 
negative durations and very small numbers of days that have been entered for some steps). 
Therefore, I have chosen to use logistic regression with a dichotomous dependent variable (either 
transposed in time or delayed) so the potential risk of using inaccurate data of intermediate steps 
and falsely entered instruments is avoided. 
 
5.4 Structure of the analysis 
In the following chapter I will first provide a more general description of the shared structuring 
elements that have an equal bearing on all the ministries. Secondly, some descriptive statistics are 
provided to place their performance and administrative practices into context, and thirdly a 
procedural description of the transposition processes within each of the departments listed above 
is given; outlining the parties involved, which lines of responsibility structure the process and 
how progress is monitored. In chapter seven I will address the most relevant prevailing 
structuring elements and characteristics that can be distinguished across departments. These 
qualitative institutional factors are then operationalized using quantitative indicators and inserted 
in a model and analysed using binary logistic regression. Afterwards, the thesis is concluded with 
a brief discussion of the results and an answer to the main research question.  
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Chapter 6. Administrative practices and procedures of transposition 
 
In all, there are nine ministries in the Netherlands that are in more or lesser degree actively 
involved in the transposition of European directives. These are the ministries of: (1) Foreign 
Affairs, (2) The Interior and Kingdom Relations, (3) Economic Affairs, (4) Finance, (5) 
Infrastructure and Environment, (6) Education, Culture and Science, (7) Social Affairs and 
Employment, (8) Security and Justice and (9) Public Health, Welfare and Sport. Although each 
ministry has its own characteristics when it comes to the organizational processes leading to the 
transposition of EU directives, there are some binding factors that aim to provide a degree of 
uniformity across ministerial borders.  
 
In the first place, all ministries are bound to the same constitutional framework, which directs 
them to use similar legal instruments as already discussed in chapter two; these are primarily 
ministerial orders, governmental decrees and statutes. This does however not rule out the 
possibility for ministries to actively determine their own legislative style and preferred drafting 
technique. For instance, in anticipation on future EU legislation, ministries might pursue a course 
in which they try to create as much legal bases for delegation or sub-delegation for regulatory 
power over material norms as possible. Such mandates ensure that future amendments can be 
processed in a fraction of the time that was required for the initial amendment by using a 
governmental decree or a ministerial order. Related to the regulatory style is the drafting 
technique of the implementing lawmaker (as discussed in the literature review). The way in which 
the text of the directive is transferred to the national legal order might save time on the short as 
well as the longer run. These aspects will further be discussed in the next chapter, where we look 
at specific elements that are detrimental and conducive to fast transposition. 
 
Secondly, there are two documents that provide government-wide guidelines by prescribing the 
structure and criteria for (general) legislative procedures and one document that focuses more 
specifically on the European policy-making process and the implementation of European 
directives. These are respectively the: Script for Legislation, Instructions for Legislation and the Manual 
Legislation and Europe.26 The former provides procedures, guidelines and models with the aim to 
describe and structure the national legislative procedure. It does, however, not include special 
sections for the implementation of EU legislation, because these sections were all transferred to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 In Dutch: Draaiboek voor de Regelgeving, Aanwijzingen voor de Regelgeving and the Handleiding Wetgeving en 
Europa 
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the Manual Legislation and Europe as soon as that document was published in 2008.  
 
The Manual (in contrast to the other two documents) aims to offer assistance through taking the 
perspective of the user (the lawmaker) and is solely focussed on EU policymaking and the 
implementation of EU directives. It integrally discusses rules and criteria by actually describing 
the policy-making procedure leading to adoption of EU law in Brussels –from start to finish – 
and also takes the whole process of national transposition into account. It covers no less than 
200 pages and is in some way comparable to a “normal” textbook on EU policy, adapted to the 
preferences of an implementing official. Although it is a comprehensive work, it has not been 
updated since its publication, which means that some of the references to the Instructions for 
Legislation and European procedures are out-dated or no longer applicable. Following from the 
interviews, many lawmakers found the Manual much too extensive and also not very easily 
accessible, which is why it is almost never consulted. Moreover, although it also includes useful 
information for Dutch policymakers involved in negotiations in Brussels, many of the 
policymaking respondents I spoke were not even aware of the existence of the Manual. Which 
leaves the Instructions for Legislation as the primary government-wide document when it comes to 
both legislative procedures and special guidelines for the transposition of EU directives. The 
latter document is, however, mainly useful for lawmakers, which underlines the importance of 
their role as the driving force during transposition procedures. In the following section, the most 
relevant Instructions will be discussed, since they provide influential and relevant guidance in 
practice. 
 
Besides these guiding documents, there are also a number of frameworks by which the quality of 
legislation is assessed, either by assessors at the transposing department itself, or by the Ministry 
of Security and Justice. The latter holds a special responsibility to audit the quality of legislation 
before a draft measure is tabled in the council of ministers; it even has a “pool of assessors” 
assigned for legislation of all the ministries and it houses a sub-department that develops policies 
on legislative quality.27 In general, it can be concluded that the attention for the quality of 
legislation is thriving through all kinds of these checks and balances. One of those checks is the 
recently introduced “Integrated Assessment Framework for policy and regulation”28 (IAK), 
which is a tool that is officially endorsed by the Cabinet as a measure to map and reduce 
administrative burdens already at the start of every policy making process.29 Moreover, there are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27!Which is the department where the author was stationed during his internship. 
28 In Dutch: “Integraal Afwegingskader beleid en regelgeving” (IAK). 
29 Parliamentary Papers II 2010/11, 29 515 no. 330. 
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various frameworks that see on the consequences of new legislation for the environment, 
business and inter-administrative relations. These will, however, not be discussed here for two 
reasons. In the first place because they are integrally part of in the policy-making process and are 
equally compelling for every department, and secondly, because they are mostly located at the 
beginning of the policy-making chain, when policies are just initiated. Which is obviously not 
applicable to EU directives that are mostly a fait accompli when published, hence leave little or no 
room for fundamental changes. In one of the interviews a respondent even assured me that the 
“IAK” can be qualified as “outright nonsense” when dealing with transposition legislation 
because of the aforementioned reasons. It would therefore be irrelevant to discuss such 
frameworks. 
 
6.1 Instructions for legislation 
The Instructions for Legislation provides guidelines for all ministries that deal with the drafting of 
legislation, and has a strong prescriptive character. Chapter 8 of this guideline deals exclusively 
with the “preparation, creation and implementation of binding EU legislative measures”.! In a 
way, it is a code of conduct that aims to provide guidelines that are conducive to timely and 
successful compliance and it is the place where the soft law measures for increasing the pace of 
transposition are found.30 In chapter two I already discussed some of the instructions (when 
describing the national transposition procedure: e.g. the implementation plan) and I will now 
describe the other relevant ones that are relevant for the purposes of the analysis. 
 
Instruction 331 prescribes that transposition measures may not include provisions other than those 
strictly necessary for the implementation of EU directives (sec. implementation). This is a measure 
that explicitly prohibits the most important aspects of ‘gold plating’ as discussed in the literature 
review and it therewith aims to limit the probability of delay (that might occur as a result of 
political debates surrounding such “additional measures”). Instruction 333 prescribes that 
transposition measures ought to be “as much as possible in line with the instruments already 
provided for by existing legislation”. This instruction not only refers to the use of legal 
terminology, yet even more so, to the instruments used for practical application of the policy 
(such as enforcement mechanisms, permits, executive agencies etc.). Changing such structures is 
often very hard and time-consuming because they often require negotiations among many parties 
that are all driven by their own incentives and vested interests. At the same, because it is a rather 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 E.g. Parliamentary Paper II 2004/05, 21 109 no. 144; some of the measures that were discussed in chapter two. 
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“conservative” instruction it might impede innovation of legal structures and cause delays in the 
long run. 
 
Instruction 334 provides a guideline along which to determine whether and when delegation of 
regulative powers is preferred to regulating on a “higher” level. More generally, ministerial 
departments simplify their task of transposing directives on the long run when they are provided 
with such a mandate, simply given the shorter duration of the process and a diminishment in the 
number of “clearance points”, such as the parliament (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). According 
to instruction 334, delegation of regulative powers is preferable when31: (a) the margin of 
discretion that is left in the directive is small, (b) when the policy that has to be implemented has 
a more detailed character, (c) when more EU regulation in the same area is to be expected in the 
(near) future, and (d) when in the legal context in which the directive will be implemented, 
delegation is practiced more often.  
 
Instruction 340 prescribes that the policy department responsible for the implementation of a 
directive needs to ensure the involvement of the central legal department (within its ministry) 
already in an early stage. Preferably already before the BNC-fiche is formulated the lawmaker 
should be involved. Moreover, the instruction furthermore presents four options for the degree 
of involvement, ranging from merely sending the relevant policy documents during each stage of 
the process to installing a complete “dossier team” in which a legal expert is involved. Early 
involvement is believed to be conducive to mitigating legal difficulties during the transposition as 
well as the eventual implementation. 
 
As said, these instructions ought to facilitate fast transposition, which is why I also discussed 
some of them during the interviews, to see how departments deal with them in practice. Apart 
from these guidelines that ought to provoke some degree of uniformity, there are of course 
various circumstances that simply make these departments different from each other (e.g. size of 
the department, nature of policies, historical legacies, the number of directives the process, etc.). 
Some of these features are interwoven in the departmental descriptions below, for now, however, 
it would be relevant to get a grasp of the number of directives that are implemented per 
department and how they roughly perform. Moreover, these descriptive statistics are also 
information in the analysis leading up to the binary logistic regression at the end of chapter seven. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 These criteria are additional to those already laid out in instructions 23 and 24, these are more specifically attuned 
to EU directives. 
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6.2 Distribution of directives and a crude measure of performance per department 
As discussed above, the i-Timer as an early warning system records the progress of transposition of 
EU directives in the national context. From this instrument we can extract information on the 
course of transposition processes, as well as information on the instruments, performance and 
workload per department. Table 6.1 displays the number of directives per department over the 
last five years (i.e. with a realized implementation date between 1-7-2008 and 1-7-2013). It shows 
that four departments (i.e. I&M, EZ, FIN, VWS) seem to do most of the transposition, while 
other departments are only occasionally confronted with EU directives (e.g. BZ, BZK, OCW). 
By breaking down these directives in terms of the instruments used for transposition, table 6.2 
provides a more refined picture and lays bare some of the variation that exists across directives 
and departments in terms of higher and lower instruments used.  
 
What stands out is that three ministries that together cover a large share of the total number of 
directives also had quite a number of directives that required “no further implementation” (i.e. 
national legislation is already in line with European norms or the European amendments are 
made with the use of a dynamic references built-in the existing law). These are the ministries of 
I&M, EZ and VWS. Furthermore, a large proportion of the transpositions by the ministry of 
Finance included statutory amendments, which according to one of the respondents is a direct 
consequence of the financial crisis that resulted in the demand for rapid changes to existing legal 
structures. That is, since many any of these directives are aimed at regulating the financial 
markets, they required amendments to the Financial Supervision Act32 on a statutory level.  
 
Moreover, table 6.1 shows that the department of Education, Culture and Science only had two 
directives, while in fact it has created 50 instruments to transpose them. One of these directives 
included 48 instruments and dealt with the “recognition of professional qualifications” across the 
member states (2005/36/EG). This exceptional case will be discussed below, since the next 
biggest number of instruments used for other directives in the dataset is thirteen. In a few cases 
departments also make use of so-called “other measures”. These are mostly transposition 
processes in which guidelines are created for executive and enforcement agencies. For example 
Security and Justice (V&J) amended a circular of the minister that contained specific guidelines 
for addressing illegal immigrants by executive agencies. Such “soft” transposition measures are 
rarely employed, not in the last place because the Treaty remains quite ambiguous about the 
status and the sufficiency of these instruments for (legal) transposition. Nonetheless, when the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 In Dutch: Wet Financieel Toezicht (WFT). 
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EU amendments only target the work of governmental agencies, they can be just as effective as a 
legal amendment to for instance a ministerial order or governmental decree. 
 
Moreover, at first sight the “level of transposition” for the more “traditional” EU policy fields – 
i.e. transport (part of I&M), agriculture (part of EZ) and food regulation (part of VWS) – seems 
to be lower (i.e. more use is made of delegated legal instruments) (Haverland, et al., 2011: 267-
268). Whether that is actually the case is difficult to say, however, during the departmental 
interviews this idea was frequently confirmed by respondents. Whether the level of transposition 
is a direct consequence of a relatively longer history with transposing EU regulation is yet 
unknown. It might as well be a result of the “depth-of-cooperation” of these directives, which 
only require minor adjustments in one field and more “deep” forms of cooperation in others 
(Downs, et al., 1996: 386). Moreover, these tables do not include any information about the 
number of regulations and decisions that the EU has ordained in these fields, which might also 
be a factor influencing the degree of harmonisation across the EU and the subsequent national 
impact of new directives. 
 
Table 6.1 Distribution of directives per ministry 2008-2013 
Responsible ministry Number of directives % all directives % Requires transposition 
Foreign Affairs (BZ)  1 0.3 100 
Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) 4 1 75 
Economic Affairs (EZ) 98 25.7 36.7 
Finance (FIN) 44 11.5 88.6 
Infrastructure and Environment (I&M) 160 41.9 46.3 
Education, Culture and Science (OCW) 2 0.5 100 
Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) 10 2.6 80 
Security and Justice (V&J) 17 4.5 94 
Public Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) 46 12 50 
Total: 382 100 52.4 
 
Table 6.2 Number of instruments used for transposition 2008-2013 
 
Statutes Gov’t Decrees Min. Orders 
Effectuation33 
of Decisions 
No implementation 
required 
Other 
measures 
BZ  0 0 1 0 0 0 
BZK 2 3 1 1 1 0 
EZ 17 35 40 3 62 5 
FIN 29 15 7 1 5 5 
I&M 34 42 90 8 86 5 
OCW 8 16 26 0 0 0 
SZW 3 4 1 0 2 0 
V&J 14 5 1 1 1 1 
VWS 3 9 15 2 23 0 
Total: 110 129 182 16 180 16 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 i.e. An instrument used to effectuate other measures taken to transpose a directive (in Dutch: 
inwerkingtredingsbesluit). 
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It is important to note here that several reorganizations within and between departments have 
taken place in this period of time (2008-2013), while the tables simply aggregate the directives of 
the merged departments. In the departmental descriptions below, these reorganizations will be 
discussed in more detail. In terms of performance; figure 6.1 displays how many of these 
directives were implemented in time and how many were delayed. There are no ministries (except 
for the ministry of Foreign Affairs) that do not contribute to the total number of delayed 
transpositions, however, there are some ministries that are according to this picture are more 
frequently delayed than others (i.e. Finance 75%, Security and Justice almost 65%). Overall, 
however, this sample shows that almost 36% of the directives in the last five years were 
implemented late and quite peculiarly even 13.7% of the directives that required “no further 
implementation” were notified as transposed late.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 provides a first impression of the performance per department, however by simply 
taking all directives –including those that are implemented using dynamic references as well as 
directives that do not require further implementation – it provides a somewhat biased picture. 
That is, these transposition processes are not comparable to transposition trajectories as 
Figure 6.1 Performance per department 2008-2013 (all directives included; N=382) 
!
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conceptualized in chapter two, which include the preparation of draft measures and therefore an 
actual administrative phase. In order to provide a more accurate representation of performance 
we should therefore exclude all directives that are not transposed by means of (at least one) 
statutory amendment, governmental decree or ministerial order. These are the generally binding 
instruments that are most frequently used and also formally accepted by the EU as measures by 
which to assure compliance with EU legislation. Figure 6.2 provides that picture and the 
difference in terms of performance –when excluding these other directives – can be observed 
immediately. Although the scale of the y-axis accentuates these differences, the relative change in 
performance for some departments is quite clear. 
The main difference between figure 6.1 and 6.2 is that the latter excludes 190 directives that did 
not require at least one legal instrument for transposition (i.e. statutory amendment, 
governmental decree or ministerial order). The exclusion of these “irrelevant” directives turns the 
relatively good performers (EZ and I&M) into seemingly bad performers, that finish 
transposition late in respectively 63% and 55% of the directives for which they were primarily 
responsible. However, since the overall percentage of directives transposed late now increases to 
Figure 6.2 Performance per department 2008-2013 (Only including directives transposed using at least one 
statutes, governmental decree or ministerial order; N=192) 
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more than 57% (which is quite an increase in comparison to the percentage mention above 
(36%)), the performance of I&M is above average. The data included in these figures are further 
specified in table 6.3 below, which displays both the transposition performance per department 
for both samples, as well as the share of all directives per ministry, per sample. In the smaller 
sample, the ministries with a smaller number of directives have a relatively larger share, which 
attests to the idea that a smaller workload often requires more drastic changes. One could 
hypothesize that through further European integration of a certain policy field, the magnitude of 
the legal amendments required for transposition (i.e. legal misfit) becomes smaller and the 
department can more frequently rely on lower instruments or even dynamic references (cf. 
Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009: 959-960). A great disadvantage of displaying these statistics on 
the ministerial level, however, is that intradepartmental differences remain concealed. Therefore, 
in order to put some flesh on the bones of these formal statistics, we will now turn to the actual 
workings of these departments, leaving their performance aside for a while and focusing 
primarily on the administrative procedures leading to the transposition of EU directives. 
Moreover, these departmental descriptions also include information on how we could classify 
different subdivisions within ministries, which is not reflected in these statistics. 
 
Table!6.3!Transposition!performance!per!department!(two!samples)!
          Sample 
 
 
Ministry 
All directives 2008-2013  
(N=382) 
Directives requiring implementation 2008-2013 
(N=192)  
In time Late 
Ministerial share 
of total 
In time Late 
Ministerial share 
of total 
BZ  1 0 1 1 0 1 
% 100 0 0.3 100 0 0.5 
BZK 2 2 4 1 2 3 
% 50 50 1 33.3 66.7 1.6 
EZ 68 30 98 13 22 35 
% 69.4 30.6 25.7 37.1 62.9 18.2 
FIN 11 33 44 9 25 34 
% 25 75 11.5 26.5 73.5 17.7 
I&M 114 46 160 32 39 71 
% 71.2 28.7 41.9 45.1 54.9 37 
OCW 0 2 2 0 2 2 
% 0 100 0.5 0 100 1 
SZW 5 5 10 3 5 8 
% 50 50 2.6 37.5 62.5 4.2 
V&J 6 11 17 5 10 15 
% 35.3 64.7 4.5 33.3 66.7 7.8 
VWS 39 7 46 18 5 23 
% 84.8 15.2 12 78.3 21.7 12 
Total 246 136 382 82 110 192 
% 64.4 35.6 100 42.7 57.3 100 
 - 57 - 
6.3 Departmental administrative procedures 
In this section concise descriptions of transposition procedures per department are provided. 
Some departments have developed very structured organizational procedures (e.g. I&M through 
working with so-called “dossier teams” for the transposition of spatial and environmental 
directives), while other departments seem to have too few directives to develop such structured 
routines. When a ministry transposes only a relatively small number of directives, the description 
will be somewhat more detailed in terms of how the organisation handled those few directives 
and how the administrative procedure is shaped, while procedures of departments with plenty of 
directives (on a yearly basis) are described more in terms of “how it is generally done”.  
 
In these descriptions five aspects/phases related to the internal phase of the transposition 
process will be discussed, these are: (1) the broad division of tasks during the negotiation phase34, 
(2) the transition from negotiation to transposition around the publication date of the directive, 
(3) if and how a planning is made, (4) the actual transposition and (5) coordination and process 
monitoring during the internal phase. Needless to add, the procedures that are depicted here are 
stylistic simplifications of the actual process that is sometimes “messy” and characterized by ad 
hoc cooperation structures and the involvement of numerous parties that can only be veraciously 
depicted through case-by-case descriptions. During many of the conversations, examples were 
given of inter-ministerial directives that required the involvement of numerous parties from 
within the government as well as external stakeholders; the following descriptions are only 
limitedly applicable to such cases. Moreover, within departments one can also frequently 
distinguish vast differences in terms of style and performance, either as a result of reorganizations 
(e.g. which led to the merger of two completely different organisation) and/or policy-related 
characteristics (e.g. some policy areas have almost been “colonized” by the EU, while others are 
merely touched by the first EU policies). Within each description the existing lines of division 
will be briefly sketched; these are not ostensible lines of division, but they are accepted and 
sustained within the departments through the organizational set-up along policy fields and 
concomitant regulatory practices.  
 
6.3.1  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ)  
As table 6.1 displays, the ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ) only had one European directive over 
the last five years, which was even the very first directive this department ever had to implement. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 This phase formally precedes the internal phase, however, frequently the internal phase or transposition phase 
already starts before the publication of the directive. Moreover, given the importance of early involvement of the 
legal department it is essential to take this step into account. 
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The reason for this sudden change is not to be found at the European level (e.g. expansion of 
competences), but simply the result of reorganizations, in which DG BEB (Foreign Economic 
Relations) was transferred from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to Foreign Affairs in 2012 
(MinBuZa, 2013: 5). In the interview that was held for this department, both the process leading 
to the transposition of the original directive (2009/43/EG; at the ministry of Economic Affairs) 
as well as the relatively simple transposition of the amending directive (2012/47/EU) through 
the use of a dynamic reference35, were discussed. Both these directives deal with the aim to 
“simplify the rules and procedures applicable to the intra-Community transfer of defence-related 
products in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market”. Although, it is hard to 
speak of a general “style of implementation” in this case, the transposition of these directives 
does constitute the frame of reference –at least for the policymakers involved- for future 
trajectories. The question still remains, however, how this will eventually evolve. 
 
During the negotiations for new directives in the policy formulation phase, DG BEB (which is a 
policy department) sends a policymaker with expertise on the specific policy area to Brussels. 
This official cooperates with the permanent representative for their department and they jointly 
negotiate in Council working groups. At least for the original directive (2009/43), the ministerial 
legal department was merely informed in the beginning (when the proposal was published by the 
Commission) and not actively consulted during the negotiation phase. According to the 
respondent this might have led to unanticipated legal problems later on in the implementation 
phase. The case holder that conducts the negotiations is normally also responsible for the 
transposition in the Netherlands (however, in this particular case, the person that negotiated the 
directive was transferred and a colleague took over the dossier). Given the fact that the same 
policymaker is responsible for the negotiation as well as for the policy input during the 
transposition, no transfer of the dossier has to be made, and the implementation process can 
start directly after or even slightly before the directive has been published. The negotiating 
official starts by taking the initiative to notify the legal department36, which in turn is requested to 
make an implementation plan.   
 
In this particular case, the central legal department of the ministry of Economic Affairs wrote the 
implementation plan (in consultation with the policymaker). In the future, this task will 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 The directive in question is yearly updated by the simple addition of products to the appendix, however, since the 
department makes use of a dynamic reference, no real transposition measures are required anymore. 
36 Most ministries have a centralized legal department that is involved with writing of statutes and in varying degrees 
with lower legal instruments. 
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presumably befall the legal department of Foreign Affairs, however, it is yet unknown how that 
will work out in practice.37 Besides the implementation plan, a separate planning document with a 
week-to-week schedule was used that enabled the central legal department to manage and secure 
the timely involvement of the policymaker. In that respect, the central legal department had a 
leading role during the transposition phase, in which the policymaker writes the general section 
of the explanatory note, and the lawmaker the actual legal text, provisions and the explanatory 
notes per article. As indicated above, this particular case was delayed presumably because the 
legal measures that were initially chosen for the transposition were unfit (as became clear after a 
negative report of the Council of State). At the time the central legal department was finally 
consulted, too much time had already passed. To summarize, DGBEB and consequently the 
ministry of Foreign Affairs, are only rarely confronted with EU directives. Moreover, given the 
dynamic reference structure in the only directive they had to implement last year, and which they 
can expect in the coming year, it is yet unclear how actual transposition processes within this 
department will be structured.   
 
6.3.2 Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) 
As table 6.1 displays, similar to the ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science, this ministry is rarely involved in the implementation of EU directives. In 
this case, obviously because many policies dealt with in this ministry are purely national. Three of 
the four directives that have been implemented over the last five years were transposed by the 
Directorate-General for Immigration. After the instalment of cabinet Rutte-Asscher this DG has, 
however, been transferred to the ministry of Security and Justice, of which the department of 
Integration and Society (formerly part of this DG) has split off to the ministry of Social Affair 
and Employment. As such, the two interviews with the four respondents held for this ministry 
primarily deal with the currently ongoing implementation trajectories38 and experiences of more 
than five years ago. No strong divisions between different approaches were observed, and the 
processes differ primarily on the basis of the number of instruments, parties and the kind of 
interests involved. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Since the only directive the department had to transpose was the amending directive discussed above that was 
transposed using a dynamic reference. Moreover, the ministry of Foreign Affairs rarely makes formal legislation, so 
depending on the quantity of directives of DGBEB, another option would be to decentralize this task to the 
department itself. 
38 i.e. these are directives 2013/1/EU and 2010/31/EU that respectively deal with the “exercise of the right to stand 
as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a member state of which 
they are not nationals” and a recast directive on “the energy performance of buildings”. The latter is already delayed 
and the former implemented long before the actual deadline. 
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When the European Commission publishes a new proposal, it is the policymaker (case holder) 
within the relevant policy department that takes the initiative to distribute the proposal among 
the relevant actors (including the central legal department; i.e. Constitutional Affairs and 
Legislation or CZW) in order to jointly formulate the Dutch position in the BNC-fiche. 
Depending on whether there are interfaces with other policy fields and the degree to which it is 
required to involve practical and enforcement expertise –to map the consequences of the 
proposed amendments – the number of parties increases and in extraordinary cases a full 
“dossier team” is formed. Generally the central legal department is involved early on, as the 
individuals within these departments are used to be acting in close cooperation (also for pure 
national issues in which legislation is involved). During the whole negotiation phase draft files are 
shared and if possible the implementation plan is already formulated during the negotiation 
phase. 
 
The implementation plan is an essential part of every transposition in which at least a 
governmental decree or a law is required. As such, in these trajectories the implementation plan is 
formulated in cooperation between the case holder (policymaker) and the lawmaker, with the 
former being responsible for the timelines of the process until the draft measures are tabled in 
the council of ministers. After the measures have been decided on, the formal responsibility 
officially befalls the legal department. Besides an implementation plan a memorandum39 is 
formulated which includes a formal request to start working on a subject in which a rough 
planning is made, the involved parties/persons are indicated and the project is accurately 
described. This document is submitted to the management staff and with their approval the 
transposition is underway. According to one of the respondents, in one of her prior 
implementation trajectories, she even submitted a formal memo to the minister for a directive 
that proposed far reaching measures. That does, however, only occur when it is expected that the 
project demands a large share of the available capacity and official permission has to be granted. 
 
When preparing the draft measures, the lawmaker writes the legal text, legal provisions and the 
explanatory notes per article, while the policymaker is involved to make specific policy decisions 
and write the general section of the explanatory note. The coordination structures for the 
implementation of directives within this department are not formalized and according to one of 
the respondents, cooperation and progress are primarily managed through the professional ethic 
and soft guidance of the involved parties during the process. Besides, every department has its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 In Dutch: startnotitie.!
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own periodical meetings in which every individuals’ proceedings are discussed. However, when 
the number of parties and the size of the project increase, the cooperation structure and 
coordination practices are more formalized (cf. dossier teams).  
 
6.3.3 Economic Affairs (EZ) 
In 2010 the ministry of Economic Affairs, merged with the ministry of Agriculture, Nature and 
Food Quality and underwent a name change into the ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture 
and Innovation (EL&I). In 2012, after the instalment of the Rutte-Asscher Cabinet, the name of 
the department changed again, back to the ministry of Economic Affairs although it now 
includes agriculture and as described above, excludes DGBEB. Within this department a trifold 
division can be made among the main policy fields that deal with the implementation of EU 
legislation and these are: (1) agriculture, (2) energy and (3) public procurement and telecom. 
Especially in the area of agriculture, which is historically linked to the earliest stages of European 
integration, we find that many directives can be implemented on a lower level, by dynamic 
references or are already covered by existing legislation (see table 6.2). Energy and public 
procurement and telecom (issues closely linked to the functioning of the internal market) are 
more similar in terms of style and performance and these transpositions are more often a 
balanced mixture of all kinds of legal instruments (although frequently involving statutory 
amendments). 
 
When the Commission publishes a new proposal, a so-called case holder is assigned within one 
of the DG’s (based on its area of competence). Before formulating the BNC-fiche, the case 
holder sends the concept text of the proposal to the central legal (staff) department (Legal and 
Juridical Affairs; WJZ) within the ministry and other ministries, stakeholders or parties that are 
relevant to consult. After formulating the Dutch position and the negotiation instructions, the 
policymaker closely cooperates with the permanent representative, and for the relevant council 
working group meetings he joins him in Brussels. During these negotiations, the permanent 
representative is the primary spokesperson with a prescribed mandate in the shape of the 
negotiation instructions (written in the Netherlands). The degree to which the lawmaker is 
involved during this stage differs quite a lot, when looking at the area of agriculture it was 
common practice that a lawmaker always joined the case holder when negotiating in Brussels. 
Nowadays (after the merger), the frequency of lawmakers being so deeply involved decreased, 
however, it still happens on a regular basis. On the other hand, in the areas of energy and public 
procurement and telecom it rarely occurs that lawmakers are sent to Brussels. During the 
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negotiation phase lawmakers do, however, receive all documents relevant for the progress of the 
directive and their degree of involvement hence depends on whether they (the lawmakers) are 
approached by the policymaker (with specific questions) and/or whether they themselves detect 
legal aspects in the draft-texts that need further attention.  
 
Although lawmakers are often already involved during the negotiation phase (at least in the very 
beginning), the actual composition of the implementation plan and the actual work often only 
starts when the final text for the directive is available. From this point on the policymaker and 
the lawmaker engage into a process of coproduction. Besides the implementation plan, a separate 
shared planning is made that involves the preparatory stages within the ministry and takes into 
account both legal as well as policy requirements. Since the transpositions of directives for energy 
are not always so-called “one-on-one” or “sec” implementation procedures, the draft measures 
are frequently tabled in one of the departmental preparation committees. With the meeting dates 
of these committees and the council of ministers in mind, the planning often revolves around the 
idea that the proposal needs to be in parliament at a given date (i.e. implementation deadline 
minus 10-12 months).  
 
During the transposition process, the lawmaker (attending lawmaker), is supported by a so-called 
“coordinating lawmaker” within this department.  This is a senior legal expert that coordinates a 
lawmakers during the transposition phase. Besides offering “a second pair of eyes” on the subject 
matter, he oversees various simultaneously running projects that sometimes need to be attuned to 
one another. Moreover, the coordinating lawmaker does not only provide substantial support, he 
sometimes interferes as referee between policy departments and the legal department (although 
that is a task normally in the hands of the middle managers). Like in most ministries there is a 
division of tasks during the transposition phase, in the sense that the policymaker oversees the 
policy decisions and writes the general section of the explanatory note, and the lawmaker the 
actual legal text, provisions and the explanatory notes per article. Although, as indicated above, 
the process is a co-production, WJZ has the lead during the transposition and exerts pressure on 
the policy departments to ensure timely efforts. This description is primarily applicable to simple 
transposition trajectories, however, when dealing with larger directives that involve more parties, 
have larger consequences for the enforcement and realization in practice and/or have greater 
societal consequences; more than three people are involved. In some cases, four or six officials 
cooperate to realize the transposition of a directive and in such cases a chairman and secretary are 
always appointed. 
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To secure coordination during the process, both counterparts (law- and policymakers) are 
embedded within their own department in which frequently team meetings are held, moreover, 
once every three months they have a personal planning interview between themselves and their 
direct supervisor. In these conversations, every ongoing project is discussed, including 
transposition projects. As described above, the coordinating lawmaker is also involved to guide 
on substantial issues, but also oversees the timeliness. Furthermore when working in a team, peer 
pressure and the coordination by the chairman and secretary further guide the process. 
According to one of the respondents, however, notwithstanding all these mechanisms, the 
success of cooperation varies greatly and often depends on the commitment of the involved 
policymaker. Since WJZ steers on meeting the deadlines, is formally responsible, and the 
policymakers only have the responsibility over the quality of the policies, actually meeting the 
deadline is hard sometimes. One of the proposals made by the same respondent would be to 
install so-called “ad hoc steering committees” during the transposition of directives for which 
several ministries are involved. The committees are meant to resolve conflicts between 
departments when they themselves have reached a point where their substantive points of view 
can no longer be reconciled.  
 
6.3.4 Finance (FIN) 
Within this ministry there is a divide between fiscal and non-fiscal regulatory policies, the two 
main areas within the ministry that deal with a substantial part of transposition of European laws 
and regulations. Fiscal policies and legislation are part of an annual cycle called the Tax Plan (in 
Dutch: Belastingplan) that primarily deals with the collection of governmental resources and 
income policies. This cycle sets in between May and August in which draft measures for fiscal 
adjustments are written within the ministerial departments. In August these draft measures are 
tabled in the Council of Ministers, after which they are rapidly submitted to the Council of State. 
In a very brief period of three months these measures need to be agreed upon in both the Second 
and the First Chamber, to eventually enter into force in January of the next year. Normally all EU 
directives and regulations that land at DG Fiscal Affairs (DG FZ) are integrally made part of this 
cycle and quite possibly these directives are therefore more frequently transposed in a timely 
manner. On the other hand, non-fiscal policies that are transposed by a sub-department of the 
General Treasury (Generale Thesaurie) are not part of the tax plan and most often deal with 
financial market regulations that often require statutory amendments. 
 
As soon as a new Commission proposal is published, the ministry of Foreign Affairs sends it to 
 - 64 - 
the department of Foreign Financial Affairs (in Dutch: Buitenlandse Financiele Betrekkingen), 
which is a sub-department of the General Treasury within the ministry of Finance. This 
department coordinates the distribution of directives within the ministry and either sends 
directives to department Europe (which is a sub-department of department General Fiscal 
Politics) or to the department Financial Markets (a sub-department of the General Treasury). The 
former is a coordinating department on the fiscal side of the ministry, while the latter is both a 
policymaking and an implementing department that directly assigns a policymaker as the case 
holder. An important characteristic of all officials involved with the transposition of EU 
directives within this ministry, in comparison to other ministries, is that no distinction is made 
between policymakers and lawmakers, since both these officials work within the policy 
directorates and often an official will have both areas of expertise. They are equipped with both 
legal knowledge and they are able to make policy decisions, hence the central legal department 
has a minor role in comparison to other ministries.  
 
Before the negotiation phase, the case holder formulates a BNC-fiche and the Dutch negotiation 
instruction along with a policymaker of department Europe on the fiscal side, and alone (but in 
dialogue with his direct supervisor) on the non-fiscal side. At the permanent representation, the 
ministry of Finance has a number of representatives with which they closely cooperate and the 
negotiations are therefore mostly a combined effort between the permanent representatives, case 
holders and coordinators of the department Europe. It is a double advantage of both being able 
to negotiate and transpose, while simultaneously being equipped with both policy as well as legal 
knowledge. This often makes the transition from the negotiation phase to the transposition a 
smooth procedure. In exceptional cases, individuals negotiate several directives at once and 
because of this disproportionate workload, another policymaker performs the transposition of 
several of these directives. According to a respondent, however, “such cases more frequently end 
up being delayed”.   
 
After the negotiation phase has ended, at the beginning of the transposition processes a 
document containing time planning is composed. The size and complexity of the planning 
depends on the number of parties involved and the number of parties that need to be consulted 
beforehand. The direct supervisor of the case holder receives the planning and in more extensive 
cases, the planning is also sent to the junior minister to keep this person informed. During the 
transposition phase most of the actual writing work is performed individually or in teams 
(depending on size and complexity of the directive), and during this process a “Senior Legal 
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Advisor” supports the drafting official. This “Senior Legal Advisor” is an experienced legal 
expert who can be found within most of the implementing departments and who helps with 
specific legal questions on the fiscal side of the department they are called “quality warrantors”. 
 
During the transposition phase, the involved officials are monitored and directed through quite 
strong coordination structures. In the first place, individuals’ proceedings are discussed in weekly 
team meetings held by staff members within the department, these informative meetings that 
facilitate the exchange of information on timing and planning of (among other things) EU 
transposition trajectories. Secondly, officials have frequent one-on-one conversations with their 
supervisors/managers, who has a coordinating role and which they will inform when possible 
delays are expected. Thirdly, on the fiscal side of the department, department Europe, that 
especially coordinates the negotiation phase, frequently also keeps track of transposition 
processes. Moreover tbecause these measures are part of the Tax Plan, timeliness is secured more 
properly. On the non-fiscal side, many transposition trajectories are team-efforts in which a 
coordinator guides a team of 2-8 people and peer-pressures ensures effective cooperation.  
 
6.3.5 Infrastructure and Environment (I&M) 
I&M is the result of a merger (in 2010) between the former ministries of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management (V&W) and Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
(VROM). Although these ministries often shared common policy grounds, their organizational 
procedures surrounding the transposition of EU directives differed quite extensively. While the 
latter introduced and worked primarily with so-called “dossier teams”, the former processed a lot 
of directives but made use of less formalized structures to do so. Some of these differences still 
persist in the current situation; however, in other respects they have grown more towards each 
other.  
 
These so-called “dossier teams” –that currently still persist and handle all environmental and 
spatial directives within I&M– are an indirect spinoff of the Dutch EU presidency in 2004, which 
led to the large scale elimination and evaluation of delays and problems with timely 
transposition40 (also discussed in chapter two). As one of the respondents described: “during that 
period of time, transposition was a pressing issue and the existing delays needed to be resolved as 
fast as possible”. In that respect, the presidency aroused a sense of urgency when it comes to EU !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 21109 no. 190 (i.e. an evaluation report of a number of transposed directives within 
the ministry of VROM that was performed in order to find and implement procedural and instrumental 
improvements to the transposition process). 
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compliance. At that time, within VROM the department of International Affairs (IZ) had a 
strong coordinating role during the negotiation phase and the Head Department of 
Administrative and Juridical Affairs (HBJZ) was primarily leading during the transposition. The 
former made use of so-called “dossier teams” that were formed with every new Commission 
proposal and dissolved as soon as the directive was published. These teams included an official 
of IZ and the permanent representative (to ensure “international expertise”), a lawmaker and a 
policymaker of the DG that was responsible for the directive, moreover, it frequently included 
officials of other ministries, of the provinces or even the municipalities. Very soon the decision 
was made to extend the life span of these (sometimes inter-ministerial and/or inter-
administrative) dossier teams and to prolong their operations until the end of the transposition 
phase. Currently, 14-15 dossier teams still exist and every new directive that falls within one of 
their areas of competence is negotiated and transposed by the members of such a team. 
 
Within I&M there is now a division between proposals that are dealt with by these dossier teams 
and directives that are handled through the regular departmental channels. In such cases the 
Department of General Administrative-Juridical Affairs (ABJZ) is the coordinating department (a 
sub-department of HBJZ) that receives information of the ministry of Foreign Affairs on new 
Commission proposals, and together with the responsible policy department prepares the Dutch 
position for the BNC-fiche. Whether and to what degree the legal department is involved during 
the negotiation phase is the outcome of a two-way process. On the one hand, the lawmaker can 
subscribe to all relevant BNC messages and preparatory documents for his specific policy areas 
via “Mailbox International” (internal information channel), on the other hand the involved 
policymakers can also contact them for legal consultation during the negotiations or already when 
composing the BNC fiche. Hence, there is no structural involvement (like in dossier teams), but 
it depends on the dossier, the attentiveness of the lawmaker and the involved policymakers. 
 
In anticipation on difficulties during the transposition phase, the legal department is however 
frequently already involved during the negotiation phase. In such cases the actual transposition 
and the formulation of the implementation plan start before the publication date (otherwise after 
publication in the OJ). Although policy departments remain responsible for compliance with the 
directive, HBJZ is de facto responsible for transposition and is also the primary point of contact 
for the ministers when it comes to transposition performance. Besides the mandatory 
formulation of the implementation plan, an internal memorandum is composed when dealing 
with large projects (both within as well as outside dossier teams). Moreover, the lawmaker often 
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makes a simple separate planning for all parties involved and a centrally assigned para-legal enters 
the planned instruments in the i-Timer.  
 
The actual transposition processes are very diverse and range from simple legal amendments to 
very complex processes, with the involvement of various policymakers, executive and 
enforcement agencies, local and regional governments and societal organizations. According to 
one of the respondents it is hard to provide a general picture of these processes, but the 
dimensions along which complexity of a process can be defined are: (a) the number of ministries, 
levels of government and other organizations involved, (b) the margin of discretion left by the 
directive, (c) the complexity of and the number of the legal amendments that need to be made, 
(d) whether or not new competences for enforcement agencies are enshrined in the text, (e) 
alterations to the enforcement instruments and, (f) the degree of political saliency. Obviously, the 
more boxes that can be ticked for complexity, the closer the organization transposition structure 
will resemble to the idea of a dossier team with more formalized procedures and working 
agreements. 
 
As a side effect of complexity, processes like these are often harder to coordinate and the 
involved officials tend to carve out larger margins of discretion once they become more 
specialized and operate more independently. These officials are therefore primarily coordinated 
by their own professional ethic, secondly, given that the central legal department takes a leading 
role, horizontal pressure back and forth between the involved counterparts also structures the 
process. Lastly, the existing departmental structures with periodic team meetings and bilateral 
meetings between officials and their direct supervisors are interwoven in the whole process. 
Nonetheless, according to one of the respondents, despite all these safeguards, lawmakers 
sometimes still need to be made aware of the urgency of these matters and spurred to start 
working early on a directive. 
 
6.3.6 Education, Culture and Science (OCW) 
Over the last five years, only two directives have been implemented within this ministry, one of 
which required an impressive 48 legal instruments (7 laws, 16 governmental decrees and 25 
ministerial orders) and dealt with the “recognition of professional qualifications” across the 
member states (2005/36/EG). Although OCW was the leading ministry for this directive, it had 
to closely cooperate with Economic Affairs during the negotiations (given the relatedness of the 
subject with internal market affairs). Moreover, since the directive touched upon a broad range of 
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professions, almost all Dutch ministries were involved in the transposition phase. The other 
directive (2007/65/EG) on “television broadcasting activities”, was negotiated and transposed 
solely by OCW itself and required an amendment of the existing Media Law and a ministerial 
order. The latter directive was handled by a policy department within one of the directorates-
general (DG Culture, Media and National Archive), while the former landed at the department of 
International Policy (IB), which normally does not make or implement any policy. 
 
As such, the experiences within this ministry with EU directives are fairly limited, as well as 
fragmented, given the fact that different departments within the ministry transposed these 
directives. Nonetheless, there seems to be growing attention for EU law and the EU in general 
because –according to a respondent – more and more people start to notice that it increasingly 
affects various preconditions of policymaking within this department. Also the departments that 
were hitherto only sporadically affected by European policies (such as higher and professional 
education). Although the area of media and audio-visual affair also rarely transposes directives, it 
is more frequently involved with European policies through soft-law measures and guidelines. 
 
When a new Commission proposal is published, it arrives at the department of International 
Policy (IB) and (if already applicable) the responsible policy department within the ministry 
through their direct contacts with the permanent representation. Although not many European 
directives are implemented at this ministry, it has a fairly well organized structure for the 
exchange of information on incoming and ongoing EU affairs41. That is, every week there is a 
meeting on EU affairs between the department of Legal and Juridical Affairs (WJZ), 
International Policy (IB), Financial and Economic Affairs (FEZ) and a representative of every 
policy department (interested in these matters), which evolves around new Commission 
proposals, proceedings of European decision-making processes, matters of the CoCo, problems 
and peculiarities with EU related topics, etc. Also substantive presentations are frequently held 
during these meetings, which are both meant to exchange knowledge and experiences, as well as 
create awareness for the importance of these matters across the departments.  
 
The preparations for the negotiations in the Council working groups are made by policymakers 
through the formulation of the BNC-fiche. At this stage, the number of departments involved 
partly depends on which policy fields are struck by the directive. The large directive on 
“professional qualifications” was mainly a combined effort of OCW and EZ, while the directive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Especially the department of Emancipation (cf. equal treatment) promotes these efforts. 
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on “television broadcasting activities” was solely prepared and transposed by OCW. A distinctive 
element of each of the policy departments within this ministry is that they all employ one or two 
lawmakers that work within the department (so-called policy lawyers). Hence, during the 
formulation of the BNC-fiche the policymaker takes the lead and consults their departmental 
policy lawyer as well as department IB and possibly other relevant (external) parties. In the 
Council working groups; the national policymaker and the permanent representative conduct the 
negotiations. 
 
When the negotiations draw to a close, the policy lawyer already proceeds in formulating the 
implementation plan. Besides the implementation plan, a schedule and description of the 
transposition project are articulated through a memorandum. Apart from these documents a 
rough planning schedule is composed (which is distributed among the involved parties) that is 
roughly based on the intermediate steps that are projected in the i-Timer (as soon as the intended 
instruments are entered). According to a respondent, the projected schedule in the i-Timer came 
in hand, especially given their lack of experience with prior transposition trajectories it offered 
useful targets to focus on. The information in the i-Timer is centrally managed, by an official who 
works at WJZ, and who is simultaneously the ministerial representative for the ministry in the 
ICER-I. During the actual transposition of the directive, this person therefore naturally 
coordinates the process by keeping track of progress and informing parties where possible 
through various channels. 
 
Given the rarity of directives within this department, there are no special coordination structures 
that guide transposition processes (apart from the weekly meeting on EU affairs discussed above 
and the ICER-I that served its purpose during the implementation of the extensive “professional 
qualifications” directive). There are, however, various meetings and information exchange 
moments that aim to secure the proper functioning of the organization. In the first place, every 
department has its own weekly meetings and within the legal department every official discusses 
“Week”. The “Week” is a kind of log in which all activities of that person are recorded that might 
be of interest for one or more of their colleagues. These logs are stored on a shared drive within 
the ministry and contribute to exchange of knowledge (within and between departments) and 
makes it possible to act quickly and informed when dealing with specific issues. Then there are 
meetings of WJZ (including all sub-departments) and there are specific lawmaker meetings in 
which policy lawyers, lawmakers and advice lawyers of all ranks of the ministry are involved. 
Apart from these formal meetings, close cooperation between departments (e.g. WJZ with the 
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policy departments) reinforces the processes within the organization.   
 
6.3.7 Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) 
Within the ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) the department of European 
Affairs (EA) as a sub-department of the department International Affairs (IZ) within DG Work, 
is the pivotal player between the European policymaking arena and the national department 
(MinSZW, 2013: 54). It coordinates the negotiation of new Commission proposals by sending 
policymakers to Brussels and closely cooperates with the Directorate General –to which the 
responsibility for the directive formally befalls- and the permanent representative during the 
negotiation phase. SZW has a central legal (staff) department that is in varying degrees involved 
before the actual publication of the directive; their involvement however strongly depends on the 
assessment made by IZ on whether or not they think it is expedient to request legal expertise. 
During the interview, it became clear that the urgency of attention for the legal aspects of the 
directive is not always equally well recognized by all policymakers. Moreover, through scarcity of 
capacity and resources, the supply of information through other internal channels has also 
declined over time, which had an equally detrimental effect on the information position of the 
lawmaker. Capacity simply dictates priorities. Mostly depending on the size of the project, early 
involvement of the lawmaker could range from sending the relevant documents and draft-texts to 
the legal department, to actually consulting and involving them and in very extraordinary 
circumstances even inviting them to partake in the negotiation process.  
 
Given that the legal department within this ministry is the driver of transposition once the 
directive has been published, the moment of their involvement also largely determines when the 
actual transposition process starts. One of the respondent lawmakers gave the example of his 
involvement with the implementation of the “Working Time directive”, in which he was already 
deeply immersed long before the directive was published. On the other hand, the actual 
proceedings surrounding a directive on “Electromagnetic Fields in the Working Place” got 
underway only after the directive was published in the OJ. In any case, the preliminary steps of 
such processes are the composition of an implementation plan (including the selection of 
instruments and reaching a broad agreement between the policymaker and the lawmaker on the 
mode of transposition) making a separate planning and entering in the planned instruments in the 
i-Timer. The latter is, however, not performed personally by the implementing officials but it is a 
task that is centralized at the department of Administrative and International Affairs (B&IZ) 
which is also a sub-unit of the department of Legislation, Administrative and Juridical Affairs 
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(DWBJZ), just like the sub-department of Legislation. The separate planning is composed 
through making a rough estimation of the time of the steps that need to be taken after the 
council of ministers has come to an agreement, completely leaving aside the projected time paths 
in the i-Timer. 
 
After these “formalities”, the actual transposition is mostly a team effort between at least one 
lawmaker and one policymaking counterpart. The size of these teams depends on a number of 
factors, these are: (a) the size of the project (in terms of the number and complexity of legal 
amendments that have to be made), (b) the number of parties involved (both governmental and 
non-governmental parties) and, (c) the saliency of the directive (in terms of political, societal and 
organizational factors). Different configurations obviously also demand different approaches and 
these efforts are primarily orchestrated by IZ, the policymaker and in lesser degree the involved 
lawmaker. In terms of the division of tasks: the policymaker writes the general section of the 
explanatory note, and the lawmaker the actual legal text, provisions and the explanatory notes per 
article. The policymaker determines the content and the discretionary policy decisions that 
sometimes need to be made. 
 
During the whole process, the policy department is formally responsible for timely transposition, 
however, the legal department steers heavily on a timely course. The progress is furthermore 
coordinated by “normal” departmental structures in which the departmental manager discusses 
day-to-day work with his team. Moreover, because the department of Administrative and 
International Affairs (B&IZ) keeps track of the processes in the i-Timer and frequently has to 
report departmental proceedings to Secretary General and the Ministers, they also exert pressure 
on timely transposition. Potential conflicts, misunderstandings and divergent views on priorities 
are either dealt with on a personal level (after all they are professionals) or when stalemate 
threatens to occur, the whole issue is “escalated”. Which is an accepted procedure that sets in 
when conflict cannot be dissolved on one level and the issue needs to be decided on a higher 
hierarchical level (between middle managers or higher).  
 
Through recent reorganizations of the cabinet Rutte-Asscher (as mentioned above), the 
department of Integration and Society was moved from the ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations to Social Affairs and Employment. In case this department would have to 
transpose a directive in the near future, the procedure described above would also apply to that 
field given the institutionalized roles of IZ and DWBJZ. 
 - 72 - 
6.3.8 Security and Justice (V&J) 
In contrast to other ministries, the lawmakers at this ministry in most cases have a leading role in 
both the negotiation and transposition of EU directives. The legal specificity of the issues they 
deal with, makes it inefficient for them to rely on the permanent representative nor the 
policymaking counterparts within their own ministry, simply because they lack the required 
expertise. The legal department within this ministry is a sub-department of the SG cluster and 
contains three sectors that are in more or lesser degree involved in the implementation of EU 
directives. These are the sectors of Civil Law, Criminal and Penal Law and Constitutional and 
Administrative Law. It strongly depends on the subject, but when a policymaking counterpart 
within or outside the ministry can be found, the legal department will send them the Commission 
proposal and the national position will be prepared in a collaborative effort.  
 
An obvious advantage of the fact that the negotiator and implementer are one and the same 
person, is that already at the onset all potential difficulties of transposition due to peculiarities of 
our national legal system and existing legislation can be taken into account. Moreover, the 
transition from negotiation to transposition can be swift and the implementation plan is 
frequently already near completion around the date of publication. According to one of the 
respondents, when the Commission publishes a new proposal, an explanatory note is attached to 
it. During the negotiations several amendments are made that cannot be traced back to that 
original document; normally when a lawmaker is not already involved during this phase, he has to 
rely on the policymakers’ notes and memory to get an idea of the considerations that have led to 
these changes. In this set-up, such difficulties are absent and the negotiation can seamlessly 
connect to the transposition in the national context. 
 
As soon as the negotiations have been concluded, the lawmaker composes a so-called 
memorandum, which is a formal request to start working on a subject in which a rough planning 
is made, the involved parties/persons are indicated and the project is accurately described. This 
document is submitted to the management staff and with their approval the transposition is 
underway. Besides the memorandum, the lawmaker often makes a rough time schedule for own 
usage, for the departmental supervisor42 and sometimes a more substantive note to discuss with 
policy counterparts or third parties involved during the transposition.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Which is the Senior Legal Advisor who coordinates two or three clusters in terms of substance, while human 
resource tasks all befall the Sector Head (middle manager). 
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Although drafting legislation is eventually an individual task, aspects related to the preparation of 
the enforcement of the policy in practice, the choices about how to fill-in discretionary margins 
and the balancing of priorities can make the transposition within this department a complex 
matter. Especially in the area of penal and criminal law, which is an area in which the EU has 
only recently started expanding, the vested interests of the public prosecutor’s department, the 
judicial power, the police and the legal profession can make the transposition of seemingly simple 
policies (through the eyes of other member states), very cumbersome in practice. On top of that, 
because the responsibility of transposition is primarily at the legal department, it is frequently 
difficult to activate policy officials to get involved in this process and leave their purely national 
tasks/priorities aside for a while.  
 
Clearly, the lawmakers at this department are of a different kind because they negotiate, carry 
knowledge on substance (policy) as well as process (law) and they need to be assertive in the 
sense that they personally lead the internal transposition process. Understandably, the 
professional ethic of these officials reduces the need for strong coordination structures. 
Nonetheless, progress is monitored through several mechanisms. In the first place, every sector 
employs a number of senior legal advisors that are the primary point of contact for substantive 
issues. Moreover, sectors are horizontally divided in a given number of clusters (based on policy 
areas) and a lesser number of senior legal advisors, frequently cluster and/or sector meetings are 
held to discuss everyone’s proceedings. In these meeting substantive transposition issues are 
discussed as well as negotiation strategies. Apart from that, timeliness is managed by the sector 
head who weekly keeps track all ongoing legislative projects and discusses them with the 
ministers. Moreover, every quarter when the appreciation letter needs to be written, extra 
pressure is exerted when the department needs to justify its delays. At least all departments that 
have already experienced delays. 
 
6.3.9 Public Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) 
Within this ministry there is a natural division between two policy areas that differ extensively in 
terms of their experience/history with EU legislation, the frequency with which they are 
confronted with directives and the magnitude of the amendments that need to be made once a 
new directive is adopted. One area deals exclusively with Nutrition, Health Protection and 
Prevention (commodities and product safety legislation), which is an area roughly 95% 
“colonized” by EU decision-making that has a very long EU history, good performance record 
and often transposes by using delegated legislation. In a sense, it is almost fully adapted to the 
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European arena and has the additional advantage of relatively well-organized and clear 
enforcement structures. On the other hand, the area of pharmaceuticals and medical technology 
is predominantly nationally oriented, only processes one directive annually (on average), 
experiences many difficulties finding the right organizational mode of enforcement and primarily 
implements by the use of formal laws. Often the transposition of these directives is delayed. 
These differences can also be found in the organizational characteristics and procedures. 
 
During the negotiation phase, both policy departments send a policymaker with expertise on the 
specific policy area to Brussels. Although the ministry has a centralized legal department, the 
department of Nutrition, Health Protection and Prevention (VGP) has two lawmakers who 
independently make ministerial orders and governmental decrees and only rely on the central 
legal department for formal laws and a final check on the delegated instruments. The department 
of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Technology (GMT) on the other hand relies fully on the legal 
department for all these products. In the area of VGP, the policy lawyer is sporadically involved 
during the negotiation phase, mostly at the end of the process and only with specific questions. 
Due to the highly technical nature of the subjects (e.g. the colorants, contaminants and 
preservatives in food) legal expertise can rarely be of added value during that phase. In the area 
of GMT, involvement of lawmakers would be more beneficial, however, capacity limitations and 
the magnitude of the subsequent projects frequently impede early involvement. According to one 
of the respondents, the legal department “is still gasping for breath having finished the prior 
directive”, which illustrates the magnitude and complexity of these processes (especially given the 
fact that they roughly only have one directive per year). 
 
Hence, the transposition almost always starts after the publication of the directive or when the 
definitive and translated text is available. Under the aegis of the deputy SG the department of 
International Affairs (IZ) has the function of feeding the legal and policy departments with 
information on new proposals, directives and all documents related to the formulation of these 
products (MinVWS, 2010: 60-61). This department is the single point of contact for the ministry 
of Foreign Affairs through which new directives are communicated and i-Timer and other 
progress and notification information is channelled. After publication, IZ formulates a memo in 
which it refers to the directive and its transposition deadline and formally requests the policy 
department to formulate an implementation plan and communicate this information to them so 
the instruments in the i-Timer can be entered. In most cases the policy lawyer is already notified 
by the negotiator before the adoption of the directive, in other cases the memo of IZ is their first 
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confrontation with the directive. The implementation plan is formulated by VGP43 in dialogue 
with the central legal department and is sent to IZ and apart from that a broad schedule (based 
on the expected duration for the legal instruments) is made to secure timeliness. The formulation 
of a memorandum is never required for transposition legislation in this ministry, simply because 
transposition is always obligatory and therefore never superfluous (otherwise it normally 
wouldn’t have passed all stages of the decision phase). 
 
The actual transposition is often a individually performed task (especially for VGP directives) and 
the duration is argued to correlate with the following variables: (a) the level on which it is 
transposed (is there a legal basis for delegation), (b) difficulties with ensuring enforcement and 
practical implement (e.g. systems of enforcement), linked to this is (c) the involvement of 
executive and enforcement agencies that are involved during the negotiation and transposition 
phase. Transposition processes range from very simple notifications (with dynamic references) to 
systematic and drastic adjustments as a result of amendments to the Pharmaceuticals Act. 
 
In terms of coordination and process monitoring, the central legal department steers heavily on a 
timely course through periodically reminding the policy departments (and decentralized 
lawmakers) they have to provide input and notify updates. Moreover, the “normal” departmental 
team structures with frequent team meetings secure the exchange of information on progress and 
exert soft pressure on performance. The i-Timer is never consulted (not by the middle managers 
nor the implementing lawmakers), and the IZ tacitly coordinates the process by periodically 
requesting information on progress. Especially around the time of the quarterly bulletin and 
when the appreciation letter needs to be published, transposition gets undivided attention. 
 
In the next chapter the shared structuring elements that define circumstances for faster or slower 
transposition will be discussed. What are the impediments and what makes the process accelerate 
or simply shorter. These questions will be addressed in a more structured manner, using the tools 
that are provided in the analytical framework of chapter four. 
 
6.4 Synthesis  
Table 6.4 below offers an overview of ministerial characteristics along the lines of the five 
aspects/phases as described in the beginning of section 6.3. To reiterate, these are: (1) the broad 
division of tasks during the negotiation phase, (2) the transition from negotiation to transposition !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Except for cases in which VGP has already drafted the required measure within two months after the publication 
of the directive. 
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around the publication date of the directive, (3) if and how a planning is made, (4) the actual 
transposition and (5) coordination and process monitoring during the internal phase. Based on 
these comparisons between ministries, a number of preliminary conclusions on the characteristics 
and styles of transposition can be drawn. As a more general observation, however, it became 
clear that departments can frequently be subdivided into several components that have different 
styles of implementation and deal with different kinds of policies in different legal contexts. As 
such, assigning characteristics to ministries as a whole can be problematic, as interdepartmental 
differences are sometimes even smaller than intradepartmental variation. Nonetheless, these 
descriptions point out a number of variables of interest. 
 
In the first place, the quantity and frequency with which ministry have to transpose EU directives 
seems to affect the degree to which work routines are formalized. Which may seem tautological, 
but since the legal transposition procedure is formally not different from the creation of purely 
national legal measures, it should not make any difference. I&M is the most typical example 
because it has formalized “dossier teams” that subsist over time, while BZK and OCW seem to 
work on ad hoc basis by either forming a dossier team or working one-on-one with a policy- and 
lawmaker. More formalized procedures not necessarily translate in stronger coordination 
structures and more parties involved, but regards the haphazardness of dealing with new 
directives. As departments gain experience in complex transposition processes, they seem better 
able to anticipate future difficulties, while BZ and BZK and OCW through their lack of 
experience might have difficulties when suddenly being confronted by a new type of directive.  
 
Secondly, the importance and intensity of a close cooperation between the policymaker and the 
lawmaker during the process differs extensively. Some departments talk about a co-production 
that needs little or no coordination, while others argue the cooperation could be improved 
through for instance more active involvement of the policy department (e.g. SZW, V&J). 
However, close cooperation is not always useful. For example in the area of Nutrition, Health 
Protection and Prevention (commodities and product safety legislation; VWS) early involvement 
of the lawmaker is useless because of the technical nature of the subject, while it is imperative in 
the area of Criminal and Penal Law (V&J). Moreover, the division of responsibilities when 
writing the legal text depends to a large extent on the possible margin of discretion left to make 
specific policy decisions. The less options; the more the legal department/lawmaker takes control 
and the more options; the more the lawmaker has to rely on the policymakers’ input when 
composing the legal text. 
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Thirdly, akin to the second observation, the degree to which the policymaker is interested or 
attuned to the European policy making arena, seems to affect the preconditions for successful 
transposition. As the policymaker is often primarily responsible for the negotiations, but also 
deliberations with the field, external stakeholders and contacts with other member states; they are 
the ministerial linking pin when it comes to EU affairs (especially in ministries that do not have 
an EU coordinating department). In general, transposition becomes more difficult when 
proposed amendments are further removed from existing policy structures and member state 
preferences. Therefore activities of the policy department to secure national interests are crucial. 
 
A fourth ministerial characteristic that can be distinguished is the “level of transposition”. Some 
respondents depicted their departmental workload as a collection of deeply complex measures 
that all required statutory amendments (e.g. Pharmaceuticals and Medical Technology and 
Criminal and Penal Law), while others (e.g. Agriculture; EZ, and Nutrition, Health Protection 
and Prevention; VWS) primarily dealt with minor amendments to details of existing rules. The 
former group more frequently employs statutory amendments, while the latter can more often 
suffice with delegated instruments. Moreover, the latter group is increasingly more often 
confronted with European regulations instead of directives, which is a sign of harmonisation that 
allows the European lawmaker to ordain such uniform measures.  
 
A fifth and final conclusion that can be drawn from these procedural comparisons is that the 
extensiveness and the number of planning documents differs per department. While it might not 
directly become clear when looking at table 6.4, some departments write an implementation plan, 
a memorandum and a separate planning document, while others only make minimal use of 
planning documents. The i-Timer Bulletin that is published to inform the parliament is almost 
never consulted by the implementing official, but often only by a single person per department 
enters information on transposition progress. Moreover, the planning documents are also not 
very sophisticated and strictly adhered. As they are often a print-out of rough planning made in 
the departmental legal planning system, and the internal deadlines are often changed along the 
way (without displaying the historical planning). Furthermore, it is at the discretion of the 
implementing official to decide when to start the process and enter the planning, which could 
potentially create a false idea of timeliness. As such, planning resembles more to reporting 
progress to superiors and the parliament than to guiding the timeliness of the process through 
setting intermediate targets.  
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In the next (final) chapter these aspects and other structural institutional elements that affect the 
timeliness of process will be further explicated in the organizational-institutional framework set-
out in chapter four and the most important elements will be tested in a logistic regression.
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Chapter 7. Structuring elements conducive & detrimental to the process of 
transposition 
 
In the previous chapter, the administrative routines leading to the transposition of EU directives 
per ministry were discussed. Although these ideographic descriptions already contained some 
traces of institutional factors that speed up or slow down these processes, this final chapter aims 
to explicate and test some of the structuring elements that affect the administrative phase of 
transposition. To do so, we first briefly revisit the institutional frames by which we set out to 
elicit these factors, after which we can identify the elements, and operationalize them. It is 
important to emphasize that not all factors show an equal degree of variation across the 
ministries (some seem equally compelling for every ministry), and secondly, not all factors have 
an equal bearing on all transposition processes within ministerial departments (hence control 
variables should be included). During the semi-structured interviews with practitioners within the 
ministries, the factors mentioned below repeatedly came across as well-defined “alternative 
rationalities” that are perceived as conducive or detrimental to the speed of transposition 
(Immergut, 1998: 18).  
 
As outlined in chapter four, perceiving the administrative preparation phase through an 
institutional perspective brings along the assumption that organizations are “bounded social 
constructs” that are “suspended in a web of values, norms, rules, beliefs, and taken-for-granted 
assumptions” (Frederickson & Smith, 2003: 71; Barley & Tolbert, 1997: 93). Hence, the driving 
forces determining the organizational structure and internal processes cannot be found with a 
sole focus on rationality, but reside in these cultural aspects that exert influence on the structure 
and legitimized workings of the organization (i.e. “alternative rationalities”). To reveal the origin 
of such rules, norms and values, we should look at the carriers through which these institutions 
are conveyed and maintained. As described above, four types of such carriers can be 
distinguished; these are (a) symbolic systems, (b) relational systems (c) routines and (d) artifacts 
(Scott, 2008: 79-85). Within each of these categories of conveyers a threefold distinction is made 
among elements that emanate from regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive mechanisms.  
 
Below, the analytical framework is directly applied to the transposition process, which leads to 
the identification of a number of independent factors that are either conducive or detrimental to 
pace of transposition. After describing these factors, table 7.2 summarizes in a single grid and the 
most important factors are operationalized and tested in a binary logistic regression at the end of 
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the chapter. This final chapter predominantly addresses the institutional elements conveyed by 
symbolic and relational systems, as the routines were extensively discussed in the previous 
chapter and an in-depth study of artifacts would lead us too far away from the field of study to 
which this thesis aims to make a connection. !
7.1 Symbolic systems 
Regulative institutional elements are conveyed by symbolic systems in the appearance of rules 
and laws; normative elements are contained in values and expectations; while cultural-cognitive 
institutional elements are deeply imbued in the “mental categories, typifications and schema” of 
the members of the organization (Scott, 2008: 79-85). The three structuring elements that are 
discussed in this section are the legislative style of ministerial departments, the way in which 
capacity and prioritization affect the transposition process, and how experience over time affects 
the cultural-cognitive elements that are assumed to lead to better adaptation to the characteristics 
of the EU policymaking arena. 
 
Constitutional framework & Legislative style ~ The first and probably most profound structuring 
element for transposition processes is the regulatory mechanism installed to secure democratic 
legitimacy through the “primacy of the legislature”. Already briefly discussed in chapter two, this 
rule prescribed in instruction 22-24 states that: “the main elements of the regulation shall, in any 
event, be contained in the act”. 44 As for other elements, the Crown and parliament should always 
decide (primacy of the legislature) which elements can be dealt with through delegated 
instruments. As such, in a formal sense this regulative institution is binding for every department 
and in cases in which the time provided for implementation is short, it can surely impede timely 
transposition (e.g. Berglund et al., 2006: 706). Several respondents indicated that when the 
implementation term offered is 18 months and the amendment of a law is required, the directive 
will be transposed late: “that’s a simple fact”. Nevertheless it is part and parcel of the symbolic 
system of the constitutional framework in which the hierarchically ordered legal instruments are 
the symbols of meaning and “democratic legitimacy” the rule that is being conveyed. Depicted as 
an analogy to the language metaphor in chapter four: grammar stands to language as the 
constitutional framework stands to the legal transposition process.  
 
Prima facie the analysis should stop here, because there is no variation across departments and we 
are not comparing member states (with other constitutional frameworks), but ministerial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 And acts are always to be adopted by the Crown and Parliament (cf. instruction 22-24; Instructions for Legislation). 
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departments within one member state. In several interviews and through comparing the 
transposition data over the last five years, however, variation in terms of the “level of 
transposition” can be observed. That is, some departments mostly use delegated instruments and 
others are bound to use –or at least predominantly employ- statutory amendments to transpose 
European directives. The primary reason for this variation is the extensiveness of the proposed 
amendments in the directive; i.e. small adjustments or changes to existing appendices simply do 
not require statutory amendments on a national level. On the other hand, directives such as the 
one discussed above on “the recognition of professional qualifications within the Union” 
(2005/36/EG), require the creation of a completely new law (and numerous legal amendments).  
 
In between these two extreme ends of the scale, the degree to which the existing legal structure is 
“tailored” to the EU legal dynamic, largely determines on which level ministerial departments are 
able and allowed to transpose directives. Although the constitutional framework is rigid, it does 
provide the option to create legal bases for (sub) delegation when the lawmaker (States-General 
and the Crown) determines this is desirable. Although this decision is thereby largely out of the 
hands of the ministries, an active course and progressive legislative style by steering on these 
processes can still be developed (Bovens & Yesilkagit, 2005: 524). That is, in contrast to the rather 
conservative aspects of the Instructions for Legislation that prescribe “not to include any provisions 
apart from those strictly necessary for transposition”, drafters of legal measures may surely 
determine to anticipate future transposition processes by trying to create a legal basis for 
transposing future amendments through (sub)delegated instruments. As one of the more 
experienced respondents illustrated:  
 
“…the Road Traffic Regulations Act used to be amended on governmental decree level and we 
produced at least ten governmental decrees a year. It required a lot of effort, but most of them 
were finished in time…all governmental decrees, without any added value, since all the Council of 
State returned were ‘blank advisory opinions’. Time and again we needed to table these draft 
measures in the Council of Ministers and that’s when I made the decision to create a legal basis 
for sub-delegation, and that helps, that makes it much simpler”. 
 
The conscious decision of this respondent resulted in a much higher pace of transposition in that 
specific area. The mechanism at work here is a small aspect of “integration”, where the 
democratic legitimisation of regulation is left to the EU institutions and the ministry becomes a 
mere “hatch” between the EU and national level legislation. In short, apart from the formal 
structure of the hierarchy of legal instruments, the legislative style thus seems to affect the duration 
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of transposition processes. That is, the better the ministerial department manages to “tailor” the 
legal structure through the creation of legal bases for delegation, the faster it is expected to 
transpose EU directives. As the descriptive statistics in chapter six already showed, some 
ministries primarily employ statutes, while others more often rely on ministerial orders. A ratio 
between directives transposed using lower and high instruments thus seems to be a valid 
indicator of ministerial legislative style. 
 
Capacity & Prioritization ~ As a broad and more general observation, most respondents argued 
that capacity (in terms of personnel and financial resources) within ministerial departments is 
limited and has been declining steadily over the past decades. Only few respondents argued that 
administrative capacity is absolutely insufficient, while others see it as a mere given that leads to a 
strict prioritization of some affairs over others. As such, trade-offs need to be made between 
competing priorities. The latter was already anticipated by the government in 2004 when the so-
called “priority rule” 45 was adopted by the cabinet. This agreed upon rule explicitly prescribes 
that: “transposition legislation –within the various ministerial departments– should in principle be 
assigned priority over purely national legal and regulatory measures, unless the ministers of that 
department in specific instances explicitly decide otherwise”. However, although this potentially 
delaying factor is not new46, the priority rule that aimed to solve this tension (between limited 
capacity and meeting time limits set to EU transposition) appears to be only limitedly abided 
within the ministerial departments (as became clear during the interviews). Moreover, since there 
are currently no data available on whether ministers officially notify other cabinet members of 
prioritizing other issues above pure transposition projects, we have to rely on the respondents’ 
answers. 
 
The explanation for the fact that the priority rule is not strictly abided by transposing officials – 
and in specific instances compromised for national priorities – was repeatedly provided during 
the interviews. It can be found in the normative obligations of the officials working in a political 
environment (i.e. the normative symbolic system). The expectations and obligations that are set 
to civil servants are to a large extent driven by the preferences of the minister(s) leading the 
ministry. Especially dominant in the normative fabric that runs through the ministerial 
departments, is the strong emphasis on the political priorities agreed upon in the coalition 
agreement. These are currently strongly grafted on reaching a balanced budget and pushing 
through austerity measures in various policy areas. The parliament is even informed on a frequent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45!Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 21 109 no. 144. 
46 Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 21 109 no. 117 and Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31 498, no. 1-2. 
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basis of the proceedings of the measures proposed in the coalition agreement and the financial 
cutbacks that are realized through implementing them. The so-called ‘Billion Monitor’ (‘Miljard 
Monitor’) and the ‘Government-wide Legislative Program’ (‘Rijksbreed Wetgevingsprogramma’) 
are the materializations of these norms (see Rijksoverheid, 2011; 2013). These reports explicate at 
which stage of implementation these measures are, and how much money they save. The reports 
do not contain any information on the transposition of EU measures, nor any wider European 
goals that could contribute to ‘sense of urgency’ when it comes to timely transposition. As such, 
when a law- or policymaker is confronted with specific measures that result from the coalition 
agreement, most respondents will have to prioritize these over pure EU transposition measures. 
 
Besides this government-wide tendency, there are also ministry-specific political issues that may 
trump prioritization of EU transposition. In line with the argument of Laver & Schofield, 
ministers and political parties in general will use “policy packages as their storefront” in order to 
maximize vote share at the next election (1990: 36). Ministers have a double loyalty in that sense, 
towards the cabinet and their own political party, thus politically salient issues might be 
prioritized over transposition, in order to draw voters’ attention. When these issues fall within the 
area of competence of the person who is transposing a directive at the same time, he or she will 
most likely follow the ministers’ orders (while possibly informing their superiors of the 
importance of timely transposition). An illustrative example was provided by one of the 
respondents who explained that:  
 
“…when person X is currently working on the Unemployment Act or unemployment protection, he 
cannot possibly come up to minister Asscher with the excuse that he cannot continue his work on this 
issue next week, because he has to transpose a directive…”. 
 
Already implicitly contained in this example is the observation that capacity is often not 
interchangeable, because lawmakers specialize on certain parts of the legal system. Therefore, 
some respondents argue that apart from these two explanations, the priority rule is hard to abide 
because capacity is not simply equal to the total number of civil servants. In economic 
organizational terms it has a high level of ‘asset specificity’ (Williamson, 1981: 555). Moreover, 
the political economy of the EU and the Netherlands are simply not synchronically aligned; 
therefore at different points in time some individuals and departments will inevitably be charged 
unevenly with responsibilities. In short, the structuring norm prevalent within ministerial 
departments is the prioritization of measures resulting from the coalition agreement or the 
personal political agenda of the minister, and the signs are specific draft measures produced by 
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individual law- and policymakers. Together with the high level of specialization, these aspects 
sometimes impede an early start of the transposition process. As such, departments that deal with 
the largest share of the coalition agreement and are most frequently subject to media attention are 
expected to be most prone to postpone EU transposition in order to prioritize purely (national) 
political issues. In order to approximate this factor, the ministerial share of the national budget 
over a period of five years is used as an indicator. 
 
Experience and adaptation ~ In the cultural-cognitive compartment of symbolic systems we find 
“categories, typifications and schema” as the conveyers of institutions that structure 
organizational processes. A “schema” can be defined as the way: “our past experiences are 
organized into […] abstract knowledge structures that are stored in memory and allow people to 
organize and interpret information about a given target of perception” (George & Jones, 2008: 
113). How individuals subsequently deal with these perceptions and determine the appropriate 
course of action depends to a large extent on the organizational and individual “typifications” 
and “schema”. These are interpretations and classifications of different types of actions that 
enable or discourage actors to act and behave in certain ways (e.g. normal schema such as: 
“supervisors give orders, workers follow them”) (Scott, 1987: 495). In the previous chapter one 
of the conclusions that was drawn, was that the degree of formalization of routines depends on 
the quantity and frequency with which a ministry has to transpose European directives. Along 
those same lines, the primary reaction of officials to EU policies seems to depend on the schema 
they have developed as a result of their experience with EU policies over the past years. Below I 
have made a rough classification of three types of schema observed during the interviews. 
 
In response to the question: “how the official perceives EU policies?”; quite divergent answers 
were collected. At one end of the continuum, we find departments for which at least 90%47 of the 
work they perform exists out of subjects related to the European Union. Especially the ministry 
of Infrastructure and Environment and the areas of Nutrition, Health Protection and Prevention 
(part of the ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport) and Agriculture (part of the ministry of 
Economic Affairs) are exemplary in that respect. In these areas, officials have ceased to make a 
real distinction between national and European policies and they perceive both of them as equal 
core activities. Besides directives, these areas are also increasingly confronted with European 
regulations, a phenomenon which contributes to the inclination of adapting to the European 
arena. They have developed constructive and proactive schema in reaction to European !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 This number is based on a rough estimation of the respondents, for the most recent calculation of the impact of 
EU law on the Dutch legal system and governmental activities see Bovens & Yesilkagit (2003; 2010). 
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policymaking and frequently their ministers use the EU decision-making channels to proactively 
try to change existing policies. As such, law- and policymakers within these departments are more 
likely to anticipate new Commission proposals early-on and seem to have developed a climate 
that is functional to fast transposition (e.g. proper information channels, early anticipation on 
new policies, active involvement in the stages before the publication of new Commission 
proposals and adapted negotiation and transposition procedures) (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 58-59). 
 
At the other end of the continuum we find organizational units that either perceive EU policies 
as a nuisance, or – although they are not necessarily sceptical about EU policies – they claim to 
be generally ‘nationally oriented’, simply because of the small quantity of directives they process 
on a yearly basis. Especially in the areas of Higher and Professional Education (part of the 
ministry of Education, Culture and Science), Criminal and Penal Law (part of the ministry of 
Security and Justice), Direct Taxation (part of the ministry of Finance) and Immigration Policy 
(part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment) the natural inclination up till now is to 
preserve national sovereignty as much as possible, or there is simply less attention for what 
happens in EU arena (at least within some parts of those areas). As such, according to one of the 
respondents, these areas sometimes resist further integration and spend more energy on 
protecting the status quo instead of focusing on timely transposition. Moreover, neglecting the 
European stage of policymaking by sometimes not even joining Commission consultation 
meetings or informing the external stakeholders about the consequences of EU policies in the 
Netherlands, can cause serious difficulties when the final text of a directive is published. I classify 
these areas as insufficiently adapted to the competencies of the EU, which is driven by 
dysfunctional schemas that make individuals inadvertent of potential consequences. Such 
schemas are not be confused with a rational calculation of interests, but rather as the result of the 
organizational cultures which condone and justify these types of behaviour. 
 
In the middle of the continuum we find the lion’s share of all ministerial departments that are 
moderately positive about European policies. They perceive European policies as useful or 
useless purely contingent upon the subjects and the plans included in the Commission proposals. 
They take a realistic stance by residing in the movement of European integration, however, are 
often reactive and reticent in granting power to the EU institutions. These departments 
frequently have to transpose European directives, but according to several respondents they are 
often: “glad to still have purely national competences”. 
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In short, the degree to which ministerial departments are aware of, and adapted to EU 
policymaking seems to correlate with their past experiences through their history with European 
policies and the number of directives which they had to progress over the course of time. In the 
operationalization below a combination will be sought between the length of history and the 
impact of EU policies on ministerial legislative activities. 
 
7.2 Relational systems 
Examining the effect of relational systems on the administrative phase from a regulative 
perspective, leads to an emphasis on the governance- and power systems during the transposition 
process. A normative angle privileges the regimes and authority systems, while the cultural-
cognitive view is primarily concerned with shared identities that exist within and between 
relational systems. The three structuring elements that are discussed in this section are the 
coordination structures that differ per department, the interplay between the normative 
frameworks of law- and policymakers and the overall degree of “Europeanization” of the parties 
on which ministerial departments are dependent in realizing timely compliance. 
 
Coordination structures ~ As depicted in the previous chapter, except for “dossier teams” at the 
ministry of Infrastructure & Environment, there are no full organizational structures permanently 
in place that coordinate transposition processes. Nonetheless, transposition trajectories often 
require the involvement of various departments within ministries, which potentially brings along 
coordination problems (i.e. information asymmetries, conflicting interests and norms, 
cooperation difficulties, etc.). EU directives are therefore mostly transposed through a 
combination of the use of existing cooperation channels (normally used for national policies), 
and in some cases ad hoc project teams are formed in order to deal with directives that are 
expected to have more profound consequences (in terms of e.g. legal, societal, organization or 
political aspects). Various set-ups can be distinguished within ministerial departments, and 
although stronger coordination structures do not necessarily lead to faster transposition, they do 
offer formalized routines to deal with coordination problems threatening to occur. During the 
interviews much anecdotal evidence was provided for the difficulties that have occurred in the 
past, however, the analysis here is limited to formal structures in place to avoid such problems. 
 
Transposition is often a co-production between a policymaker of a line-department, who 
performs the negotiations, guides the process of making discretionary policy decisions and writes 
the general section of the explanatory note, and a lawmaker of a staff department, who writes the 
 - 88 - 
legal texts and the explanatory notes per article. Although there is often a material difference 
between staff and line departments within organizations (Dalton, 1950; Koolma, 2009), all 
respondents in this study perceived the status of these departments of being “on equal footing”. 
Both parties can therefore function as ‘factual veto point’ that potentially delay or block the 
process when they feel their interests are not represented in the way the directive is transposed 
(Héritier, 2001: 12). In line with that idea, it was frequently voiced by the respondent lawmakers 
that “it really depends on which person you deal with at the policy department” for how 
successful the cooperation is. Administrative efficiency increases when the interests of both 
parties are aligned and they are both prepared to make an effort to meet the deadline. Moreover, 
some respondents explicitly mentioned that “the priorities of policymakers are not always aligned 
with those of the lawmaker” which can potentially result in delays when these parties are unable 
reach a common understanding or departments work at different speeds (Zubek & Staronova, 
2010: 7). In situations where no special coordinating structures are in place, these ‘lower level 
players’ then normally resort to a strategy of escalation (moving up the conflict one level) in order 
to avoid deadlock and delays (Steunenberg, 2006). 
 
Table 6.3 in the previous chapter already roughly classifies the strength of coordination structures 
per ministry, here, however this classification is further specified so it can be used as an indicator 
for the logistic regression below. It only takes into account organizational structures of 
cooperation (as the focus is on relational systems) that are facilitative to the coordination of EU 
transposition processes. Thus, although more formal positions and departments within ministries 
may exist, the classification is based on the parties that are actually involved during the 
transposition processes, according to the respondents. The following rough classification is 
made, however, for a more detailed substantiation of this operationalization see the appendix. 
 
Table 7.1 Coordination structures 
 Coordinating players, departments and mechanisms Classification 
1 Departmental manager Very weak 
2 Departmental manager and coordinator Weak 
3 Departmental manager, coordinator and EU or international (coordinating) 
department 
Normal 
4 Departmental manager, coordinator, EU or international (coordinating) 
department and frequently “project teams” 
Strong 
5 Departmental and “dossier teams” Very strong 
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Divergent logics of policy and law ~ Interwoven in many of the descriptions in the previous chapter 
and also relevant for coordination structures, is the competition of logics between the two main 
counterparts in transposition processes; i.e. policy and law. As described above, the emphasis 
during the negotiation phase tends to be placed on policy related aspects, in terms of determining 
and defending the “national preferences”, questioning subsidiarity and proportionality, often 
driven by a political point of view. Whereas, during the transposition phase, the lawmaker often 
has the upper hand, aiming to secure legislative quality and trying to find a mode of adaptation to 
the existing legal structure that respects the coherence of the law and its historical context 
(Veerman, 2007: 159-160; Steunenberg & Voermans, 2005). Although these logics are not 
necessarily competing, as legal instruments are merely the carriers of policies, tensions can arise 
when the lawmaker is not properly consulted during the negotiation phase. In various instances, 
respondents provided examples of how seemingly little terminological or circumstantial aspects 
of policies can severely affect the feasibility of timely transposition. As described above, during 
different stages of the process, the emphasis shifts from one logic to the other. Eventually, 
however, both parties have to cooperate and come to a final agreement on how the directive is 
exactly translated into legal measures, despite their widely different normative frames of reference 
that are sustained and enforced within their own governance systems (Scott, 2008: 82). 
 
The governance system of the lawmaker is very coherent and sustained in a closed community 
(of about 600 lawmakers) that runs horizontally through all ministries, bounded to a clear set of 
rules, norms and standards. The lawmakers’ “groupness” is reinforced through various 
mechanisms that define the identity and normative framework of their members (Brubaker, 
2002). In the first place it educates its own members in the Academy for Legislation (in Dutch: 
“Academie voor Wetgeving”) in a two year programme; it has a separate knowledge centre and 
website48 which are partly only accessible for community members; they organize a biannual 
“Day of the Legislation” alongside the various regular workshops and activities; they also publish 
an informal magazine only for lawmakers (i.e. “Lex Klets”); and they even have a “lawmakers 
choir” and a “lawmakers cabaret” that perform during some of the more celebratory meetings. 
More in general, through their educational background and community norms the lawmakers are 
inclined to (1) always question the necessity and legitimacy of proposed policies (2) search for the 
correct legal basis of new legislation (3) fit new policies into existing legal structures (4) avoid 
conflict between lower and higher laws, other existing policies and secure equality and legal 
certainty for citizens and companies, (5) and place strong emphasis on correct wording and use !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 i.e. www.kc-wetgeving.nl. 
 - 90 - 
of terminology (Veerman, 2007: 159-160). Several respondents depicted law-making as a special 
craft that requires taking into account numerous legal-political consequences of interventions by 
the government. Moreover, through the Script for Legislation, Instructions for Legislation and various 
other normative prescriptive documents, this governance system is also frequently targeted to 
improve governmental output and reduce administrative and regulatory burdens. As such, these 
aspects often make their work time-consuming. Lawmaker often try to write durable legal texts 
that do not necessarily reflect the turmoil to which these policies need to offer a solution but can 
withstand the ravages of time, and they are very cautious in violating quality requirements solely 
for political purposes.  
 
The governance system of the policymaker on the other hand is much less coherent and even 
very diverse across ministries. Policymakers are often driven by an ideological element that is 
determined by the political regime prescribed by the coalition agreement and more specifically 
the minister within the ministry. Some policymakers have purely technical expertise (e.g. highly 
specialized in the subject for which they create policies such as biologists and spatial planners), 
while others have a broader orientation and background and are more skilled in the procedural 
aspects of policymaking (while they build technical expertise when working on specific dossiers). 
Policymakers are often member of various networks at once, and are much harder to regulate 
along the same mechanisms as lawmakers. Nonetheless, a general set of standards is regularly 
ascribed to the policymakers within the government, this set includes: (1) dedication to the public 
good, (2) expertise, (3) independence and impartiality, (4) democratic awareness, (5) rule of law 
awareness, (6) politico-administrative sensitivity, (7) flexibility, (8) outward orientation, (9) results 
orientation (10) cooperativeness (Karssing, 2008: 17). As can be understood, these rather broadly 
defined values can sometimes be at odds with those of the lawmaker. As such, tensions can arise 
in situations where the interests of the policymaker and the lawmaker cannot be reconciled.  
 
Quantitatively operationalizing how and when such tensions and potential conflict between 
policy- and lawmakers within ministries affects the transposition process, is cumbersome. 
Nonetheless, in some ministries transposition is clearly a co-production, while in other ministries 
one of two parties performs most of the work individually while minimally requesting input from 
legal or policy counterparts. That latter situation can be observed at the ministry of Finance and 
the ministry of Security and Justice where respectively a policymaker with legal knowledge and a 
lawmaker with substantial policy knowledge negotiate and transpose without mandatory 
cooperation with other departments. In the other ministries, policymakers negotiate and 
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lawmakers get involved around the publication date, which makes it a process of cooperation 
(with two ‘factual veto points’). To capture this variation in the logistic regression below –for lack 
of more fine-grained indicators – a simple dummy variable will be employed. 
 
Europeanization across the board ~ The final institutional factor conveyed by relational systems is 
concerned with the environment of the ministry and more specifically the identities of parties and 
stakeholders on which the ministry depends for input and cooperation during transposition (such 
as the parliament, enforcement and executive agencies and the policy field at large). It is the 
process of “Europeanization” and can be defined as “change in core domestic institutions of 
governance and politics, understood as a consequence of the development of European-level 
institutions, identities and policies” (Olsen, 2002: 932-937). In the Dutch context, this relates to 
aspects of identity that are shared in more or lesser degree between parties in the chain of 
transposition. It is a question of whether parties and institutions perceive themselves as being 
part of a European network or whether they are still primarily governed by a national agenda. 
The transference of national powers to the European level is accompanied with emotions of 
“resistance and acceptance” that complicate or ease this process. Where some parties are 
immediately aware that efforts have to be channelled to the EU institutions to have an impact on 
policy (i.e. mostly companies and large organizations), others are still mostly attuned to the 
domestic channels (often parliaments).  
 
A major difficulty for ministerial departments that are in a process of transferring national 
competences to the EU level, is the resistance that is offered by the environment. According to 
one of the respondents, in the area of the Pharmaceuticals Act, ever larger pieces are being 
regulated on a European level, which frequently leads to widespread discussions among 
enforcement agencies and the ministry about which agency will be vested with which new 
responsibilities and competences. Moreover, when these substantial legislative proposals reach 
the parliament, innumerable (often seemingly irrelevant) questions are posed and peculiar 
amendments are proposed. For example, one parliamentarian opted to include a review clause49 
in a transposition law that aimed to create a legal basis for future delegation (i.e. in anticipation 
on future directives). The review clause obligates the minister to evaluate the consequences of the 
law in practice after a period of five years. It would be more effective, however, if such efforts 
would be directed at the EU level where future policies are designed. Moreover, in some 
situations parliamentary questions and resistance to delegation are also instrumental to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Parliamentary Papers II 2012/13, 33208 no. 8. 
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expression of discontent over the course of matters. Such as the Socialist Party which repeatedly 
uses plenary sessions to express their resistance to the privatization of public utilities. During one 
of the interviews a respondent aptly remarked that the transference of competences: “is like a 
grieving process, first you deny it, and then you need to accept it”. And the ministry and 
businesses are often first to do so, while parliaments and citizens lag behind.  
 
In order to capture this quite broad category of delaying factors that emanate from difficulties 
that accompany the process of Europeanization, I will use a measure that reflects the intensity of 
harmonisation in the policy area. More specifically, every directive in the dataset is linked to an 
EU directorate-general (DG) that created the directive. For each DG in the dataset the total 
number of directives it has produced since the 1960s is inserted in order to approximate the 
degree to which a certain policy field is “Europeanized”. It is hypothesized that directives 
published by DG’s that have produced already many directives, are more likely to come from 
more harmonized policy areas than directives from DG’s that are have been less active.  
 
7.3 Routines & artifacts 
The previous chapter already described the administrative procedures of transposition processes 
per ministry in detail; moreover, various aspects of the negotiation procedure were also taken 
into account. The most important artifacts such as the Instructions for legislation and the 
Implementation plan have already been discussed in detail above, therefore the content of these 
documents will not be reiterated. Furthermore, although various “route planners” and “guides” 
(artifacts) for the EU policy process are available across the ministries, these were never explicitly 
mentioned by the respondents as guiding documents during transposition processes. They merely 
offer an introduction for those unfamiliar with the EU policy arena, but never really enter into 
specifics about departmental trajectories.  
 
Apart from these EU policy information booklets, most ministries maintain ministerial 
“protocols” such as the “HAP” (“Handbook Administrative Procedures”) within the ministry of 
Security and Justice. These protocols offer very detailed guidelines on various administrative 
procedures (e.g. how to fill in specific forms, which elements should be included when writing a 
memorandum, etc.). In none of the interviews these handbooks were mentioned as important 
guidelines for transposition. Therefore this section will only briefly address some of the links 
between the planning and monitoring routines and the artifacts that reinforce these processes 
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before turning to the logistic regression to quantitatively subjugate the six institutional factors 
identified above to the test.  
 
Planning & process monitoring ~ As described in the previous chapter, the planning process in most 
departments is predominantly controlled by the lawmaker or the legal department. Since the EU 
directive is translated in specific national legal measures, these trajectories predominantly accord 
along the accepted time-paths that are prescribed for different types of legal instruments. The 
facilitative artifact that is employed during this stage of the process is the departmental “legal 
progress system”. Which is a planning and monitoring system that allows lawmakers to produce a 
rough planning, while taking into account both the internal phase (within the department) of the 
process, as well as the Council of State consultation and the parliamentary phase. The most 
widely used planning and monitoring system (and also the most recently introduced) is “Kiwi50”, 
while only the ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport51 uses “Delphi” and the ministry of 
Education, Culture and Science uses “Pro Ares”. 
 
These planning and monitoring systems offer fairly basic tools to produce a time-schedule for the 
transposition phase, that both serves as a guideline for the transposing officials as well as a 
management tool in order to scrutinize legislative processes as a manager or minister. Peculiarly, 
however, these systems are not directly connected to the i-Timer early warning system, moreover 
these systems are fully flexible in determining internal deadlines. As such, it frequently occurs that 
according to the i-Timer the ministerial department is delayed because it has not finished the first 
step of the process in time (i.e. agreement in the council of ministers over the draft-measure), 
while according to the departmental planning system, the process proceeds according to 
schedule. Moreover, since these systems are only accessible for lawmakers and not for involved 
policymakers, they are bound to reinforce lawmakers’ already leading position during the 
transposition phase. 
 
In order to secure timelines, the departmental managers and in lesser degree the ministers within 
a department frequently oversee the process, but a powerful incentive to speed up transposition 
processes comes from the i-Timer quarterly bulletins and more importantly the “Appreciation 
letter” that accompanies the bulletin when it is sent to the parliament. This letter specifies the 
exact reasons for delays per directive to inform the parliament and apart from purely informing, 
it also functions as a method of ‘naming and shaming”.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 In Dutch the abbreviation stands for: “Ketenvolgsysteem en Wetgevingsvoortgang” 
51 Although this ministry is currently in  transition to start using Kiwi as well.  
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7.4 Binary logistic regression with key institutional variables  
The analysis so far qualitatively identified and analysed a collection of institutional factors that 
speed up and slow down the process of EU transposition within national departments. At the 
end of each description, already a rough operationalization per factor was provided, but for a 
more detailed description of the relation between these factors and the chosen indicators, see the 
appendix. This section takes the first six of those factors and tests whether they are indeed 
potential factors of delay, by using a dataset that was already introduced in the beginning of 
chapter six. This dataset originally contained all 382 directives that have a realized 
implementation date between 1 July 2008 and 1 July 2013 and are thus transposed over the last 
five years. A large share of these directives required “no further implementation” (either because 
existing legislation already covered the proposed policies, or the policies were implemented by 
means of a dynamic reference) or was implemented with the use of other measures than statutes, 
governmental decrees and/or ministerial orders. Therefore 190 cases were omitted from the 
dataset. The current dataset includes 192 cases that were transposed with a least one statute, 
governmental decree or ministerial order. All these observations match the conceptualization of 
the process as depicted in chapter two and contain a dichotomous dependent variable (coded “0” 
for transposed in time, and “1” for transposed late). Before turning to the binary logistic 
regression, however, we will first briefly look at some descriptive statistics to get a better 
impression of the sample and briefly describe the control variables that will be included in the 
model. 
 
7.4.1 Descriptive statistics52 
The 192 observations include directives containing policies from a diverse collection of policy 
fields. As table 7.3 displays, when we link these directives to the EU Directorates-General that 
have produced them, we see that a majority derives from DG MOVE, DG SANCO and DG 
MARKT. Table 7.4 shows that these directives, which are primarily targeted at mobility and 
transport, health and consumers and the internal market and services, are respectively mostly 
channelled to the ministries of I&M, EZ and VWS and the ministry of Finance. When taking into 
account the performance per department as depicted above in table 6.3, it seems that especially 
the internal market directives clustered at (presumably the non-fiscal side of the) the ministry of 
Finance are a source of compliance problems. Another interesting observation is that the 
distribution of directives coming from specific EU DG’s is rather dispersed over the national 
ministries. There does not seem to be an organizational adaptation of the ministerial departments !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 In chapter six various descriptive statistics at the directive and ministerial level are already discussed, therefore 
these will not be reiterated in this section. 
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to the channels of EU policy production (cf. DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a), which makes it difficult 
to translate the sectoral differences in terms of performance directly to the ministerial 
departments (e.g. Haverland et al., 2011). Therefore, various EU level variables are taken into 
account to control for the potential differences within cases that make them unique, already at 
the starting line of national transposition. 
 
Table 7.3 Performance of EU policy sectors in the dataset  
EU Directorate-General Implemented in time Implemented late Total 
 N % N %  
Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) 2 100 0 0 2 
Climate Action (CLIM) 2 33.3 4 66.7 6 
Communication Networks, Content and Technology (CNCT) 0 0 4 100 4 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL) 4 66.7 2 33.3 6 
Energy (ENER) 2 22.2 7 77.8 9 
Enterprise and Industry (ENTR) 9 36 16 64 25 
Environment (ENVI) 5 37.5 11 62.5 16 
Home Affairs (HOME) 1 25 3 75 4 
Justice (JUST) 2 40 3 60 5 
Internal Market and Services (MARK) 6 20 24 80 30 
Mobility and Transport (MOVE) 18 48.6 19 51.4 37 
Health and Consumers (SNCO) 24 70.6 10 29.4 34 
Taxation and Customs Union (TAXU) 7 50 7 50 14 
Total 82 42.7 110 57.3 192 
 
Table 7.4 Distribution directives EU policy sectors and Dutch ministries 
EU DG BZ BZK EZ FIN I&M OCW SZW V&J VWS Total 
AGRI         2 2 
CLIM   1  5     6 
CNCT   3   1    4 
EMPL     1  5   6 
ENER   7  2     9 
ENTR 1  6  12  2 2 2 25 
ENVI     15    1 16 
HOME  3      1  4 
JUST     1  1 3  5 
MARK   4 19  1  6  30 
MOVE     35   2  37 
SNCO   14 1    1 18 34 
TAXU    14      14 
Total 1 3 35 34 71 2 8 15 23 192 
 
 
7.4.2 Control variables 
In addition to the predictor variables presented above, the model controls for a number of 
variables on the EU level that might affect the national course of EU transposition processes. 
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First, in order to control for the ‘political complexity’ of the proposed policy, the number of 
recitals per directive is taken into account (Kaeding, 2006: 236). These explicit provisions are 
meant to provide direction in the process of transposition (but also to safeguard member state 
specific interests); however, these recitals can be so specific that they could potentially complicate 
efficient transposition and even cause delays. In addition to the number of recitals, the number of 
articles and appendices per directive are also recorded as measures of complexity.  
 
Another aspect of directives that will be taken into account is the EU decision-making procedure 
that preceded the publication of the directive. More specifically it is recorded whether the 
Council, European Parliament in co-decision with the Council or the Commission enacted the 
directive. Since the former two bodies are primarily concerned with politically relevant and 
substantial issues and the latter – through delegated acts – primarily enacts technical and 
politically less salient directives, these factors have to be controlled for in the model 
(Mastenbroek, 2003: 375-376; Haverland et al., 2011: 275-276). It is argued that Commission 
directives often propose relatively small technical changes, while Council and co-decisions 
directives deal with larger and more substantial issues, therefore the latter category of directives is 
expected to be more prone to delays. A fifth control variable on the EU level is the time 
provided for implementation by the Commission. That is, the time between the publication of 
the directive and the final deadline that is set by the Commission to realize formal compliance. 
Since logistic regression does not differentiate between directives that had relatively short 
implementation terms and those that span over a number of years, this variable is included in 
order to control for this variation. 
 
A sixth control variable on the domestic level is the total number of national instruments that is 
produced in order to transpose the directive in the national legal context. While most studies 
simply add the total of instruments used (Mastenbroek, 2003: 381; Kaeding, 2006: 238; 
Steunenberg & Kaeding, 2009: 440), irrespective of whether these are statutes, governmental 
decrees or ministerial orders, this study makes a differentiation between these instruments. 
Instead of merely adding the number of statutes, governmental decrees and ministerial orders, 
the instruments are weighted according to the average amount of time that is “normally” required 
for these instruments with a ratio of (4:2:1). For a more detailed description of the 
operationalization of all control and predictor variables, see the appendix. 
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Table 7.5 reports the mean, median, minimum and maximum score for five predictor variables 
and five control variables. Clearly the data of the predictor and control variables are all based on 
very different scales, therefore the model below will be presented using the original scaling as 
well as a model using standardized data, so that the relative effect size of different variables 
becomes clear through the use of standard deviations. The categorical variables are also included 
in this table, for these variables only the count per category is displayed to get an impression of 
the distribution of scores within these variables. Moreover, at the bottom, both the total number 
of national instruments used to implement per directive, as well as the weighted total number of 
national instruments are included. As said, the latter will be included in the model since I argue 
that it better reflects the characteristics and the time needed to produce such instruments. 
 
Table 7.5 Descriptive statistics variables in the model 
Variable name  
(Predictors) 
N Mean Median Min Max Std. deviation 
Legislative style 192 0.52 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.24 
Capacity & priority 192 8.51 6.15 2.65 25.08 5.16 
Experience & adaptation 192 14.98 15.22 0.76 21.24 5.18 
Coordination structure 192 3.49 4.00 1.00 5.00 1.37 
+ Divergent logics (Dispersed)!† 143 -  - - - 
+ Divergent logics (Unified) 49 -  - - - 
Europeanization 192 12.96 9.49 0.86 30.03 9.87 
Control (EU)       
No. of recitals (directive) 192 23.93 19.00 2 118 19.49 
No. of articles (directive) 192 17.02 8.50 3 119 18.56 
No. of appendices (directive) 192 2.03 1.00 0 21 3.13 
+ Commission (0) 56 -  - - - 
+ Council decision (1) 27 -  - - - 
+ Council and EP decision (1) 109 -  - - - 
Time to deadline (in days) 192 620 567.00 17 2507 419 
Control (national)       
Number of national legal instr. 
(weighted) 
192 4.58 4.00 1 85 6.71 
Number of national legal instr. 
(not included in the analysis) 
192 2.19 1.00 1 48 3.73 †!For categorical variables solely the sum of each category is displayed. 
 
The predictor variables are all normally distributed and show no extreme levels of skewness, 
although they are all in various degrees platycurtic (i.e. < 3 kurtosis). The control variables on the 
other hand are all positively skewed and leptokurtic, which seems, however, to be a consequence 
of the sample size. The sample size can, however, not be enlarged with the use of similar i-Timer 
data because the i-Timer started in November 2007 and many observations were entered 
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retrospectively in the database. During that process, a number of false entries on the number and 
kind of instruments used for specific directives were entered53, rendering the quality of these data 
uncertain. Hence the data as displayed here are included in the model. 
 
7.4.3 Results 
Table 7.6 below displays the results of the binary logistic regression including the six institutional 
factors identified through the qualitative analysis above (i.e. symbolic and relational systems). The 
first column contains the variable names, horizontally divided in a group of predictor variables, 
EU level control variables and a domestic control variable. The second column displays the 
expected direction of the relationship. Note that some signs are somewhat counterintuitive, but 
they show the hypothesized impact of the variable on the odds that a directive is transposed 
“late”. The third column includes the coefficients (with asterisks for significance) and between 
brackets the standard errors. Since coefficients in logistic regression are harder to interpret than 
in normal OLS regression, the odds ratios are also included in the fourth column. It should 
furthermore be clear that if the estimated odds ratio is greater than one, this indicates that as the 
value of the variables increases, the odds of the directive being transposed late also increase. 
Conversely a value smaller than one indicates a decrease in the odds of a directive being 
transposed late. Column six and seven basically display the same model, however, using 
standardized data that simplify the interpretation and the comparison of the effect sizes. Lastly, at 
the bottom of the table, a number of measures that indicate the “goodness of model fit” have 
been included. 
 
First of all we can conclude that the overall model is a significant improvement to the baseline 
model, which includes no predictors. With a chi-square of 51.776 and 13 degrees of freedom it is 
significant at p<.001. Secondly, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test is non-significant which means 
that the data fit the model well. When we look at predictor variables; it can be concluded that 
Legislative style shows to have a significant effect on the odds of a directive being transposed 
late. A one standard deviation change in the legislative style of a ministry increases the odds of 
the directive being transposed late by a multiplicative factor of 24.54. Remember that legislative 
style was based on a ratio between directives being transposed by at least one statute and all 
directives. Which means that higher ratios imply that departments more often use higher 
instruments for transposition, which apparently positively affects the odds of delayed 
transposition. Just as significant (p=.05) but with a smaller effect size, the model indicates that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 The chosen cut-off point 31-07-2008 was decided in consultation with a senior legal advisor at the ministry of 
Security and Justice, who has been involved with i-Timer since the beginning. 
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ministries with a larger share of the national budget over the past five years are more likely to 
transpose directives late. More specifically, in contrast to other research that argues that 
administrative capacity increases the odds of timely transposition (e.g. Hille & Knill, 2006), these 
results show that larger (financial) capacity leads to increased odds of delayed transposition. As 
explained in the qualitative analysis above, ministries with more national political priorities (i.e. 
larger share of the budget) are more likely to prioritize other work over EU transposition, which 
leads to the result that implementing officials more often start the process of transposition late.  
 
Although the third variable – Experience & adaptation – shows a significant relationship (at 
p<.10), the direction of the relationship does not match the expectation. That is, based on the 
2003 data of Bovens & Yesilkagit (2005), this variable aims to measures the degree to which a 
ministry has been exposed to EU legislation. In the qualitative analysis above it was argued that 
departments that have more experience with EU legislation are more likely to have developed 
functional schema and a favourable climate within their departments to transpose EU directives 
in a timely fashion. The current data, however, indicate that a one standard deviation change in 
the experienced of a ministry increases the odds of the directive being transposed late by a 
multiplicative factor of 2.54. There are, however, two shortcomings to the indicator used for this 
variable. In the first place the data only take into account all valid legislation produced before 31 
July 2003, which means that the last ten years in which many areas have developed rapidly, were 
not taken into account. Secondly, no differentiation is made between the kinds of instruments 
that were used for transposing the directives. As such, although 11% of ministries’ legislation 
may have a EU background, it differs whether this 11% exists out of laws or ministerial orders in 
respect to the degree of Europeanization.  
 
The Coordination structure of a department does not seem to have a significant effect on the 
odds of timely transposition. This may easily be a consequence of the way coordination 
structures function. That is, the indicator used for measuring this variable takes into account the 
formal structures, while in practice the strength of coordination within ministries might strongly 
depend on the directive that is being transposed and the parties that are involved. Therefore, the 
mere existence of formal structures might not reflect the actual strength of coordination during 
EU transposition processes. On the other hand, the hypothesized effect of Divergent logics 
between policy and law does seem to have the expected effect on timely transposition. More 
specifically, these results show that in ministries where the negotiation and transposition are 
conducted and performed by two different persons, the odds of delayed transposition increase.  
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Table 7.6 Logit model including institutional factors: symbolic and relational systems 
 
Note: N= 192, Model x2= 51.776, df=13| p=.30 (Hosmer & Lemeshow); Cox & Schnell R2=.236; 
Nagelkerke R2=.317. † Categorical variables were included to fit this model, raw data was not standardized however; 
*p <.90 **p <.95 ***p <.99. 
 
  Unstandardized Standardized† 
 Exp. Sign B (S.E.) Exp(B) B (S.E.) Exp(B) 
Pred i c tor  var iab le s       
Legislative style + 13.08** 478730.39 3.20** 24.54 
  (5.79)  (1.42)  
Capacity & priority + 0.19** 1.21 0.99** 2.68 
  (0.10)  (0.50)  
Experience & adaptation - 0.18* 1.20 0.93* 2.54 
  (0.10)  (0.51)  
Coordination structure - -0.14 0.87 -0.19 0.83 
  (0.19)  (0.26)  
+ Divergent logics  + 4.85* 127.16 - - 
  (2.48)  -  
Europeanization - 0.01 1.01 0.14 1.16 
  (0.02)  (0.24)  
      
Contro l  var iab le s  (EU)      
No. of recitals (directive) + 0.007 1.01 0.14 1.15 
  (0.016)  (0.31)  
No. of articles (directive) + 0.005 1.01 0.09 1.09 
  (0.015)  (0.28)  
No. of appendices (directive) + -0.08 0.92 -0.26 0.77 
  (0.07)  (0.21)  
+ Council decision + 0.51 1.66 - - 
  (0.65)  -  
+ Council and EP decision + 1.66*** 5.25 - - 
  (0.50)  -  
Time to deadline - -0.001 1.00 -0.30 0.74 
  (0.000)  (0.19)  
      
Contro l  var iab le s  (nat iona l )       
Number of legal instruments (weighted) + 0.11 0.14 0.74 2.10 
  (0.07)  (0.50)  
Constant  -15.12**  -4.17**  
  (6.46)  (1.87)  
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As such, this relationship corroborates the idea of ‘factual veto points’ and the potential for 
delays as a result of an increase in the size of this variable (Héritier, 2001: 12). The final 
institutional factor – Europeanization – does not have a significant effect on timely transposition. 
Which could potentially be a result of the measurement used for approximating this widely 
defined factor. Moreover, as we saw above in the section of descriptive statistics, DG’s seem to 
produce directives in a diversity of different (national) fields of policy. As such, more fine-grained 
indicators would be required to fully capture the aspects that accompany Europeanization. 
 
When we look at the control variables, only the EU decision-making procedure is highly 
significant. Which indicates that directives produced by the Council and the European parliament 
are more than five times more likely to be delayed than directives produced by the European 
Commission. Which corresponds to some of the examples that respondents provided during the 
interviews, when they argued that the European Parliament often makes far-reaching 
amendments that frequently complicate timely transposition (e.g. shortening the implementation 
term). 
 
7.5  Conclusions 
This chapter has shown, that through a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods 
of analysis, it is possible to identify a number of institutional factors that are conducive and 
detrimental to timely transposition of EU directives. It thereby provides both an accurate 
description of the mechanisms through which these factors exert influence on the organization 
process, as well as their impact at large when combining them in a quantitative model. The 
theoretical guidance was provided by institutional theory that directs the attention to the 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive mechanisms that affect organizational processes. As 
such, it shows that organizations and organizational processes are not primarily structured and 
driven by efficiency and rationality, but are strongly affected by the cultural/institutional factors that 
primarily provide legitimacy to the re-enactment of institutionalized practices, instead of offering 
measurable output and resources.  
 
As the analysis shows, departments that develop a progressive legislative style by “tailoring” the 
national laws in which EU directives are frequently transposed, are more likely to transpose 
directives in a timely manner. By creating and using legal bases for delegation, they manage to 
mitigate some of the regulative forces that are exerted through the principle of the ‘primacy of 
the legislature’, and thereby speed up transposition processes. Secondly, ministries that spend a 
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larger share of the national budget are more likely to transpose EU directives late. The primary 
explanation for this relationship was found in the normative obligations that bind law- and 
policymakers in their daily work. Since capacity within ministries is generally limited, strict 
prioritization of some affairs over other is required. Ministers and the Cabinet in general, place 
strong emphasis on realizing policies that have been agreed upon in the coalition agreement, and 
as historical examples show (e.g. program minister for Youth and Family; Housing, Communities 
and Integration) these priorities are often translated in budgetary reallocations. Therefore it is 
quite plausible that ministries that spend a larger share of the national budget are also more 
frequently confronted with a dilemma between prioritizing national affairs or EU transposition. 
Such ministerial conditions increase the odds of delayed transposition, as more often the will be 
given to national affairs that are in line with the agreements made in the coalition agreement. 
 
Contrary to the hypothesized relation resulting from the comparative analysis, the quantitative 
analysis shows that an increase in the historical experience of ministries with EU law also 
increases the odds of delayed transposition. More specifically, the results show that when a larger 
share of the ministries’ legislation has a European origin, the odds of delayed transposition 
increase. Given shortcomings in the data, however, the validity of this relationship is 
questionable. That is, since the indicator doesn’t include EU legislation produced in the past ten 
years, and the share of instruments based on EU law is simply a sum of instruments that does not 
take into account the hierarchy of legal instruments. As such, in order to measure the 
development of functional schema and typifications as a result of historical experience, we should 
develop more fine-grained indicators. Fourthly, although the qualitative analysis indicated 
variation in the strength of coordination structures, no direct relation to the odds of delayed 
transposition could be observed. As chapter six already shows, although there are several formal 
coordination structures in place, the impact of coordination structures is different in each 
transposition trajectory.   
 
Fifthly, in many interviews a contrast between the normative frames of references held by the 
policy- and lawmakers was observed. As both of these groups are very different and their 
separate status is maintained by authority systems with different norms and customs, a process 
that requires intense cooperation is potentially fraught with problems of “clashing logics”. As a 
proxy, the ministries where transposition is a co-production (that includes a mutual dependency 
relationship) were coded with a dummy variable. Although this indicator leaves a lot to be 
desired, the results show that when negotiation and transposition are performed by one and the 
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same person, the odds of timely transposition increase. It thus seems advantageous that a single 
persons leads the whole process of both negotiation in Brussels, as well as the transposition in 
the domestic context. 
 
Lastly, although many respondents referred to their environment (parliament, enforcement 
agencies, businesses, etc.) as a frustrating factor in efficient transposition, the quantitative analysis 
did not confirm a strong relationship between the degree of Europeanization in a policy field and 
the odds of timely transposition. As an indicator of Europeanization, I have calculated the share 
of all EU directives that have been produced by the different EU DG’s, after which the directives 
in the dataset were linked to these DG’s and their share indicates the degree to which this field of 
EU policies has harmonized over the years. It was hypothesized that more harmonized areas (i.e. 
in which more directives have been published) would probably result in a domestic environment 
that is more attuned to the EU policy arena and will therefore less likely frustrate the national 
process of transposition. This chain of arguments could, however, not be quantitatively 
confirmed, if only because DG’s produce directive that are channelled to many national policy 
areas (i.e. see table 7.4). 
 
The final section below places these diverse findings in the larger context of compliance studies. 
This thesis includes a large amount of information and especially this last chapter narrows the 
study down into in a very compressed verification of a number of factors, which does not 
necessarily reflect the nature of all observations that were made along the way. Therefore, the 
wider implications of the study will be discussed a bit more thoroughly below.  
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Discussion and conclusions 
 
With this thesis I aimed to study the organizational characteristics and institutional factors that 
shape the administrative preparation phase of the transposition of EU directives in the 
Netherlands. By focusing on the bureaucracy, administrative practices and the cultural aspects at 
work during the administrative phase of EU transposition, I have revisited some of the findings 
that trace back to the foundations of the current field of compliance studies (e.g. Siedentopf & 
Ziller, 1988). The primary goals that were determined at the beginning of this thesis were; first to 
shed a light on these organizational and institutional characteristics for the sake of conceptual 
refinement, and an exploration of possible “other factors” that have hitherto been underexposed; 
and secondly, to identify which administrative characteristics contribute to the success and failure 
of timely, correct and complete transposition. In line with these goals, I have searched for a 
middle ground between very specific explanations and broad generalizations such as frequently 
made in large-n study. This thesis aims to answer the following main research question: How do 
organizational structures and institutional factors affect the administrative preparation phase of EU transposition 
within ministerial departments? 
 
Similar to the first-wave compliance studies, I have drawn eclectically from different fields of 
study by using an elaborate institutional-organizational analytic framework in order to address 
this question (Mastenbroek, 2005; Scott, 2008). During a period of twelve weeks I have held 
many interviews and conversations with implementing officials within the Dutch ministries, 
through which I have attempted to uncover the structuring elements that shape the 
organizational processes. After qualitatively identifying a number of institutional factors, some of 
these factors were operationalized and subjugated to a quantitative verification using binary 
logistic regression (on national transposition data containing directives that were transposed in 
the past five years derived from the i-Timer database). By effectively combining the methods of 
structured, focused comparison and binary logistic regression, I came up with a number of 
conclusions that address various aspects of the main research question. 
 
In the first place, different from what it is sometimes assumed, the intra-ministerial differences 
are sometimes greater than the differences between ministries. Ministries can frequently be 
subdivided into several components that have different styles of transposition and deal with 
different kinds of policies in widely divergent legal and political contexts. Especially with the 
reorganizations that have been made during the past governmental terms, single policy fields can 
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almost never be classified neatly in one of the ministries only. As such, assigning characteristics to 
ministries as a whole can potentially be problematic, therefore it would perhaps be more accurate 
to focus on inter-sectoral differences (e.g. Haverland et al., 2011) or we could try to identify even 
lower levels of analysis (e.g. the organizational unit). An additional advantage of focusing on 
organizational units would be that – if such data would be available – the data on such a level 
would probably be more suitable for performing multi-level analysis than hitherto been the case 
with data on the national and ministerial level (Mastenbroek, 2005: 1113). This has always been a 
problem, given the inherently limited number of member states of the EU. 
 
Secondly, as a result of the comparison between ministries, and more specifically ministerial 
departments, it was observed that when ministries have to process a larger number of directives, 
their routines seem to formalize. The ministry of Infrastructure & Environment is exemplary in 
that respect, as a results of the large number directives this ministry transposes (that also have 
various inter-administrative and inter-departmental aspects) it has developed formalized “dossier 
teams” that subsist over time. While other ministries occasionally make use of ad hoc structures 
and project teams, this is the only ministry that actually formally adapted to the EU context. 
Especially when we take into account the dispersion of EU directives coming from one EU 
Directorate-General over different national ministries, it is somewhat remarkable that not more 
of those kinds of structures have been formed.  
 
Thirdly, when assessing the departmental routines it became clear that the degree, to which the 
policymaker is interested in and attuned to the European policy making arena, is of crucial 
importance for successful transposition. As the policymaker is often primarily responsible for the 
negotiations, but also deliberations with the field, external stakeholders and contacts with other 
member states; they are the ministerial linking pin when it comes to EU affairs (especially in 
ministries that do not have an EU coordinating department). In general, transposition becomes 
more difficult when proposed amendments are further removed from existing policy structures 
and member states’ preferences (cf. “misfit”). Therefore activities of the policy department to 
secure national interests are crucial. 
 
Fourthly, when it comes to preparedness and anticipation, especially ministries that show a 
progressive legislative style, manage to increase the odds of timely transposition. In contrast to 
the conservative nature of some instructions included in the Instruction for legislation, departments 
that succeed in “tailoring” the legal structure by creating sufficient legal bases to transpose 
directives on a “lower level” are less frequently delayed. As we saw in the analysis, it is often a 
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conscious decision to instigate delegation as a result of ministerial efforts, which is an actor-based 
explanation that links the individual action to the structuring context. 
 
A fifth conclusion that is drawn, runs somewhat counter to most of the “administrative capacity” 
explanations that are normally provided in the literature (see also Toshkov, 2011; Hille & Knill, 
2006). While often the direct connection is made between a lack of administrative capacity and 
the increased probability of delays, this study identifies an interfering variable and finds that 
limited capacity primarily leads to a strict prioritization of affairs, which in turn can potentially lead 
to delays. It was observed that departments, as a result of normative political considerations, that 
spend a larger share of the governmental budget, are also more prone to prioritize purely national 
tasks over EU transposition. Conversely, this would mean that less administrative (financial) 
capacity would enable the ministry to prioritize EU transposition. Moreover, this study indicates 
that we should refine the idea of capacity as simply the sum of resources (i.e. personnel) available 
within a member state or ministry. That is, because (implementing) lawmakers specialize in 
certain areas of the legal system, they are not simply interchangeable and suitable to work on 
every subject. As such, more refined indicators that also take into account the degree of legal 
expertise should gain more prominence. 
 
Another normative structuring element during the ministerial phase of transposition is the 
diversity of authority systems within ministries. As law- and policymakers are the two most 
prominent “groups” involved in the process of negotiation and transposition, the quality of their 
relationship as a result of their divergent normative logics seems to negatively affect the odds of 
timely transposition. As lawmakers are part of a very coherent and somewhat closed community, 
their stringent normative frame of reference is sometimes hard to grasp as a policymaker. Vice 
versa, early involvement of the lawmaker (during the negotiations) is only effective to a limited 
extent, when policymakers take the upper hand. However, since the negotiation and transposition 
phase are inextricably connected, these counterparts depend on each other for successful 
compliance. The model presented above shows that in ministries where the same person who 
transposes the directive performs the negotiations, the odds of timely transposition are higher. 
Which attests to the idea of ‘factual veto points’ (Héritier, 2001: 12), since no formal agreement 
has to be reached between two parties, potential conflicts are avoided and time is saved. 
 
Overall it can be concluded that the administrative phase of transposition merits more attention 
when it comes to explain transposition in EU delays. As ministries are the primary instigators and 
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drivers of domestic transposition, the factors identified above have direct consequences for 
national transposition performance.  
 
One of the shortcomings of the approach that has been taken in this thesis, however, is that the 
strong focus on the micro processes within ministerial departments somewhat underexposes the 
domestic political aspects of transposition (cf. Falkner et al., 2007: 404). Moreover, by primarily 
interviewing implementing officials, the process has been observed on the most elementary level. 
In future research it would be interesting, however, to also take the perspective and experiences 
of higher placed managers into account. Finally, because this study includes all Dutch transposing 
ministries, departs from quite a wide theoretical approach and the timespan was somewhat 
limited, the observations could therefore not always be explored to the fullest extent.  
 
Nonetheless, by providing a very accurate and (by respondents) verified description of 
departmental procedures of EU transposition, I have tried to make a unique contribution to the 
field. Moreover, through these descriptions and the application of various aspects of institutional 
theory a number of influential institutional elements were identified that could provide an 
impetus for a more thorough discussion on the conceptual refinement of “administrative 
explanations” to delays in national transposition.  
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Appendix 1. Semi-structured interview ministerial departments 
 
Onderzoek interne fase: Werkwijzen, normen, regels en gebruiken bij de 
implementatie van Europese richtlijnen 
 
Gegevens respondent  
Naam en functiebeschrijving:  
Ministerie: 
Eenheid: 
Datum gesprek:  
 
0.    Algemene introductie in het onderwerp en introductie respondenten 
 
1. Organisatiekenmerken / afdelingskenmerken 
o Hoeveel richtlijnen moet uw eenheid gemiddeld omzetten per jaar? 
o Uit hoeveel medewerkers bestaat uw eenheid/sector? 
o Hoeveel van deze medewerkers houden zich met het omzetten van richtlijnen? 
! Is de omzetting van richtlijnen geconcentreerd bij 1 of een paar personen of hebben de 
meeste medewerkers er weleens te maken? 
! Is er voldoende capaciteit beschikbaar voor het vervullen van deze taak?  
! Doorvragen capaciteitsverdeling (waarop gebaseerd en door wie?) 
o Kunt u wat meer vertellen over de achtergrond van deze medewerkers?  
! Dossierinhoudelijke kennis, allround, procedureel  
! Wetgevingskennis – beleidskennis (specialisatie in het onderwerp) 
! Zijn er naast de wetgevingsjuristen van de centrale juridische afdeling binnen het 
departement, wetgevingsjuristen werkzaam binnen de beleidsdirectie? 
! Hebben beleidsmedewerkers binnen dit ministerie wetgevingskennis en/of hebben 
wetgevingsjuristen binnen dit departement juist beleidskennis?  
o Zijn er binnen het ministerie nog meer eenheden belast met het implementeren van Europese 
regelgeving?  
! Zou u hier een overzicht van kunnen geven? 
o Reorganisaties of organisatieveranderingen in recent verleden? 
! Bv. V&W en VROM zijn opgegaan in I&M – is er sprake van een andere organisatie / 
samenstelling? 
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2. Regels, protocollen en werkwijzen  
o In Aanwijzing 340 v/d Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving (Ar) wordt gesproken over het 
belang van het vroegtijdig inschakelen van de centrale wetgevingsafdeling (v/h betrokken 
ministerie). –  
! Hoe gaat men er binnen dit ministerie mee om?: zijn er al wetgevingsjuristen betrokken 
tijdens voorbereidingsfase en/of onderhandelingsfase in Brussel?  
! In welke gevallen?, Op basis van welke afweging?, Wie neemt dit besluit? 
o Afstemming tussen voorbereidingen en onderhandelingen in Brussel en de uiteindelijke 
implementatie in Nederland 
! Is er een overdracht van het dossier of de informatie die is verzameld tijdens de 
voorbereidingen en onderhandelingen? 
! Zijn de onderhandelaars ook betrokken bij de implementatie van de betreffende 
richtlijn? 
! Wat is de inhoud van de afstemming – welke problemen worden vermeden door goede 
afstemming? 
o Hoe verloopt de toedeling van richtlijnen binnen het departement?  
! Zijn alle dg’s gelijkmatig belast met implementatiewetgeving of zijn er slechts een 
enkele dg’s die te maken hebben met Europese regelgeving? 
o Wordt er in de bredere zin een nadrukkelijke keuze gemaakt over “de aanpak” bij het 
omzetten van een richtlijn? (mbt, wie gaat wat doen en wanneer) 
! Zo ja, door wie? 
! En op welk moment? 
! Zijn er meerdere werkwijzen te onderscheiden (dus bijvoorbeeld bij richtlijnen die 
weinig inspanning behoeven een decentrale aanpak en bij politiek gevoelige 
richtlijnen....) – of aan de hand van het instrument?? (selectiecriteria) 
o Hanteert het DG naast de Aanwijzingen voor de Regelgeving en de Handleiding Wetgeving 
en Europa nog (formele) richtsnoeren bij het implementeren van Europese richtlijnen?  
! hoe wordt gebruik gemaakt van deze middelen tijdens het “proces”? 
o Wanneer er een nieuwe richtlijn is, is het volgens aanwijzing 343 (Ar) gebruikelijk om binnen 
twee maanden een implementatieplan te hebben ingediend bij de ICER-I. Toch bestaan er 
verschillen in hoe men omgaat met deze verplichting.  
! Kunt u uitleggen hoe binnen dit DG het proces eruitziet dat leidt tot de indiening van 
het implementatieplan? (Wie neemt de verantwoordelijkheid? / Wanneer wordt ermee 
gestart?) 
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o Wanneer wordt feitelijk begonnen met het uitwerken van een voorstel? 
! Waar blijkt dit uit? 
o Wordt deze aanpak vastgelegd in een planning?  
! (begin uitwerken voorstel, toedeling ambtenaar a.d.h.v.?, wie neemt dit besluit) 
o Voortgangsbewaking 
! Is er  sprake van voortgangsbewaking bij implementatieprocessen? 
! Hoe ziet deze voortgangsbewaking eruit?  
! Zijn er bijzondere overlegstructuren die voorkomen bij implementatietaken? 
! Worden de i-Timer kwartaalberichten hierbij als overzichtsmiddel gebruikt? 
! Worden er andere instrumenten ingezet t.b.v. voortgangsbewaking en tijdige 
implementatie? 
 
3. Normen, verhoudingen en relaties  
o Als een belangrijke verklaring voor vertragingen en te late implementatie van EU richtlijnen 
wordt vaak aangehaald dat het om complexe materie gaat. 
! Wanneer wordt er binnen het DG gesproken van een complexe richtlijn? (e.g. 
nalevingslasten) 
! Hoe anticipeert men hierop? 
o Behoort de implementatie van Europese regelgeving tot de (officiële) Politieke prioriteiten 
binnen dit ministerie? 
! Waar blijkt dit uit? 
! (ja of nee) Hoe heeft dit invloed op implementatieprocessen? 
o In de strijd tegen implementatieachterstanden een aantal jaar geleden, is de zogenaamde 
“voorrangsregel” ingesteld die ervoor zou moeten zorgen dat implementatieregelgeving in 
beginsel voorrang krijgt boven wet- en regelgeving van nationale afkomst 
! Hoe wordt binnen dit ministerie omgegaan met de voorrangsregel? 
o Zou u wat meer kunnen vertellen over de relatie van de beleidsafdelingen/directies en de 
centrale wetgevingsafdeling – binnen sommige ministeries heeft de centrale 
wetgevingsafdeling een belangrijke en invloedrijke rol bijvoorbeeld door de grote hoeveelheid 
formele wetgeving of een concentratie van juridische kennis.. 
! Hoe speelt dat binnen dit ministerie / deze eenheid? 
! Kunt u een voorbeeld geven dat typerend is voor deze verstandhouding? 
o Als een belangrijke verklaring voor vertragingen en te late implementatie van EU richtlijnen 
wordt vaak gewezen op de moeilijkheden die ontstaan bij Interdepartementale samenwerking  
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! wat zijn de ervaringen van deze eenheid hiermee? 
! Heeft u een verklaring voor het succes of falen van goede samenwerking? 
o Zou u de relatie van het DG met actoren uit het beleidsveld kunnen beschrijven? 
! Symbiotische relatie of top-down, etc. 
o Sommige richtlijnen laten beleidsruimte – 
! Kunt u beschrijven welke stappen genomen worden om tot de “gewenste” invulling 
van deze beleidsruimte te komen? 
o Is vertraging te verklaren vanuit de werklast (hoeveelheid richtlijnen e.a. taken) – hoe wordt 
hier mee omgegaan? (Denk ook aan capp parlement) 
 
4. (Informele) gebruiken en gewoontes  
o Hoe zou u de onderlinge samenwerking (tussen de medewerkers) bij de implementatie van 
Europese regelgeving willen beschrijven? 
! Dat wordt in teamverband opgepakt of is juist een individualistische handeling? (Kunt 
u een voorbeeld geven waaruit dat blijkt?) 
! (e.g. Men is openhartig over waar men mee bezig is in de sector overleggen of het 
wordt niet echt onderling besproken) 
! (e.g. Men vraagt gemakkelijk om hulp bij alle medewerkers) 
o Hoe kijkt men aan tegen Europees beleid? (middel om nationale doelen te verwezenlijken – 
of juist in de weg met nationale doelen?) 
! is het een essentieel onderdeel van de werkzaamheden? 
! wordt het als moeilijk of juist als prettig werk ervaren? 
! Waar blijkt dat uit? 
o Zijn er ongeschreven regels waar men tijdens het implementatieproces op moet letten? 
(bijvoorbeeld in de samenwerking met andere departementen dat men wacht met het naar 
buiten brengen van informatie naar een ander departement, wanneer daar een 
overeenstemming over is bereikt binnen het departement) 
o Zijn er kenmerken die  typisch zijn voor dit beleidsveld?  
! Zijn er bijvoorbeeld bepaalde organisatie waarmee men (vaak) contact heeft bij de 
implementatie van EU richtlijnen 
 
5. Resultaten en feedback 
o Feedbackloop – als richtlijnen te laat zijn of incompleet of geen actie –  
! Wat voor impact heeft dat op de eenheid of de DG? 
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! hoe reflecteert dat op de persoon of personen die verantwoordelijk zijn? 
! Wat zijn de consequenties? 
o Resultaten – bepaalde feedbackmechanismen 
! Zijn er mechanismen of instrumenten die binnen het DG worden gehanteerd om het 
proces te evalueren? 
! En te verbeteren? 
! Bepaalde leermomenten, vaste momenten waarop teruggeblikt wordt? 
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Appendix 2. Operationalization of variables binary logistic model  
 
A. Dependent variable 
• The technique used for analysing the dataset is logistic regression that requires the use of a 
dichotomous dependent variable scored “0” if transposed before the transposition deadline 
and “1” if the directive is transposed late.  
 
B. Independent variables 
• Legislative Style: To test whether legislative style positively affects the probability of timely 
compliance this variable is operationalized as the ratio between directives that are 
implemented using at least one law/statute divided by the total number of directives in the 
dataset (that were implemented with the use of at least one law, governmental decree or 
ministerial order). The variable is calculated with the data from the dataset used for the 
analysis. Legislative style is a ministerial characteristics and it is hypothesized that ministries 
with a small ratio increase the odds of fast transposition. Given that ministries develop a 
legislative tradition in which new directives arrive and handled differs per ministry, it is 
expected to be an influential variable. 
 
• Prioritization: According to the line of reasoning as set out in the analysis, there is a general 
scarcity of available capacity. Most compliance studies use this as a factor to explain non-
compliance by for example using measures such as the World Bank governance indicators 
(Berglund et al., 2006; Hille and Knill, 2006; Thomson, 2007; Toshkov, 2008; Steunenberg 
and Toshkov, 2009) or GDP per capita (Börzel et al., 2010; Hille and Knill, 2006; Knill and 
Tosun, 2009). However, most respondents during the interviews held for this study argue 
that the limited amount of capacity does not directly lead to delays, but it leads to a strict 
Ministry A. No. of directives transposed 
including at least one statute 
B. Total no. of directives 
transposed  
Legis la t iv e  Sty l e   
Ratio = (A/B) 
BZ  0 1 0.00 
BZK 2 3 0.67 
EZ 14 35 0.40 
FIN 29 34 0.85 
I&M 33 71 0.46 
OCW 2 2 1.00 
SZW 3 8 0.38 
V&J 14 15 0.93 
VWS 3 23 0.13 
Total 100 192  
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prioritization of affairs and brings along the normative obligation to use the capacity as 
effectively as possible. In concrete situations it is therefore quite likely that coalition 
agreement policies receive priority over pure EU transposition tasks (since government 
effectiveness is judged by the implementation of measures proposed in the coalition 
agreement). Therefore, in order to approximate the likeliness that an implementing lawmaker 
is confronted by a trade-off between purely national policies and EU policies, this variable is 
operationalized as the ministerial share of the national budget. That is, policy areas in which most 
expenditures were made, are expected to deal with issues that receive most priority. The 
percentage is calculated as the share of the ministry over the last five years. 
 
Ministry 200854 
(x €1000) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
(average) 
Prioritization  
(% total) 
BZ  12.787.900 11.136.139 10.983.464 11.014.566 10.774.139 11.339.242 8.06 
BZK 6.126.192 6.012.021 6.055.523 5.275.596 5.028.293 5.699.525 4.05 
EZ (EZ) 2.141.163 2.805.863 2.809.896 5.943.642 4.853.753 †!3.719.404 
2.65 
EZ (LNV) 2.655.653 2.549.581 2.637.090 - -  
FIN 42.400.343 14.044.881 12.160.484 9.709.103 11.362.786 17.935.519 12.75 
I&M 
(V&W) 
7.332.778 9.074.642 9.441.404 11.209.002 10.503.658 ††!8.641.440! 
6.15 
I&M 
(VROM)* 
5.648.084 6.548.768 4.943.404 - -  
OCW 34.732.759 36.285.506 37.172.706 33.964.261 34.169.160 35.264.878 25.08 
SZW 21.888.884 26.900.617 29.136.612 30.766.600 31.897.995 28.118.142 20.00 
V&J 5.825.626 6.239.605 6.098.906 11.438.507 11.467.322 8.213.933 5.84 
VWS** 20.303.827 21.677.200 28.477.714 19.145.152 18.813.779 21.683.534 15.42 
Total      140.615.617 100  
* A separate budget for the program minister of Housing, Communities and Integration (“Wonen, Wijken en 
Integratie”) was included in the budget of VROM until 2010 
** A separate budget for the program minister of Youth and Family (“Jeugd en Gezin”) was included in the budget 
of VWS until 2010 † Over 2008-2010, the annual totals for both EZ & LNV are added and divided by two. The three resultant amounts 
are added to the amounts of 2011 and 2012 and the total amount is divided by five (i.e. the no. of years). †† Over 2008-2010, the annual totals for both V&W & VROM are added separately and divided by two. The three 
resultant amounts are added to the amounts of 2011 and 2012 and the total amount is divided by five (i.e. the no. of 
years). 
 
• Experience and adaptation: In the analysis above I described the cultural-cognitive schema 
that are developed as a result of past experiences through (extensive) history with European 
policies and the number of directives that have to be transposed on an annual basis. Since we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Source: Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31924 no. 1; Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32360 no. 1; Parliamentary 
Papers II 2010/11, 32710 no. 1; Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 32240 no. 1; Parliamentary Papers II 2012/13, 33605 no. 
1 
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need to capture the intensity of these past experiences with EU policies, which assumingly led 
to the development of functional schema, we need to develop a measure that takes a longer 
period of time into account. The most recent attempt to estimate the influence of European 
policies on the national ministries has been done by Bovens & Yesilkagit (2003; 2010), who 
attempted to quantify the impact of the EU per ministry over the period 1960-2003. They 
compiled a dataset that includes all valid measures on 31 July 2003 in which they were able to 
make a distinction between purely national measures and measures specifically created in 
order to transpose EU directives. As a proxy measure of the experience and adaptation to the EU 
policy arena, this variable is thus operationalized as the share of valid measures that resulted 
out of the obligation to transpose a European directive per ministry. 
 
Ministry EU % N=100% EU based legal measures EU share in % EU exper i ence   
BZ  0.76 262 2 0.76 0.76 
BZK 1.92 1092 21 1.92 1.92 
EZ    (1) EZ 19.85 650 129 19.85 
21.24† 
         (2) LNV 21.90 1370 300 21.90 
FIN 12.45 795 99 12.45 12.45 
I&M   (1) V&W 13.39 1486 199 13.39 
15.22†† 
           (2) VROM 18.33 873 160 18.33 
OCW 1.08 1390 15 1.08 1.08 
SZW 7.90 987 78 7.90 7.90 
V&J 6.59 1290 85 6.59 6.59 
VWS 20.55 1275 262 20.55 20.55 
Source: Bovens & Yesilkagit (2003: 526); this table aggregates and displays the number of national legal instruments 
(statutes, governmental decrees and ministerial orders) employed to transpose EU directives that are valid on 31 July 
2003 as a share of all legal instruments created by the ministry that were valid on 31 July 2003.   
† Calculation: ((129+300)/(650+1370)) x 100% 
†† Calculation: ((199+160)/(1486+873)) x 100% 
 
• Coordination structure: it is hypothesized that a stronger coordination structure increases 
the probability of timely transposition (Zubek & Staronova; 2010). In order to test this 
proposition coordination structures within the Dutch ministries are operationalized along a 
five-point scale. The scale starts at the most (1) elementary form of coordination that is 
performed through the direct supervision of the departmental manager. This person oversees 
the work of the members of his organizational unit and if problems threaten to occur with 
other departmental units, he or she takes it up with his or her equivalent at the other unit, to 
coordinate the process. The coordination structure is somewhat stronger (but still weak) 
when legal departments have (2) coordinating lawmakers (or an equivalent of such type of 
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persons) who oversees several (transposition) processes in a given area at the same time. 
These individuals provide procedural support, but sometimes also help in solving 
coordination problems between departments. The coordination structure becomes stronger 
when (3) apart from the departmental manager and a coordinator; there also is a coordinating 
department for International and/or EU affairs that guides the process. These departments 
smoothen the transition from negotiation to transposition and often distribute information 
within the organization. Departments that frequently transpose European directives tend to 
fall into (4) repeated forms of cooperation between various organizational members in the 
structure of a “project team”. The routines of these teams are not as structured and well-
defined as those of “dossier teams”, but through the appointment of a chairman and 
secretary, these structures provide quite some coordination. The strongest coordination 
structure can only be found at the ministry of Infrastructure and Environment where 
“dossier teams” guide the process. As said these formalized structures are specifically formed 
for the transposition of EU directives in given areas and they subsist over time. They have 
strong and formalized routines, moreover, clear agreements are made beforehand in order to 
secure successful cooperation. 
 
 
• Divergent logics between policy and law: As described in the analysis above, the 
divergent logics of policy- and lawmakers may potentially cause delays during the 
transposition process. Either as a result of insufficient involvement of the lawmaker during 
the negotiation phase, or a conflict of opinion in terms of the specifics during the 
transposition process. It is expected that the probability of such conflicts arising is much 
greater in ministries where there is dependency relationship between the law- and 
Ministry Elements of Administrative Coordination Qualification Coordination Structure 
(code) 
BZ  Dept. manager Very weak 1 
BZK Dept. manager Very weak 1 
EZ Dept. manager, coordinating lawmaker Weak 2 
FIN Dept. manager, EU affairs dept., Senior Legal 
Advisor, frequently used “project teams” (+ 
Budget cycle) 
Strong 4 
I&M Dept. manager, “Dossier teams” Very strong 5 
OCW Dept. manager, Advisory lawmaker, EU weekly 
meetings 
Normal 3 
SZW Dept. manager, EU Dept., Coordinator Normal 3 
V&J Sector manager, coordinating lawmaker  Weak 2 
VWS Dept. manager, International Affairs Weak 2 
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policymaker. That is, where the policymaker primarily negotiates, he depends on his law-
making counterpart for legal expertise, while during the transposition phase the tables turn 
and the lawmaker requires information from the policymaker to accurately translate the EU 
directive into national legal measures. As such, these ministries are expected to be more 
prone to delays (with two ‘factual veto points’). In contrast, in the ministries of Finance and 
Security and Justice, the same person negotiates and transposes the directive. In the latter 
situation, there is no dependency relationship and potential dispersion of interests, hence 
such a unified approach is expectedly less susceptible to delays. 
 
 
• Europeanization across the board: This broadly defined variable addresses the difficulties 
that accompany the process of Europeanization. As illustrated in the analysis, while 
successive treaty changes might have granted increasing authority to the EU institutions over 
specific policy areas, domestic parties and institutions in the chain of transposition may still 
be lagging behind. Difficulties may for example arise in terms of enforcement arrangements, 
legislative practices and public support for European measures. In order to operationalize 
this variable, it is assumed that the degree of resistance and misunderstanding decreases with 
an increase in the number of directives that is published in a specific policy area. In order to 
approximate this number the table below displays the number of “active” or “valid” 
directives per European Union Directorate-General (DG) on 9 July 2013. These data were 
acquired from the Dutch ministry of Security and Justice that provided an export file of all 
directives that were applicable to the Netherlands (sorted by DG) further specified in 
directives still active, withdrawn, etc. The variable that is extracted from these data is the 
percentage of all active directives that was produced by the EU DG. More specifically it is 
hypothesized that directives that come from DG’s that have relatively produced more 
Ministry Division of tasks Qualification Divergent logics 
(Dummy) 
BZ  Policymaker negotiates, lawmaker & policymaker implement Dispersed 0 
BZK Policymaker negotiates, lawmaker & policymaker implement Dispersed 0 
EZ Policymaker negotiates, lawmaker & policymaker implement Dispersed 0 
FIN Policy- and lawmaker negotiates, implements (policy & law) Unified 1 
I&M Policymaker negotiates, lawmaker & policymaker implement Dispersed 0 
OCW Policymaker negotiates, lawmaker & policymaker implement Dispersed 0 
SZW Policymaker negotiates, lawmaker & policymaker implement Dispersed 0 
V&J Lawmaker negotiates, implements (policy & law) Unified 1 
VWS Policymaker negotiates, lawmaker & policymaker implement Dispersed 0 
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directives over the last five decades, will find less resistance given that past European policies 
that have already been ordained in that field.  !
European directorate general (DGs) Abbreviation 
Total no. of 
directives 
% Active 
Europeanization 
%  
Agriculture and Rural Development  AGRI 46 1.31 19 1.36 
Climate Action  CLIMA 12 0.34 12 0.86 
Communication Networks, Content and Technology CNECT 29 0.82 14 1.00 
Competition COMP 19 0.54 2 0.14 
Education and Culture EAC 1 0.03 1 0.07 
Economic and Financial Affairs ECFIN 8 0.23 1 0.07 
Enlargement ELAR 1 0.03 0 0.00 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion EMPL 90 2.56 48 3.42 
Energy ENER 74 2.10 32 2.28 
Enterprise and Industry ENTR 624 17.74 304 21.68 
Environment ENV 307 8.73 186 13.27 
Home Affairs HOME 26 0.74 26 1.85 
Justice JUST 51 1.45 33 2.35 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries MARE 2 0.06 0 0.00 
Internal Market and Services MARKT 316 8.98 133 9.49 
Mobility and Transport MOVE 249 7.08 118 8.42 
Secretariat-General SG 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Health and Consumers SANCO 1429 40.63 421 30.03 
Eurostat ESTAT 34 0.97 5 0.36 
Taxation and Customs Union TAXUD 195 5.54 45 3.21 
Trade TRAD 4 0.11 2 0.14 
      
 Total 3517 100 1402 100 !
 
C. Control variables 
In addition to the predictor variables, the analysis controls for a number of variables on the EU 
directive level as well as one variable on the domestic level that might affect a duly course of 
transposition. 
 
EU control variables 
a. Number of recitals of the directive – In order to control for the ‘political complexity’ of 
the directive (which expectedly extends duration of the transposition process), the number of 
recitals per directive is taken into account (Kaeding, 2006: 236). These explicit provisions are 
meant to provide direction in the process of implementation (also to safeguard specific 
national interests); however, they can be so specific that they could potentially obstruct 
efficient implementation. 
b. Number of articles of the directive – A second measure of complexity is number of 
articles per directive. 
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c. Number of appendices of the directive – A third measure of complexity is number of 
articles per directive. 
d. The EU institutions involved in creating the directive – Another factor that may affect 
the duration of transposition is the EU decision-making procedure that has preceded the 
publication of the directive. It is a frequently observed phenomenon that directives ordained 
by the Council and/or the Council and the European Parliament together generally concern 
more substantial policy decisions (Haverland et al., 2011: 275-276). Commission directives on 
the other hand deal with delegated issues and are hence less substantial, more often 
concerning technical issues. As such a categorical variables is included in which the baseline is 
will be directives published by the Commission, followed by Council directives and a third 
category being Council and EP directives. Commission. It is expected that the former are 
least prone to delays while the latter will increase the probability of delays. 
e. Time provided for the implementation – the final control variable on the EU level is the 
time provided by the EU to transpose the directive on the national level (Mastenbroek, 2003: 
381). Since, the dependent variable is dichotomous it does not directly distinguish between 
directives that propose more substantial amendments and directives that solely require minor 
changes to existing national policies. Although the measures of complexity above already 
intend to cover some of that variation, this variable is included to control for extremely short 
and long implementation terms. 
 
National control variables 
f. Number of instruments used for transposition – For every directive the number of 
instruments used for implementation is added. But rather than simply adding these 
instruments, they are weighed according to the normal or accepted terms that stand for these 
processes. On average it is accepted that statutes take 24 months, governmental decrees take 
12 months, while ministerial order on average should no take longer than 6 months 
(Rijksoverheid, 2012: 11-13). As such the legal instruments are weighted in ratio of 4:2:1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
